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America, the elected chief executive
faces pressures, ansing from

officeholder must play, that can potentially
push in different directions.

simultaneously be both a political figure

members of the
satisfactory

polity,

who responds

to

is

must

and makes demands of other

and an administrative chief who sees

manner The executive challenge

He

roles the

that the

law

is

executed

in

a

to reconcile these possibly competing

pressures successfully toward the end of providing
leadership Leadership,

in this thesis, is

the maintenance of a successful electoral coalition
based on a stable, coherent program of

governance, which

Because

is

implemented once the candidate

politicians

is in

office

and thinkers have conceived of politics and administration

differently at different times,

American

politics has

produced three broad conceptions of

the executive; the constitutional executive, the partisan administrator,
and the popular

manager. Each conception of the executive also
culture that an officeholder

at

is

both the national and state

able to emphasize.

levels.

is

a reflection of a broader political

Each of these conceptions has appeared

This thesis examines the executive challenge using as

a case study the development
of the Massachusetts
govemorshtp from colonial and

Revoluttonary times through the
present day.

of Michael Dukakis as an

The

in

position taken here

that the

is

a political activity; and

governors

who were

effective at exercising leadership

other constitutional institutions;

law

is

sought to lead a discussion including

most

then focuses on the
political expenences

depth examination of
each conception of the
executive

providing leadership were those

who

It

when

when

who were most

successful at

attentive to competing
political cultures and
all

when

members of the community. Executives
the officeholder

are

remembers the legitimacy of

the chief executive remembers
that carrying out the

the president or the governor
presents a vision while

also allowing sufficient opportunity
for discussion within and about
that vision
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INTRODUCTION

the executive
CHALLENGE: LEADERSHIP.
POWER AND POLITICS
The American
sets

elected executive,
national, state or
local, faces several
competing

of pressures, each of
which may not push
the officeholder

time, various

.Amencan

political thinkers

direction

of the elected executive
This

argue that conceptualizing
the executive differently

m

same

have sought to
reconcile these pressures

different ways, resulting
in different
conceptions

executive’s ease or difficulty

in the

will

have an

effect

Over

in

thesis will

on the chief

reconciling those pressures
and exercising effective

leadership

The Founders,

the Jacksonians and
the Progressives each
conceived the nature of

the executive differently
These different conceptions
of the executive office affected
the
ability

of the officeholder to reconcile
competing pressures The
executive moved ffom

being a Constitutional leader
and chief executive to being
a partisan leader and
administrator and ultimately became
a popular leader and
manager

These conceptions of the executive
have existed not only

at the national level, but

also at the state level. This study
will involve an elaboration
of the various conceptions of

the elected executive and their
effects on attempts to cariy
out the executive office

Massachusetts politics generally, especially
Michael Dukakis’s terms as Governor,
used as a case study The purpose of this
project

Dukakis as Governor ot Massachusetts, the
as a popular leader and

manager

inherited

still

is

will

be

to challenge, through examination of

predominant conception of the executive

from the Progressive

Progressive conception ot the office be modified to

facilitate

tradition

more

How can

that

effective leadership‘s

Challpno ^

The executive challenge
.

,

that

of reconciling
rernnriiio..

competing pressures,

arises

of the roles of the American
executive: the political
rnl<- and ti.
p meal role
the executive
role that this project
will discuss

execuuve

.3

ts

one

to deal with

conns the
must act

part

is

that

of pol.tical leader

The

first

In th,s role, the
elected

of a poht.cal system, one
ntentber of a group of
officials whosejoh

pubhe concerns. The elected
execut.ve shares w.th

,t

‘

responsibility to respond to
public issues in

,n

role.

from two

some

the legrslature and the

fashion

The

elected execut.ve

concert w,th these institutions,
often checking the actions
of (or having his

actions checked by) others
Partisanship, persuasion and
compromise can be put to use, as
politics

must be performed

along with everyone else
this role, the elected

agenda to the

m

if

any action

is

to receive

broad consensus The executive,

the system, has an agenda
he would like to see instituted
In

executive

is

one member of a

political

polity’s satisfaction, given the
opportunities

The second

role

of the elected executive

that will

system and must pursue an

and constraints of that system.

be discussed here involves the

execution ot the laws The public executive
must carry out assigned business, largely as
dictated by the legislature.

effectively the

law

is

He must

pay attention both to

carried out and to

cariy-ing out their duties.

how

The executive can

how

efficiently

and

how

the administrators of the law behave in

carry out the public business either with (the

spoils system) or without (the merit system)
followers

of his

administrative offices, but ultimately the chief executive

execution of the law.^

2

is

own

party in lower

responsible for the proper

Ye, .here

is

often a tension
between what

roles Acttng poht.cally

.ay

it

takes to carry out
these respective

not be conrpattb.e wtth
carry,
ng out the law

-nay veto a proposed law.
only to have the veto
overridden

He

An

execut.ve

could then drag

h,s fee, in

-nplententtng the law by tmpound.ng
firnds, promoting
his agenda, though
no, fhifilhng

duty

A

pantsan appo.ntmen, to a lower
adm.nistrative office may

of the law

.f

the appointee, though loyal,

rousing speech

much

in

support of a program and

public support

execution Thus,

is

when

the

program

political action

incompetent

m

falters

front

Finally,

result in

h.s

poor execution

an executive

may

give a

of an enthusiastic public, only
to lose

because of poor conception
and/or

and execution of the law may
well be incompatible

Despite the potential incongruity
of these roles, an elected executive
cannot ignore
either one, as

executive

fitifilling

who

only the executive or the political
role

not sufficient by

is

executive, while a

member of a

law This aspect of the office

found and incompetent

is

if

is

political system, does, after

ignored

programs

at the risk

all,

polity,’ Also, the

have a duty to execute the

of being labeled corrupt

if

abuses are

falter/

the challenge that faces the American elected
executive: the reconciliation

of pressures stemming from two roles

that

may be

incompatible, yet neither of which can

be ignored. The executive does not face an either/or proposition,
the officeholder
suffer if either the political or the administrative role

is

a matter of balance or integration.

political leader

The

ignores the political role of the office
runs the nsk of being labeled arrogant

and becoming unpopular and/or uninfluential
with other members of the

This

itself

is

will

given distinct preference. Rather,

Each public executive must

integrate the roles of

and chief executive. Through speech and action the elected executive

it

creates what the officeholder
hopes ntentbers of the polity
will cons.der an effective
pubhc

An

executive

effective

pubhc executive

substantive leadership, a term that

is

will

be defined as one

necessarily complementary, pressures
that

may work

roles that are not

imJ a competent

entailed In performing the tasks
jointly and effectively-

of these

definitions

How are

roles affect

an elected executive’s

How

against one another, integrated
or

resolved- If the executive must be a
strong political figure
is

can provide

defined below The question
then becomes:

does the public executive go about
the business of the office-

executive, what

who

ability to integrate

chief

How

do

them successfully

and thus be judged an effective leader^
Leadership

The

central question ot this study, then,

is

how

the elected executive can

successfully meet the executive challenge toward
the end of providing effective

leadership

'

Leadership here

is

not limited to specific, detailed policy leadership

'

The

expectation that the elected executive will provide that form
of leadership has certainly
arisen in the twentieth century and will not be ignored
Neither

mean

is

leadership taken here to

only charismatic public or rhetorical leadership. The executive has been
conceived as

a public leader since the partisan period. Lately, however, parties have lost

much of their

effectiveness as mediating institutions between the elected executive and the public and

that office

now

is

directly representative

embodiment of the “public

will,”

is

of the public good 7 The

role

of public leadership,

expected of the elected executive, and

this,

too, will

not be ignored. The definition of leadership used here will not be solely administrative

leadership, either.^ Again, the expectation that the executive will be an administrative

4

leader exists and should be
taken into account, but

is

not the executive’s sole
leadership

role

For the purposes of this study,
leadersh.p
elections based

on a

stable,

is

taken to

mean an

coherent program of governance,
which

ability to

is

win

then implemented

This definition of leadership
takes into account other,
more narrow leadership roles the

executive

may

play While this

leadership roles,

it

is

may

entail

each

or

of,

some combination

of,

the above

not limited to any one of them
Policy leadership, rhetorical or

charismatic leadership and administrative
leadership must be considered
parts of the
ultimate purpose of winning elections
and implementing an agenda But,
like Roosevelt

19j2 or Reagan
governance.

A

mandate and a

in

1980, those elections should be

won

based on an agenda of

victory based solely on negative
attributes of opponents
potentially

weak

in

coalition. Further, a record

makes

of achievement

for a slight

after

an

initial

election can provide a candidate with a basis
for future campaigns

More

broadly,

two main forms of political

taken into consideration

in

emerge, both of which must be

an effective definition of leadership.

and bargaining while the other
conception of leadership that

maneuvering and notes

tactics

is

this

more

One

is

coalition building

ideological, grandly partisan-type leadership.^

The

study utilizes ultimately employs both forms of political

that both are necessary for the exercise

of a successful tenure as

chief executive. Strong, positive electoral coalitions, and results once the candidate has

attained office, ultimately indicate the presence of effective leadership. Leadership,

implementation of a program

office, requires

that, ideally,

was

the basis of the executive’s election to

both of these more narrow forms of political action.'®

5

Power and

Politir^

Leadership
system.

By

in this thesis involves

power and must be exercised within

virtue of possessing the veto
power, and other

more

positive but less decisive

“weapons,” the elected executive may
exercise a cenain power
Power
thought of in positive terms:

A

person possesses power

Especially recently, an elected executive

through the

legislature.

make budgetary and

By

virtue

legislative

positive power. That positive

is

if

a political

is

generally

he can accomplish something "

seen as powerfiil

of possessing the power

if

he can “push his program-

to carry out the law, and to

recommendations, the elected executive does
possess some

power

is

largely hampered, however, as
the executive

presumably must wait for laws to be passed before
they can be executed. Furthermore,

though the executive may make recommendations,
there
legislature will act

on them This

is

no guarantee

is

that the

not to dismiss positive power completely. The

executive must possess the authority to execute the law

in

order to be of any use. Also,

being able to originate legislation certainly provides the
executive with the
agenda. Executive power

based

in the veto.

is

substantially not

of the positive

Presidents and Governors have the

the

power

to say,

“No

” Ultimately,

even the positive

however. Rather,

variety,

power they do

are allowed to thwart the plans of the legislature. Executive

power

legislative

ability to set

is

an

it is

largely because they

a negative power,

power

the President

possesses rests on his power to veto acts of the legislature, or the possibility that he may.’"

To speak of executive “power”

is

to speak largely of negative power, of the

prevent others from accomplishing what they wish to accomplish.

6

power

to

Possession of the veto not only
confers power on the elected
executive,
locates the office wtthin a
polit.cal system.

it

also

The executtve must somettmes
acquiesce

laws are to be passed Thus, the
possession and exercise of
power

in

if

the American system

ultimately involves the activity
of politics Politics entails
attempts to exercise persuasion

over elected

officials in the direction

ultimate end of politics

politics, the

is

of affecting the means and
ends of government

the public good, protection
of peoples' rights

In

The

performing

executive must be persuaded, and
must persuade other members of the

polity

Politics has shifted not only

its

nature but

the 1830s, politics took place within
and

among

its

location in

Amencan

civic

life.

Until

Constitutional institutions." Without

popularly-based political parties, legislators,
executives and judges sought to promulgate
policy with each institution representing a
different facet of the polity The legislature

represented the consent of the citizens while the
executive and the judiciary spoke

in

language of rights and jointly checked the legislature to
insure protection of those

rights.

In order to

accomplish public business, policies had to

Constitutional institutions.

Not only

satisfy the

the

members of all

the consent of the people, but the rights of the people

had to be taken into account as well

By

the 1830s, politics shifted

electoral arena

its

location from Constitutional institutions into the

The development of mass-based

organizations and conventions of party

life.”^

political parties centered politics in the

Politics

no longer

Constitutional institutions checking one another. Rather,

other Party loyalty became paramount. Maintaining

7

it

principally entailed

became one

at least

party checking the

an appearance of harmony

within the party

no longer the

was necessary

result

of interplay amon« various

became synonymous with the
for the public

welfare

good and

Once

only one’s

party

good

that the other

a party had

own

to establish respect
and

won

an

party, but also

win voters The public
good was

political institutions

Now the public good

Electorally, each party
claimed to be

pany was merely

a faction, inimical to the
people’s

office, fulfilling public

demands

enough members of the other
party

entatled satisfying not

to pass legislation

Thus, institutionally, moral issues, or
issues of rights, were often
ignored
intra-

and inter-party harmony. Where
certain

political institutions

in

between

The weakening

parties rather than discussion

ot political parties’ hold

onset of the Progressive era

in

politics shifted to the personal

on

the interests of

had spoken the

language of rights previously, the parties
did not partake of that language.
the art of compromise

among

Politics

political institutions.

.Ajuerican political

life

began with the

bond between voters and the
in

check,

it

individual candidate.'" Rather

now became

the candidates’

job and the people’s task directly to keep other candidates
and officeholders

was no longer

good. Nor was

it

good came

the executive

in

check.

Constitutional institutions attempting to interact for the public

parties

compromising for the public good Rather,

candidates debating one another, while compromise became more
public

became

the late nineteenth century. Ultimately,
the location of

than institutions or parties keeping one another

Politics

working

it

became

individual

difficult to attain.

The

to be an abstraction rather than the result of political processes. Finally,

came

to be the direct

embodiment of the

him and the people.^"

8

public good, with nothing between

Each of these notions of politics
F
that this study will outline.

and perfo™

politics

The

nlavc intr,
^
plays
into one of
the conceptions of the
executive

ultimate question

toward the end of becoming
an

office that the executive challenge
encapsulates

politics,

office

however Executing
also,

It is

however, deeply

Working within

do not correspond

political in the

is

a system of separated

It

The

it

perfectly to

power and

virtue of the

can be used to persuade

by the

political beliefs

of the

powers and checks and balances

also,

power

roles of the

power designated by

sense that

certainly affected

for public purposes certainly emails
politics

the executive can
exercise

effective leader

the law certainly involves

others as to the virtue of a law and

executive

how

is

to act

however, involves acts of power

that

could not be exercised by anyone except the
individual holding office Thus, the
executive
challenge

is

represented in the roles of the office more
broadly than

between power and

politics or strength

it

is in

the struggle

and weakness By investigating that challenge,
one

can begin to address the concerns of executive
leadership
Historical Reactions to the Executive Challenge

Several methods of dealing with the executive challenge
have emerged over the

course of history.

One way,

historically the

image of the executive predominated,
Constitution until the ISjOs.

political

system of Constitutional

institutions.

that

Under

The executive can

members of the

the executive

is

first, is

the Constitutional executive This

at the national level,

this

from the framing of the

conception, the elected executive

institutions that

exercise

power

in a

negatively, through the veto, necessitating

in acting as a
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engaged

check him as he checks other

legislature take into account the executive’s wishes.

accompanied by the courts

is

At the same

negative check on the

time,

legislature

if policies

“

Separation-of-powers and
checks-and-balances make

are to be instituted

“ A

policy has to be
acceptable to

government, and thus many
different
the executive

institutions.

is

He

to exercise

interests, to

power through

both restrains and

is

politics a vital activity

all

three branches of

become and remain

law. In this system.

the veto, within a
constitutional system of

restrained

by other members of the
constitutional

system.

Yet, government with an
extraordinarily

awful

sight, as individuals

attested

Under

carry out the

gap “

It

that system, orders

commands of the

As

executive can too easily

become an

experienced the Articles of
Confederation could have

would be

legislature

Here, an executive exists with

existed

once

who

weak

The

issued, laws promulgated,
with

“energetic executive”

power enough

to carry ou, the

a coequal branch of government,
the executive

is

fills

this

no one to

enormous

law where none had

to insure the law’s execution

has been approved by the legislature,
the executive, and possibly the
courts

executive, then, regards himself as

among

equals

in

An

the government, the chief of the

executive branch, with a duty to respect both
the legislature and the courts while

executing the law

.Ajiother

way

that the executive challenge has been

approached

is

through the

partisan administrator. During the nineteenth century,
the locus of politics

Constitutional institutions into the electoral arena where

political parties

the polity

who

marked the

Perceived elitism led to a

felt their

first

call for

it

came

moved from

to be organized

a broader political base by

by

members of

needs were not being met.^^ The election of Andrew Jackson

major success of the popularly-based
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political parties that

were the great

development of nineteenth century
American

Amencan
would run

politics, panicularly

politics

they were installed in their
positions

this

were ex

In contrast to

i

beholden to patronage interests as
well

executive to an administrator
other important party

By

members

formally chief executive, a loyal

in

this definition, the elected

He changed from

member of a

partisan

team Where

worked with other members of the

administer the law. Parties

came between

out of the law Loyal party

members expected

the executive’s party.

was, while

his role as

still

executive

was

political parties,

first

guided

party to develop and

the President or the Governor and the carrying

to receive rewards for their services

rewards most readily available to the elected executive

These jobs would be given

He

his role as administrator

equals in a political party. Public opinion, as
mediated by

the chief administrator as he

an

executive played a role with

formulating and implementing policy

had been coequal to other branches of
government,

office

the guiding force in

development, the elected executive
became not only a creature of the

political panics, but

among

became

regarding the electoral

for office and candidates
generally

With

Parties

to those individuals

at

The

the time were appointments to

who

had demonstrated loyalty to

Especially at the state and local levels, party machines developed

and thrived by winning executive offices and distributing patronage benefits

to party

.embers

The execunve's

.o>es had

become

to the partisan cause, and
an ad^.nistrator

a

pa.y

leader w,.h respec.
for arrd loyaUy

who worked

w.th other party ntembers
to

implement the law
Eventually, the third, and
current, method of
conductina the 6xecutive office
to

predominate This was the popular
manager

separation-of-powers and the Jacksomans’

On

polit.cal

Separanon of powers made leadership
and action

the national level, both
the Founders’

pan.es frustrated the Progressives

difficult.

-A

legislature that dealt w,,h

such minutiae as Civil

War

working conditions

committee cenainly was not
conducive to

in

pensions and was able to hide
such issues as deplorable

amelioration of social problems

on patronage and compromise,

were not conducive to

social progress

and the

.According to the Progressives,
the job of the executive

should be to lead the legislature rather
than to check
reliance

came

regulation, too

it.

political parties,

Because of their fragmentation and
according to the Progressives,

open to corruption and too evasive of
major

issues.

In keeping with previous thinkers,
Progressives expected the elected executive to

be a leader. Yet

Nor was

it

his leadership

based

was

in the strength

not to

come through

political

power based on

the veto.

of a partisan following. Rather, executive leadership
was

to be popular leadership Previously, politics
had shifted from Constitutional institutions to
political parties.

It

was

Now its

location shifted from political parties to the individual candidate.

asserted that the executive

was

the only official elected by

given community. Consequently, he was the only one
as the

embodiment of the

will

who

of the people, without the
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all

the

members of a

could claim popular legitimacy

political party (or,

on the national

scene, the electoral college)
as an intermediatr

the people

fold

when

He would

tt

required

suppon The

duty to educate public opinion

.t

Thus, he could take his
case directly to

responsibility

be guided by public opinion.

public opinion, the executive
must obey

”

If the

in

of the executive would be two-

power of the

some manner Yet

If publ.c opinion

was

to

office

was

to be rooted in

the executive also had a

govern

,t

educated judgments Politics became
vigorous, open debate and

had to make

tntelligent,

civic education."*

Enlightened administration and moral
leadership on the pan of the
executive would allow
greater cooperation

competition

on the part of the members of the

among members of Constitutional

was sought The executive was

political

system Rather than

institutions or political parties,
cooperation

to facilitate that cooperation through
enlightened popular

leadership

In this

administrator

scheme, the elected executive became a manager
rather than an

The job here

is

not to

law and distributing benefits Rather,

The executive’s

other party

members

in carrying

out the

to

manage programs

as efficiently as possible.^**

manager placed him

directly at the top

of the public administration

it is

no intermediaries between him and the administrative agencies or

hierarchy, with

executive office.

manager had

role as

work with

The executive became not

coequal, or

first

among

equals, but

first

to have a rational plan (representing the public good) and that plan

carried out as efficiently as possible by an expert, neutral

executive office

The executive-as-manager proposes

his

civil

was

The
to be

service and a fully staffed

own programs and

they are passed and implemented properly, generally meaning

the

to sees that

efficiently. Partisan

patronage had been one means through which the administrator had handled the executive
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challenge.

The

rational, neutral civil
service

executive-as-manager. Through
office, the executive

social concerns.

was

to be

civil

became

the important device
for the

service reform and
reorganization of the executive

made

the initiator and
head of programs in response
to

This image of the executive

is

of a popular leader tutoring
and bound by

public opinion, and a manager
carrying out social
programs efficiently.

Each of these conceptions of
the executive has

The adoption of the

much weaker

Constitution of

1

780 followed the

existed in Massachusetts
polit.cs
rejection

of a Constitution with a

executive," .^s a result of the
perceived tyranny of executive
power before

the Revolution (especially a
Royal

Governor appointed by

the

Crown, no. responsible

the local legislature), the
Constitution that the General
Court proposed

a severely limited executive

executive

was

ratified

This

When
is

that

was

rejected,

one with

powerful by twentieth century standards

It

was not Compared

other states and compared to the rejected
executive, however,

1778 contained

in

a relatively

not to say that the Governor
approved

it

in

1

more powerlul

780 was

to the executives

was

to

of most

relatively Strong.

This early governor was conceived as the
constitutional executive The partisan
administrator

predominated

made
until

its

way

to Massachusetts by the late 1830s or mid
1840s/"

It

roughly the 1960s Perceived corruption on the part
of party

organizations led to efforts beginning as early as the
1850s to chip away

at

it

However,

the governorship remained based in disseminating the
rewards of the office for quite
time.

The

some

partisan administrator remained the predominant concept of the office in

Massachusetts for the longest period of the three types. Indeed, the Massachusetts
governorship attained

less

of the centralized power than the governorship had elsewhere.
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The

centralized

power

it

did

gam came

later than

elsewhere, ftnally becoming
comparable

the mid-1960s.'*'

in

Each of these

htstorical types

of the elected chief executive
are

still

available to the governor or
president Thus, they can
be used to analyze a

executive Michael Dukakis
that

is

modern chief

the major example of the
publicmanager type of Governor

is

meant not mainly

ideologically, but institutionally
Seeking to

Governorship an expression of the public
desire
elected

up and cut

his

and

Massachusetts has seen. To say that
he was an exemplar of the
Progressive-type

Governor

was

alive

for a cleaner state

Governor based on pledges of neutrality
and

down Massachusetts government

was

the

government, Dukakis

He

efficiency

Yet, Dukakis

make

promised to clean

ultimately unsuccessful in

tenures as executive

Dukakis experienced two cycles of success
and
office in

failure

1974 as a model of the progressive executive
Yet

the Democratic nomination for Governor
to

executive,

it

seemed

that

much of his

Edward King,

political capital

First,

he was elected into

by 1978, when Dukakis
a

more

lost

partisan-style

had been spent. Dukakis’s second

cycle occurred from his reelection as Governor in
1982 through his unsuccessful run for
the Presidency in 1988

to

is

By

1982, Dukakis had changed his style enough that he was able

win oack the Democratic nomination from King, and be

how

he had modified

his strategy after his first

changed conception of the

office allowed

reelected.

The

question, then,

term as Governor Further, had

his

him to succeed where he had previously

Indeed, Dukakis experienced further success

in

failed*^

the Gubernatorial campaign of 1986

when

he was resoundingly reelected What did Dukakis do differently the second time around
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tha. allowed iKls success^
Finally,

Aga.n, Duha^s's a..en.p.s

a.

wda. happened

.he debacle of .he

in

„SS ca„p.,n,

budding an effec.ve
poh.,cal coaiiuon were

unsuccessful His cycles of
success and

concept. on of the execut.ve
office and

fa.lure, .his .hesis
will

,.s

ul.in,a.ely

argue, can be .raced
to his

roo.s in .he Progress.ve
.radiuon,

1,

was

his

concept, on of the execut.ve
as a popular leader
and a manager that led
to Dukakis’s

ulumate

political fatlure,

while h.s greatest success
came

leader and a ch.ef executive.
Finally,
State level led to his failure
to

i.

will

when he

acted as a const.tu.ional

be argued that Dukakis’s
expertences

u luuci an ettective
conduct
effertivp and
convincing campaign
•

a.

the

•

at

the

national level

It

should be noted that the “roles”
of the executive are categones
created for

analytic purposes

by scholars and other

political

observers

For the officeholder,

individual roles such as the
political and the administrative
are generally integrated, and

not as separable as they

may appear

to be in written analysis

As

indicated above,

however, dealing with the executive
challenge involves resolving the
cross-pressures
resulting

from the roles of political leader and chief
executive, so

support one another,

A strict

that they

do successfully

separation of the political and the administrative

urged here For the purposes of this

thesis, the roles

is

not being

of the executive are used to explicate

a typology to investigate the executive office
These characterizations of the executive
arise out

of American

political

conception of the executive

typology

is

is

development and follow

a certain historical logic

Each

available for use by an officeholder, however, so that the

also useful for the analysis of the executive office as

it is

currently conducted.

Therefore, this typology will be used for both historical and analytical purposes.
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M

ilical

Cult uresand_Expecialion.i nf t
h e OfflrphnlH^r

Wh.ie each conception of the
executive delineated here
officeholder.

is

not so

much

executive can emphasize once
into a

broad

government

political culture

,n its original

in office

form as

ts

available to the

a political culture which
the chief

in

Each conception of the

Political culture involves
a set

office can

be translated

of expectations regarding the

Citizens have certain expectations
which they believe the

government must meet These expectations
include both how

the

are supposed to conduct themselves
and what the government

is

members of the

members of government
expected to accomplish

through public policy As well, members
of the government hold cenain
expectations of
each other Depending on the nature
of these sets of expectations, the

political cultures

can be classified as either constitutional,
group-based, or bureaucratic

The

constitutional executive operates in

political culture

The government responds

what can be termed

to those individuals

the laws defined in the Constitution. Citizens
expect that

protect their rights, as defined

in

conduct themselves according to
citizens will follow the

law and

will

by the Constitution The focus here

ability to

official

conduct

tenets Individual

are willing to follow

members of the government

the Constitution, and that

its

who

a constitutional

members of government

will

will

members of government expect

that

focus themselves according to their duties as defined

is

on

politics within Constitutional institutions

politics within a constitutional

behavior and the viability of public policy

and the

framework. Decisions regarding both

will

be based on the constitutionality of

an action, on whether the individual or the government should or should not perform
action based on the Constitution, and on institutional roles.
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that

Tk
b.»d .» how ..„ .. wdwid..,
d„.,o„

„

a panicular political
party Citizens expect
that once they elect
s
into office, the positive
benefits

of politics

(i.c..

member of their group

appointive offices) will
be theirs and that

polices will he enacted
that confonn to the
wishes of the group
Members of government

expect that both citizens and
other members of
government

will toe the party
line,

respecting and obeying
dictates of party elites
Politics here takes
place

in the electoral

arena where parties vie for
the favor of a majonty
of the voters. Judgement
of proper
policy and action

is

based on party doctrine and
party standards

The popular manager
focus

IS

represents a managerial,
professional political culture
The

on administration and the proper
means of conducting government,
so

that

professional standards {,.e„ openness,
honesty, neutrality, efficiency)
will be the measure

of individual participation Members
of the citizenry expect

conducted

in a professionally

competent manner, and

administration can address any public
problem
citizens will be loyal to

their constituents

and

them personally, and

will

that

government

that a properly

in

expect that

members of government

maintain standards of professionalism in
their

conduct Politics here takes place

be

conducted

Members of government

that other

will

own

will serve

political

both the electoral and institutional arenas, with

professional standards such as openness, neutrality
and efficiency being the yardstick for
the judgement of proper policy and action.

Of course,
another. Rather,

the existence of one political culture does not exclude
the existence of

it is

a matter of emphasis.

One
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political culture

may dominate and

will

often be challenged by
.he adherents of
another For exatnple,
devotees of a bureaucrat,
pohtical culture, such as
Michael Dukak.s
aga,nst

early-l960s Massachusetts,
often react

what they perce.ve as the
corruption and .nefticeney
of a group-based

culture. Paralleling the
conceptions

dominated

m

Massachusetts and

Another way of looking
have been documented here

,s

in

of the executive, various
the United States at

changes

at

,n

have

vanous times

the notions about the
elected executive that

to note that the

changed The execut.ve performs

political cultures

poh.tcal

expecat.ons of the officeholder
have

d.fferent roles, or s.m.lar
roles in a d.fferent .nanner,

because .nembers of the public
and other members of the
government expect him
II

political cultures are

based around expectations, „
makes sense

to

that expectations

do so
of the

executive would be different as one
political culture rather than
another comes to

dominate a

In

polity.

The Myth of the

Modern

Presidency^ David K. Nichols claims
that people have

too long ignored the potential inherent

what

IS

referred to as the

the Constitutional Presidency

“modern presidency” was always present

Nichols argues, and growth

indicate that

in

in the roles

of government actualized

Americans have ignored the

potential

in

The

potential for

the Constitution,

that potential.'*'^

To

of the Constitutional Presidency

sidestep the fact that the roles of the executive
have been defined differently

is

to

at different

times and that expectations of the office have consequently
shifted as time has passed
the potential for the

will try to

different

make

clear

modern”

how

If

president, or executive, has always been present, this study

various executives have sought to actualize that potential

ways
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in

The

potential latent in the
office

may

not have changed,
but the expectations
of the

officeholder and the public
have If the exermn/o
h
2xe
executive
has
always embodied the
government to
a certain extent in the
popular mind, there are
now no intermediaries
between
that office

and the people

If

addresses to the legislature
allow the chief executive
to exercise

iegislative leadership
that role has

become much more

budgeting and originating
legislation

detailed, with the
responsibility for

falling to the
executive. If the elected
executive

has

always been the head of the
executive branch, that
role has taken on a
more complex
character as the executive
branch has

This thesis

office that

The

IS

most

desire here

Naturally, that

into

is

is

will

grown

m

size

and importance

argue that the constitutional
executive

facilitative

is

the conception of the

of leadership given the current
expectations of the

office

not to transplant two-hundred
year old institutions into the
present day

unworkable Rather, the question
involves

translating those institutions

our present conditions What would
a constitutional executive
look

current expectations of the office’

constitutional political culture be

Why

more

given the

like

would an executive who emphasizes
a

successful than one

who emphasizes

a bureaucratic

or a group-based political culture‘s

A
A

central question arising

problem ot how an executive
leadership,

he

fails to

is

is

Challenge, not a Problem

from the

literature

on the elected executive

is

the

to exercise leadership in a system that,
while necessitating

not particularly conducive to

it.

The American

elected executive

provide leadership. Yet, authors recognize, the American

the American polity generally do not

make

political

is

berated

system and

the provision of leadership easy. Seen in a
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if

positive light, that

means

that the

system provides

which otherwise would become
tyrannical

limits or

checks on executive power,

Thus, while authors complain
of the

“gridlock” which results from
separation of powers and
checks and balances, they
also

recognize that leadership must
be checked and made
responsible The question
elected executive, seen as the
sole unifying force in a
political community, can

is

how

the

overcome

these obstacles and supply leadership
within the limits of the
constitutional system

Much of the
in

literature

on the executive does not recognize
the challenge inherent

the office, or, rather, does
not treat the office as a challenge

question of executive leadership as
a problem that lends

Strengthened

political parties,

Most authors

treat the

itself to a single solution

strengthened administrative capacity,
psychological

investigation of specific executives, or
emphasis on the formal or informal aspects
of the

executive office are examples of solutions
that have been proffered to allow
the executive
to exercise leadership

A

number of authors, James Ceaser and Theodore Lowi

invigorated political parties to correct perceived
defects
a strengthening of the parties to

remedy defects

in

for example, call for

the executive.

Ceaser

calls for

in the Presidential selection system.

Lowi

advocates a third party to allow the President to exercise more
effective leadership
Certainly the role political parties have played in the selection and
operation of the

executive has declined. Parties, however, tended to focus on the benefits of office and the
distribution of those benefits rather than overly programmatic matters. Advocating the

strengthening of parties also ignores the fact that party politics has generally produced the
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weakest executives

in

American

polit.c,

Abraham Lincoln and Andrew
Jackson being

important exceptions.

Many

authors advocate modified
administrat.ve or managerial
capact.es to allow

the executtve to exerc.se
leadership

Roosevelt,

is

The Brownlow Comm, .tee
Report, under

Franklin

the grandest example of the
emphasis on the adm.ms.ra.ive
capacities of the

executive and the connection between
them and the

ability to exercise leadership

Richard

Nathan has written sympathetically about
Richard Nixon and the development
of the
administrative presidency

Stephen Hess recognizes many
problems inherent

extended Presidency focused on
reorganization of staff and bureaucracies
that the managerial role should
be

ot the President

use of experts

brought more into

line

He

in

an over-

emphasizes

with the capacities of the office

Walter Williams emphasizes the need for
more effective analysts and

in the

Presidency

The problem

here,

which Hess

question of capacity. The executive can only
accomplish so

raises effectively,

is

the

much and an extended

bureaucracy surrounding the executive can obscure
responsibility and lead to bureaucratic
structures which

may

not be within the capacities of the executive to
maintain

effectively.^’

Other authors have taken to examining the psychological make-up of individual
executives with the hope of obtaining the secrets of the executive

then

is

what does an executive

is

supposed to do

if

he

is

office.

The question

not that person. James David

Barber and Fred Greenstein, for example, both study individual executives to formulate
the “solution” to the office.

Barber’s study yielded the “active-passive, positive-

negative” classifications and an emphasis on the attitudes of individual executives toward
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he.r work Greens, ein investigated
Dwtght E.senhowefs Pres.dency
and concluded

Eisenhower had a personality

that ntade h.nt adept
at manipulat.ng the
public

that

and pnvate

aspects of the office Yet that
leaves the question
open of what to do if. an,
not Franklin

Roosevelt. Dw.ght Eisenhower
or any other tndividual

who

has served in the execut.ve

capacity successfitlly Examining
individual executives can
take one only so far

not that executive Also,

Members of the

the office

Nor

IS

is

,s

not solely the office holder

legislative branch,

executive branch and

how

it

members of the

members of the

who

one

is

defines the executive office

political party, other

members of the

public also have an interest
in and influence

upon

defined and executed

the problem of the execut.ve
solely a formal/informal matter
Richard

Neustadt argues that the presidency’s
formal power

backed up by personal power, so

that the executive

is

useless in and of itself and must be

must

rely

on powers of persuasion.”

Neustadt misses the point, however, that there
must be some power

in

the office,

otherwise no one would pay any attention to the
incumbent executive. David

on the other hand, claims

K

Nichols,

that scholars have ignored the potential
inherent in the

Constitutional Presidency,

a result

if

i.e.

the formal executive.”

of the Constitutional executive

in

The seeming “modern executive”

an age of heightened government

is

activity. Yet,

as indicated above, this ignores the fact that the roles of
the formal executive have been

redefined throughout history.

The formal power of the executive

is,

by

definition. Constitutional.

elected to office, and without the veto power, the executive

is

Without being

powerless. Indeed, there

no executive power without the Constitution. However, the Constitutional executive
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is

is

given certain roles, but those
roles are

have been redefined
this

at several points

far

from

strictly defined

throughout American

The point here

political history

is

that they

In that sense,

study will focus on the
formal office Yet, the
informal executive, too,
has had

and expectations changed and
redefined The informal
about the way

must be taken

in

which the executive

will carry

its

rol.

office, the expectations
that exist

out the office have
changed as well, and

into account. Popular
expectation

of moral, rhetonc^ leadership
and the

expectation of detailed policy
leadership are generally
not written directly into
the
Constitutional role of chief
executives, but they are
expected of the officeholder and
are

Ignored

mcumbenfs

a, the

A solution

peril

formal or the informal executive
Rather h

does not

lies in

res. in strict

emphasis on either the

the recognition that certain
roles and

aspects of the office can be defined
and redefined The formal and
the informal must be

examined together, as they influence one
another

directly

and importantly

Thus, the question of leadership involves
allowing the executive to exercise
while

at the

proposed

same time

restraining the actions

specific solutions to the challenge

leadership While this study will

is

based

in

a challenge and that

of the officeholder Various authors have

of how the executive

make recommendations,

it

his will

lends itself to

it

is

to exercise effective

also recognizes that the office

more than one answer

In order to address

the issues of executive leadership, this thesis
will indicate various answers that have been

proffered and will explore their consequences for the
present

There are certain authors
executive.

Ellis,

challenge with

who do

recognize the pliable nature of the office of the

Wildavsky and Genovese each sees the

many

potential

era.

office

of the executive as a

ways of being addressed. Their understandings of the
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challenge each involve the
location
location of
of the office
locate the challenge

competing
political

in

•

ma

political

system

”

Ellis

and Wildavsky

the necessity that
at the
tne exen
,tn,„
executive
maintain a coalition in
a system of

political cultures.

Genovese

indicates the
position of the office
in the

and economic system,
one which makes
leadership

sll

American

but impossible according
to

Genovese, as the challenge

However, the way

in

which

Ellis.

Wildavsky and Genovese
portray the challenge

Ignores the question of a
politically astute executive
administratively unfeasible,
or

aspects of the office

A

administratively unsound

implementing

his

presents a vision that

simply does not pay
attention to the administrative

still

be thought of as unsuccessful

Emmette Redford and Marian

if his

tenure

Blissett, for

ceriainly a politically capable
executive,

is

example, claim that

was unsuccess&l

in his efforts at

Great Society because the United
States did not possess the

administrative capacity to handle
Johnson administration’s proposals
Martha

Weinber^ notes

that Francis Sargent,

governor of Massachusetts from 1969

tended to focus on the “ceremonial" aspects
of the

office, at the

administrative ones, and his administration
suffered as a result

executives

may do

may

,s

president or a governor
can present a vision, balance
a coalition

and promote discussion and

Lyndon Johnson,

who

who

Wagner

until

1975

expense of the

It is

evident that

successfully navigate the political system,
that the president or governor

very well

politically,

while presenting an ultimately unsuccessful or unrealistic

program from an administrative
only the political aspect of the

law, the administrative role.

standpoint.

office,

It is

The challenge

as defined here involves not

but also the necessity that the executive carry out the

the location of the challenge in these
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two

roles

of the

office, not

m in which th^
the office resides,

only the system

•

j

which impedes the

ability

of the

elected executive to
provide effective leadership

^^feMchusetts_and Progressivi..v,

M imponant

question involves the
legitimacy of using a
state and a specific

governor to study the .American
executive challenge
Studying the elected
executive on the
state level

makes sense because

making runs

for the Presidency

Increasingly

In the

m the twentieth century, governors

1980s alone, three of the five

Presidency had sewed as Governor
If the state

level is

where Presidents and

candidates are acquiring experience
for the national-level
office,
State level to see

what

that experience can

tell ffiture

Funher. states are being asked to
do more
years

Members of the .American

to

government” has come

movement toward

governments.

to pervade

it

is

ran for the

Presidential

useful to look at the

Presidents

American

polity have been suspicious

the Revolutionary era While that
suspicion has
(centralized)

in

men who

have been

politics than they

in

of centralized authority since

waxed and waned,
American

have

general mistrust of “big

politics again,

and

this

has led

the transfer of functions from the
federal government to the state

It this is

the case, presumably governors are going
to be asked to do more,

and to take on more substantive leadership roles
regarding public policy and governmental
activity.

As

states

become more important

in policy-related

important to understand the implications of gubernatorial

The next question involves

matters,

it

becomes more

politics.

the use of specifically Massachusetts as a case study.

Massachusetts a suitable state for the study of executive

26

leadership'!’

Massachusetts

is

Is

suitable ,0 this study because

will

be discussed have

Massachusetts

.s

all

it

has a nch polit.cal
histoty and the types
of executive that

extsted in the state at
sonte point

also appropriate because

Mote

of the nature of tts

specifically,

polit.cal culture

Massachusetts, for .ost of its
h.stoty, has been a
one-party state The Whigs
dominated
.he state front their inception
in the state unt.l the late

With

the.r

1920s After

demise

tlutty years

took over by 1960 Their dominance
continues
Congressional delegation, where party
parties have rotated the hold

on

in

is

political

in

the

1

S50s, the Republicans
held

power

of two-party competition, the
Democrats
the state legislature and
the

generally

more important than

power, but there has been

personality

little

The

party

competition

-A

lack of party competition

was

a Progressive ideal

If this

the conception of the executive which
currently predominates

popular manager, should be modified to
executive

in a

in

study

is

American

facilitate executive leadership,
a

to

show

politics, the

Progressive

Progressive environment would be most
effective as a case study In

Michael Dukakis

of Progressivism,

will

If

be examined as a Progressive executive

Dukakis were unable to succeed

in

that

an environment

effect,

facilitative

as a Progressive in a state with a

notable lack of party competition, that says something
about the nature of the Progressive

conception of the executive
order to achieve success

in

If

he needed to change

Massachusetts’s

political

his

conception of the executive

in

environment, that says more about

the Progressive conception. Finally, Dukakis’s experiences at the state level led
directly to
his experiences at the national level in 1988. His presidential

for

its

campaign

that year

is

noted

lack of vigor and ultimate lack of success. This lack of success above the state level.
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th.s thes,s will

seek to demonstrate,

,s

due

to Dukak.s's

expenences

in

Massachusetts

politics.

It is

necessary to say a word about
Progressivtsm

in

Massachusetts. Progressivism

as an ideology, as a response
to social problems assoc.ated
with developing capitalist
culture,

came

to Massachusetts earlier than
elsewhere in the nation,”
Progressivism as a

means of conducting
If

It

came

at all,"

It is

polit.cs,

r.e,

neutral, effic.ent, central.zed,

came

often asserted that Massachusetts
politics

according to the rules of the nineteenth
century The focus,

it is

late to

is still

said,

Massachusetts

conducted

is still

on the rewards

ot holding office and the distribution
of benefits to one’s friends and family,*'
There

however, a Progressive niche

and lack of neutrality

is

a reaction to

it

in

Massachusetts

The conduct of politics may not always be

that exemplifies the impulses

least in his first term,

politics, largely in reaction to the

is

is,

nepotism

Progressive, but there

of institutional Progressivism. Dukakis,

an exemplar of those impulses

in his

reactions to what he

saw

at

as

corruption in the state’s political system.

Conclusion

The

constitutional executive, the partisan administrator and the public

manager are

the three principal methods by which executives have sought to exercise
leadership in the
face of the executive challenge of reconciling the conflicting pressures of potentially

incompatible roles. Again, these are historical types, and their emergence follows a certain

logic.

The

constitutional executive

is

generally associated with the Framers of the

Constitution as one response to the Articles of Confederation. The constitutional
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executive predominated

in

Massachusetts
sacnusetts aftpr
^
after tho
the adoption
of the Constitution of
1780

The pan,sa„ administrator
arose w.th
Jacksontan era

American

in

politics

the

end of the Virginia
dynasty and the onset
of the

and continued through
the Progress.ve era

In

Massachusetts, the partisan
adnt.nistrator ttnly took
hold by the 1840s
after a supply of
Revoluttonao- War heroes had
been exhausted The
pubhc manager was developed
by
Progressives

who

sought stronger leadershtp
regarding social problems
Freeing the

ecutive from the grip of
political parties
public

manager came

later to

was a

vital part

this.

The

Massachusetts than to many
other locations, though there

had been hints of it beginning
before the Progressive era
ineft'iciency in administration

of accomplishing

It

came

as a response to

and the perceived corruption
and nepotism of political

parties

These formulations of the
strictly historical,

however As

roles

of the elected executive should
not be read as

indicated earlier, they are also
analytic tools, and can be

read as categories or ideal types
Further, this

exhaust scholars’ analytic

Weber

is

not to suggest that these categories

possibilities inherent in the

American elected executive. As

Max

notes, categories of this type “are to
be considered merely as border cases which

are especially valuable and indispensable
for analysis. Historical

always appear

in

Future executive

mixed forms, have moved and

may

still

realities,

move between such

which almost
pure types,

well concoct other methods of reconciling the
competing political

and administrative demands on the president or the governor.
Also, no conception of the
chief executive

is

exclusive of another, and they can be combined and mixed to create

more nuanced types than

the three presented here.

29

The

point

is

that executives

have

conceived of several means
of meeting the executive
challenge, each of
which
the purposes of analyzing
the office. In
this

fact, if these

conceptions were

useful for

strictly historical.

typology would be of little
use

Vanous concept.ons of the
executive have predominated
as Stephen

Skowronek reminds

appropriate than others.^

will

is

us, certain times

The assumption

here

be argued that the constitutional
executive

effective leadership,

cloth into our era

i,

is

also

,™e

What would

that

is

is

may make
that

a.

various times, because,

certain actions

more

one can .earn from the pas.
While

it

the conception most
facilita.ive of

what has come before cannot
be transplanted whole

that conception look like
if it

century .American political system,
with

its

appeared

in late the

twentieth

modified expectations of Ihe
elected executive'-
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CHAPTER

I

the constitutional
executive

Problems regard,
ng .he executive entered
Massachusetts

-- —setts Ba. Colon.
Sovemntenta.

t„

spec, f, call,

era through Revolutionary

tintes.

,n

politics

the seventeenth

with the

centu. Percept.ons
oP

execuuve ,rann,
plagued co,o„s.s .on,
the Pun.an

Governors such as John
Winthrop and Thontas

Hu.ch.nson ran into problents
when they at.etnpted to
aggrandize what cCon.sts
felt was
too ntuch polittca, power
To counteract th.s, the
Pun.an Era saw the
development of
represen.a.,ve government,
a b.cameral legislature
and a wntten code of
laws

Anterican Revolut.on was a

reacon

aga.nst perce.ved tyranny
under Bntish rule, notably

an executive not responsible
to the people or
controlled by elective

Jhe

The

political .nstitutions

Puritan Fra

The chaner of the Massachusetts
Bay Company, s.gned by England’s
K,ng
I

on March

4.

1629,

was exceptional

headquaners be located

in

in that

it

d.d not require that the

The

original

members should
the General

company

operate:

company’s

England Twelve men meeting on
August 26. 1629 agreed

given that exception, they should
take their families and

World.

move

the enterprise to the

that

New

charter delineated the form of
government under which the

The voting members of the

Coun, which was

to

polity,

known

as freemen,

formed

meet four times a year Their duties included
choosing a

governor, a deputy governor and eighteen
assistants from among themselves, and
admitting other freemen

Charles

^
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A

year

la.er,

.he Massachusetts

on August

23. 1630, the

Bay Colony tooh

first

nteet.ng of the Court
of Assistants of

place In Charlestown
Intportantly, at th,s
meeting

.he ass,stants voted
that the Governor,

Deputy Governor and
four

of the Peace, thus combining
governmental powers

Justtces

urt

^

ass.stants

Under

had the power to make,
ordeine, and establish

all

the charter, the

manner of wholesome

and reasonable orders, lawes,
statutes and ordinances,
directions, and
contrane to the lawes of this
our realme

chaner by keeping

this

power

in their

choose officals The assistants

England

,n

own

of this

a freeman and by

initial

meeting, the

first

violated the

hands, allow,
ng the freemen only the

also breached the charter
by

keepmg

instruct, ons, not

- The assistants directly

meet only once a year They were
able to accomplish

become

were to be

this

havmg

'

who was

able to

In his journal for the date

governor under the charter noted
simply:

“We

kept a

court

—

n Winthro^ That

Charter was John Winthrop,

Winthrop governor
voyage to

New

in

first

governor of the colony under the
Massachusetts Bay

Members of the Massachusetts Bay Company had
named

October of 1629, and he had been

England.

He would

expressed

in

“A Model of Christian

charge of organizing the

continue as governor until 1634, and would
serve

again for eight of the years between 1637 and
1649.

sought to organize colonists around

in

his

own

A charismatic figure,

Winthrop

vision of Massachusetts Bay, a vision he

Charity,” a lay-sermon delivered aboard the ship

Arabella Winthrop would aggrandize much

political

power

in

the early days of the

colonial government. Serving as governor, or as deputy governor,
effectively placed him
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to

the General Court

by hmiting

the Royal Charter concealed

power

in the legislative,

part

executive and judical
judicial cpatc
seats of government
This accrtial of power
on the

of Wtnthrop and the
other assistants would
be the cause of a
great deal of

consternation

The

among

first

the colonists.

significant challenges
to

Winthrop. power came

tesidents of Watenown
protested a tax that had
been levted on

in

1632.

Most

them without

notably,

their

consent The assistants had
approved a tax of eight
pounds on the residents
of Watertown
.0 help pay for the
consmiction
later

become

eider, etc.,

money

the

fortification against
Indian invasion

town of Cambridge, Winthrop
notes

assembled the people and
delivered

after that sort, for fear

result, the

of a

in his journal that

their opinions that

it

of bringing themselves and
posterity

was

of what would
'The pastor and

not safe to pay

into bondage.”’

As

a

offenders were called before
the Court of Assistants
Winthrop noted a

satisfactory resolution to the
event, stating that the
townspeople had “confess[ed] freely
that they

were

in error '*

nature of the government

seemed

They were mistaken, Winthrop
was not

It

to think Rather, the

tndicated to them, about the

a direct democracy, he claimed,
as the colonists

Freemen of the General Couti had
elected

those officials were free to enact laws
as the assistants saw
issues at the meeting of the General

Watertown “were

fully satisfied,

Coun, through

and so

their

their

fit

their offtcials,

and

Colonists could address

vote The concerned citizens of

submission was accepted and their offence

pardoned,” Winthrop writes.^

While Winthrop saw

this as a victory for the

Massachusetts Bay Government,

Watertown

incident

was

it

few elected

would only prove

officials

of the

to be so in the short term.

The

the beginning of the introduction of representative
government
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0-™,
.h.

„

,« W,.«„, „„

^
;,

^
next Court to advise
with the governor
and assistants about
the raising of
public stock, so
as what they should
agree upon should
bind all, etc

Members of the

polity

attempting to limit the
power of the governor
through the introduction
of a

were

political

system, in which a broader
base of ind.viduais
would have a substantive
say regarding the
actions of government
officials

Colonists clearly resented
the power John
Winthrop had collected
as governor

elect

The General Court

Wmthrop Governor, though

sesston, representative

life

in

Town

May of

1634 was the

firs, a,

in his early

years

whtch the freemen d.d no.

he retatned a posit.on
as an ass.stan. A, that
same

government became further
ensconced

,n

Massachusetts

polit.cal

representat.ves had asked to
read the charter, and had
realized the extent to

whtch leaders such as Winthrop
had
ex.st.ng institutions

The General Court,

a year rather than once, and

freemen part.c.pated

in

towns were

attempted to

in

curtail the

as a result,

document

in establishing

was now required

.n

the

to meet four times

to send representat.ves
to the meetings All

election of officials, while the
representat.ves alone

the other assemblies to “assist

could thus have a say

d.rec.ly vrolated that

mak.ng laws, disposing

more than simply appointing

lands, etc

officials

power of the Governor and other

introduction of political institutions.
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would attend

Local residents

and taxation questions They

elected officials through the

May

of 16.7, Winthrop
tnumphed over Governor
Henry Vane

.He sovemorsHtp

.he colony

Wntdrop.

success

was due,

when he was out of the
governor's

Pequot Indians, the colony
ran
Ant.no., an

,nc, dents.

,n ,ar,e

office

reelect, on

ca.e

,n

to

pan, to tHe tuntult
tdat Had Heset
In addition to a

into trouble wtth
dissenters ,n the

W.nthrop's

in a reelection

war wtth the

Roger Williams and

the .,dst of the
Antinonnan

Hutch,nson banished from the
colony Winthrop had
sided against Hutchinson,
while

Governor Vane had stood

for her In a content.ous
meet.ng,

and an early manifestation
of

the executtve challenge
pitt.ng strength aga.nst
liberty, Winthrop
triumphed over Vane,
.ndtcating the preference of
the freemen for stab.lity
in the colony, albe.t
stabihty w,th a

popular voice

As
h,s

the Antinomian .nc.dent
indicated, Winthrop cenainly

was

not open-mtnded in

notions of what constituted a
proper political and religious
establishment

The Puritan establishment was
leaders,

Winthrop

a theocracy:

especially, did not tolerate dissent

discussion existed regarding proper
policy

November of

Church and

was

far

state

were

,n

the colony

a single entity,

and

from established views. What

from widespread and inclusive

In

1637, shortly after returning to the governorship,
Winthrop oversaw the

banishment of Hutchinson, John Wheelright
and other important members of the

Antinomian

faction,'"

From

the beginning, Winthrop had attempted
to institute his vision

of what the Massachusetts Bay colony should

be.

and certainly earned him a great deal of respect,
trouble. In attempting to institute his

own

it

While

was

this

also

helped establish his authority,

what caused him

vision, especially through the
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to run into

aggrandizement of

institutional

The

power, he brought out
the rebellious nature
of many of his fellow

point of that rebellion

was

to establish institutions

colonists.

which would force
individuals

administering the government
to account to others
for their behavior
Again, this was an
early manifestation

A

of the executive challenge

further step to limit the

power of the government
came

in the 1640's

wrth the

draftmg of the -Body
ofL.bert.es,- a rudimentary
code of laws Thrs emerged
as a
response to the monopoly
the assistants held on
judicial power Th,s
monopoly led to a
call for a

written code of laws that
could be used to hold the
assistants accountable for

their decisions, a call
colonists

had been issuing since 1635,'^
The General Court

authorized various committees
for this purpose over
the next several years
until

1

64

1 ,

however,

urt established the

amended and

after having submitted
a potential

Body of Liberties, according

established to be perpetual

code to the towns,

to Winthrop, “to have

it

was not

satisfied the colonists generally

A

many

satisfactory to

comprehensive system of laws continued,

A

full,

would not be

bicameral legislature developed

was

not

that the General

them

fully

This covered “ftindamental
constitutional

principles as well as statutory
laws and church-state relations

Liberties covered,

It

in

colonists,

As much

as the

Body of

and demand for a

extensive written code of laws which

established until 1648,*'

Massachusetts by 1644, two months before

voters demoted Winthrop from Governor
to Deputy Governor.^* Establishment of
a

bicameral legislature

came

as a response to the assistants’ having a
“negative voice” over

the towns’ representatives, or deputies, in
governmental business.

The

assistants

and the

deputies sat together once representative government
had been instituted. The charter
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requ.red .he approval of
a. leas, s,x
ass.s.an.s in any action
taken by the General
Court,

body approved
changed so

,t.

A paniai v.ctory for the deput.es

that a majority

cante

of each group was needed

After a dispute between
a

poo,

elderly

in

1636,

to pass

woman and

when mles were

any action.

a rich Boston merchant
over a

murdered sow. however, the
question Hared again Winthrop
notes

“upon the motion of the deputies,

it

was ordered

in

March of 1644

that the court should
be divided in their

consultations, the magistrates
by themselves and the
deputies by themselves,
what the one
ag:reed

was

upon they should send

to the other,

and

if

both agreed then to pass, etc,”*’
This

a partial victory for each side.
.AJthough the assistants had
retained veto power, the

deputies had attained a greater
ability to check the actions
of the assistants,
political

system began developing

in

A rudimentary

response to arbitrary rule of
Winthrop and

men

in his

position.

Colonists ftinher challenged Winthrop's
authority

town of Hingham

petitioned the General

then Deputy Governor

residents

of the town

“

Coun

when

residents of the

to hear a case against Winthrop,

Winthrop, the petitioners claimed, had
a hand

into accepting a militia captain
they did not

whether .Anthony Eames or Bozoun Allen
should serve
in the

in 1645,

in that

who was

in trying to force

want The question was

position

Eames had

served

mihtia for at least seven years, and magistrates
had received a recommendation to

promote him The townspeople, however, preferred
incident had caused a fracas to ensue in

Allen, his subordinate After the

Hingham. the Reverend Peter Hobart had

appeared before officers of the General Court and acted
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in a particularly belligerent

Deputy Governor

power and

rather than Governor.

infringing

on the people’s

evenly dw.ded Th.s
d,v,s,on

bitration

the deput.es
delayed the case

Little

the charges levied
against

evil or federal

trial,

unt.l, in

the Court acquitted
Winthrop and fined

Speech on Liberty” was
him

He

the

trial

did not

Us th.rd month,

six

of the

members of the

If they did not, they

in society.

to enforce

choose the members of that
government,
it.

his eloquent
philosophical rejoinder to

insisted that there

The former had no place

government with enough
power

submit to

m

faction

throp s

a

The nature of the H h
debates

committee composed of
six elders from
the colony and

deputies After the lengthy

Hingham

wnhm

liberties

but,

its

were two types of liberty:

The

edicts

latter

natural

could only be enjoyed under

The people had

once they had done

the

so, they

power

to

had a duty to

would become ungodly.^*

Broadly, Winthrop took a
stand and presented a
well developed philosophy
of

government and authority As
noted above, Winthrop was
autocratic and generally
intolerant

of dissenting points of view.
Alternatively, however, when
challenged he

addressed explicitly and intelligently
the question of why
governmental authority was
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and

proper and

why

it

should undertalcf^

r

•

'

H.S success

,
„ earned him
h.mself

in

defend..

respect .hroughou.
.he colony and
.he voters elected
h'
him
governor for
tne tour remaining
years of his life.

under dohn Wtn.hrop,

the

first

Governor under the
Massachusetts Bay
Colony

law, and tndeed
carry out most functions
of government,
as

..

developed

,n early

Mew

England

,.s representattve

wHat would become
separa.,on-of-powers and
W.nthrop found h.mself
more and more

in a

Itm.ted

clashed w.th the
political system

government and

government crept

fatnt traces

tnto the

of

colony

posh, on wh.ch necess.tated
.ust.ficat.on of h,s

repeatedly returned him
to that duty, ind.cat.ng
a great deal of
respect for hts abihties.
Yet

he was also expected
to employ those

abtli.ies

of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony fought

wtth a cerra.n

restraint,

to establ.sh
.nst.tutions that

and voting members

would ensure

moderation on the governor’s
part

The Ro yal Governnr*;
The Puritan
time.

mamtammg

settlement in Massachusetts
lasted slightly

Its

colonists walked a line

the sovereignty of its

between remaining

own government The

more than

fifty

friendly with

years

England and

colonists often ignored orders

issued from the mother
country, while strife in England
frequently prevented the King

from pressing

his authority fttrther

sent by Charles

II in

“

Residents of Massachusetts treated
commissioners

a generally hostile

manner and ignored an order
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to send officials to

Randolph, as an agen.
of .he King,
conduced a senes of
.nves.iganons

in ,he

colony and

-d.ha..hecoion.s.shadc,o,a.ed.heBn^

™

urt repeatedly
stalled, albe.t
with sonte unsat.sfacoty
attempts a.
mollification Finally
IS, .PS4, the
Bntish Court of
Chancery rssued a
decree that vacated
the ongrn.

-

Massachusetts Bay charter
y Charter, That
That rtdecree ubecanre

agreement, the General
Court

The deposed .Massachusetrs

Je/uco

final

on October 23, 1684

subnnt.ed to the authority
of the Royal Governor

officals rega.ned
the.r offices ,n

1

689, after the Glonous

Revolutron of 1688, when
Wrll.am of Orange tooh
the Britrsh throne
from James
restored tenure of
Massachusetts’

King Wilham

.ssued a

new

cvic leaders

a. thrs

pomt was

short-lived,

political

a colony

curtailed in

rndependence Massachusetts
had enjoyed greatly
diminished as

more

the General Court,

will,

Coun

and judical powers, and
shorn of all imponant
executive powers

The
became

however

charter ,n .691, one
which continued the
institution of the

Roya, Governor Whrle
the General Court
remained, .. was a
General
legislative

The

firrffiy

was a

it

under the control of the
King The Governor, a
member of

royal appointee, could
assemble and dissolve the
legislature a.

and could veto any acts
of that body. The Governor
also approved House
elections of

members of the

Council, which

Gubernatorial advisory body

was

the upper chamber of
the General Court and a

No money

could be spent without the
approval of the
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Governor and the Council,
Converselv
without

the approval
Of
he House of
Representatives and that
body
y controlled the r
Governor's salary
As a result
c ashes over
financial matters
were frequent
occurrences
BattI
Power between the
Royal Governor and
the House of
Re
Represen.at.ves continued
through

"

the e,ghteen.h

century, with vanous
intercessions from
the Kino

^
General
Court

m

1768 and General

r

Bernard's refusal to

call

the

.

=

attempts to dissolve

on the eve of the
Revolution are indicative
ofthe conflicts that
occurred »Finailv
rinally, ,h
the colonists took
it

,

up

F.ve intolerable Acts,
which they saw as
attempts to divest
them of their rights

Thomas Hutchinson
1

760 and again from

1

769- 774 Othf^r
Other tu.
than n
General Thomas Gage,

than one year, Hutchinson

He had

been active

in

was

the

last

in

that he held

was looking

served for less

in

serving as a

various Judicial

of Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Superior

offices might not have
proved Hutchinson's

many of them

to establish

firs,

1749, he served on the
Council and

Court - The holding of
numerous

who

Royal Governor before
the American
Revolution

Massachusetts politics since
1737, however,

positions, culminating in
the position

.ha. he

at the

same

undoing

time, leading to the
perception

and maintain an oligarchy
and thus deprive the colonists
of

their rights.

The

practice

of holding multiple

offices simultaneously

was held over from

days of the Massachusetts
Bay Charter, In the eighteenth
cen.u^, as

members of the

in

1

Boston Selectman Beginning

The problem was

served as Governor
of Massachusetts

legislature, specifically the
Council,
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were often

in

the

the seventeenth,

also judges, Hutchinson

1

advantage of this, thus
incumng the wrath of
many Massachusetts
residents

Oove™. P.nc,s
Nove...

,.0

,3,

Hu.c.nso„ was

P-a.e
before

H.C.on CH.en.Pce ..e
ao. Ho.c.nson was

a, so

Ueo.ena.

ana Cononana.

h., Ho.cH.nson

o.He

a

Cas.le, .He

Ada...ona„y, Ho.chinson
.enaea .0

Hutchinson

co^s.on. Oece„.. 30^,

Oove™.

he, a le„s,a.,ve,

s

Coonc.

on Cas.,e ,,a„a

execoOve ana joa.c.a,

.ns.ai, his

ot the Council.

the Superior Cour.
and

Suffoll.

Coun.y

.ha.

Two

.

Co. o„
sa.e

So.o. Coon, 3oa,e
o.
.3 3 oH„ W.n.Hnop Haa

offices a. .he

sa.e ..„e

fnends ana rela.wes
,n.o offices under

son represented Salem

in

Hu.ch,nson.s hro.her-,n-,aw
was Secre.ar, or.he
Prov.nce,

member

S.pe„o.

the

h.s

House of Representatives

a,a,e

,n

Essex Coon., ana

other relativf-«
Kx
rela.,ves-by-marnage
.0 Ho.chinson
werejoages on

Cooncl members

haif-brother of his took
the position

i

Ho.chinson vacated upon receiving
the appointment to
the Superior

Court.

Hutchinson’s hold.ng these
offices concurrently,
combined with
offices

under

his control .0 frtends

and family, raised the

ire

his distribution

of many colonists before he

had even ascended .0 the
Governorshtp The colon, sts
were more than aware that
offices

Hutchinson held were not necessarily
compatible “As John Adams

later

Hutchinson had obviously ’too many
offices for the greatest
and the best man
to hold

Justice

-

James

Otis, Sr. noted that the
positions

were “'enough

same time

act as judge

for

in

the

all

remarked,

the world

of Lieutenant Governor and
Chief

any gentleman to hold’, and

it

was

illegal that

he should

at

the

of probate.’’” The allegations against
Hutchinson’s simultaneous

holding of various offices led to his
losing election to the Council

49

of

in 1766, for the first

a

Since

74, and

.

.0 H.s bein, .e„,ed
a sea.

.e.e,

o

.0

We .e

proceedings

Funhern.ore,

The trouble

was

no, solely ,ha, the
offices

were ,ncon,pa„ble
with each other

also lay ,n the fact
that, accord.ng
,0 ntany of the
colonists, the union
of the

eg.slat.ve, execut.ve
and .udicia, offices

was

host.le to their

I,

763, a pubhc debate raged
,n the press
between combatants
J

TQ

bert.es

Begin.ng

known

only as

'T

in

April

Q

and

stated the case against
accretion of power
nicely:
All

men

will allow, that

it is

to be possess’d
'safety ot

possible for one aentleman

more power than
a community

The time may come when
an
cedents which

we

ill

is

use

consistent with the
^

may be made of nre
when others by

are no^, establishing,

n«. as well as /rower,
not barely to “disturb
the peace ”
but to destroy the liberties
of a province

Pronunen, colonists, such as
John Adams and Josiah
Quincy, wen. so
Hutchinson of being part ofa
consp.racy ,0 destroy the
residents

-

government

This paranoia on the pan of
the colonists led ,0
v.olent outbursts against
the
,n

general and Hutch.„son

in

pan.cular

On August 26
it

,

1765 a
,

mob angered

and nearly everything

public and private papers
Hutchinson had been collecting for
thirty years

Hutchrnson responded to these
accusations with the assertion
in

accuse

of Massachusetts

liberties

by the Stamp Ac, stormed
Hutchinson’s house and destroyed

mcludmg

far as ,0

in

it,

’’

that his critics

were

a conspiracy to topple the
government In a letter relating the story
of the destruction of

h.s house,

Hutchrnson wrote of those who had roused
the

they could be convinced what infinite
hazard there
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.s

mob

in

of the most

the

first

terrible

place: “I wish

consequences

such demons,
when ,hey are

-her..,

a.

hand suffic.e„..o

,e.

,oose

in a

govemnren, where
.here

suppress. he.

Here^

,s. he

is

^

.

h„

eadersh,p,s.„us.ra.edwe„Hu.chins
Hutchinson worried
about the power
of the an

of the

polity

and .he preservation
of the.r rieh.s
^nts. The
i he ne
necessity was for
an
'

~.uch.hesa.es.r,feashehad,n.heyears,..^^^^^^^^
Hovernorsh,p Opponents
of .he colon,
a, «overnn,en.
tended to see Hutch,
nson as
representauve of
oppress,ve Br„,sh otle,
regardless of Hutch
utchtnson s
•

the Governor had
opposed the

Stamp
mp Act of
ot 765,
fiS
1
1

colontsts, generally

to

deny them

the.r

u

as

a

pan of the

f
for
example,

was

own
lost

posttions That

on

rebel

royal entourage,
they assened,
Hutchinson intended

nghts and l.ben.es
Hutch.nson, despite

h.s generally

moderate pol.t.cal
temper, saw any d.ssen.
from the adm.mstrat.on
as unreasonable,
and wondered at the
coion,sts’ grievances

«

H.s .nabil.ty to
comprehend the pos.t.ons
of the rebelhous

members of the Massachusetts

AS
nterpreted

a result

all

pol.ty ultimately
undid

of Hutchmson’s

official stat.on

and

him

h,s

staunch positions,
opponents

of his aCons through
a lens of host.lity
and paranoia. Hutchinson
handled

the Boston Massacre,
for example, with
a reasonable amount
of aplomb and deference

toward the rebels Ye. the
opposition report of the

March

5,

1

incident represented the
fracas

770 as -“the .ntrigues of
wicked and designing men
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to bring us into

on

bondage

John Adams blamed
Hutchinson
but passive
instmmen, s'" and
that

Hut

specifically, insisting
that the
“‘sold'
»'d.ers

^
He,
H
ebberately,
with

were

h

-Jed

coolly

,

all

that premeditated

mahce

aoains.
t the oe
»
people in general
,

-ofi.hee.ecut.vebecameevenmoreprevalent.han,thad
,

once Hutchinson
assumed the
Governorship.
Members of his
immediate and
exten ed family
held a customs
position, minor
judgeships, seats
on the Supeoor
Court
-ding the position of Chief
fustice), the
position of province
secretary and the

J

— ~ip

colonists interpreted
t.s, too, as an

-ercount.todommate
colonists:

Massachusetts

"The coincidence of
his

the pattern suggested
by this evident
If the rebels

compromise At one

point.

Hutchinson, requesting
the
charter.

a

in

in Britain,

was

said
said, h
be

a
accidental

in their

latter's

Everything

fitted

accusations against

Hutchinson, again, was
not overly willing
to

Lord Hilsborough,
Secretary of State
opinion on potential
revisions
possibility

for the

in the

Colomes, wrote

Massachusetts

of abandoning the
charter and creating

combination with the colonists,
he was mainly against
changing the

Massachusetts charter, though
he
executive

it
t

authonty and the
multiplication of

monopoly of office

While Hutchinson
suggested the

new one

.

were creative and
closed-minded

Hutchinson and higher
powers

m collusion with the

politicsto.hee.tentoftyra„m.^

rise ,o
n u
to ,h.
the highest

offices within his
extended family could
not

e.o.

still

sought some son of
strengthening of the

" The energy of
the opposition

and the general lack of
active support

Hutchinson received from
England caused him
that the executive

needed strengthening

« He
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that

to entrench himself
fiinher into the position

argued for a strong, independent
executive

nto

a plebeian anarchy
and eventually
military rule

HutCnson wrote and spohe

«

lectunn, the militant
colon, sts on const,
tutionalism

and .he necess.ty
ohma,nta,n.n, the balance
of the En„sh-model

poitt.cal

not discuss, ons
Hutchinson was as

what members of the
opposition had

to say as they

.nterested ,n the
give-and-tahe of debate,
but rather

For

his efforts,

were

in listentng to

little

Hutchinson suffered not
only the rebuttal from
the opposition

their rights

Vet

interested In

m carding the day with his

Hutchinson had treated the
colonists’ claims that

»

him He was not

Massachusetts, but a reproach
from England for having
roused the rebels
place

system

assertions

in

in the first

were being violated

“stniggle to persuade the
great moderate majority
of the population of the
sheer
..rationality

and self-destmctive nihilism
of the extremists’ claims
and demands

Hutchinson’s downfall came
most directly as the

result

of the publication of letters

he had written to Thomas
Whately, former Secretary
to the Treasury

in

England regarding

the situation in
Massachusetts. Benjamin Franklin
had underestimated the
zeal of

American

patriots

from England

was

to

and sent portions of the
exchange between Hutchinson
and Whately

Speaker of the Massachusetts
House Thomas Cushing Franklin’s
hope

that the letters

would assuage

colonists’ enmity toward

England by redirecting

Hutchinson, a Massachusetts native
Franklin instructed that the

shown

to a small circle of individuals
and

were not to be
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letters

were only

printed. Eventually,

it

at

to be

however, the

letters circulated

and raised strnna
strong feehngs
aga.ns. not only
Hutchinson, but
England

general.-

m

^
Amenca were damning
were
,

to

anyone looking
S

positively inflammatory

at
ui

them with a
tnem

The most trnnW

y

r
cntical eye.
i

To

the rebels, they

r

'he letters involved
the claim

y Hutchinson that colonists
livine
ng so

rights as English
citizens “‘there

far

from p
England could not hope
to enjoy
i

all

their

must hp
a
be an
an ok
abridgement of English
libenies,”’” While

Hutchinson claimed a
misunderstanHintr
sunderstandmg. r
Colonists leaped on
i

this

with vigor and vitriol
accusing Hutchinson
and, by extension,
England of attempting
to subjugate them
to
atbitra^ government
Resolves from the House
assened that Hutchinson

was

conspiracy -to raise their
profit,

own

part

of a

fortunes and advance
themselves to posts of
honor and

not only to destruction
of the charter and
constitution of this province
but at the

expense of the rights and
libenies of the American
colonies.'- Hutchinson's
demand

for

obedience again clashed with
the colonists' protection
of their nghts, with neither
patty
acting in a particularly
conciliatory

manner This controversy

eventually

was

far

too taxing

for Hutchinson's already
strained constitution and
drove him from office, out
of his

homeland and

To

into exile in England.

the end, Hutchinson failed
to appreciate the claims
of his opponents In spite of

the moderation of his
political temper, Hutchinson
legitimate,

and sought to

engage them

in

dialogue.

Instill

The

was unable

adversaries with what he

final

saw

to see opposition as

as the truth rather than to

major fracas of Hutchinson’s
administration was the
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^

P

I

a~,

Hutchinson
Oeneta, Oa,e
Hu.chtnsou steahhast,

-e Boston hathotuuiess the au.

on the

te..h

tea hah been

to

pe™,t

the

pa.
as an

onthenu.htsa„ate.seatopa..t.at.^^^^

called

a lawless and
highly criminal
assembly
y

-«

It
,t

no, merely
was not
.

m.sread public opinion,
though he d.d on
several
at occasions
itt

e

of the public as
legitimate

political participants
partiduanfs

01 his stances, such
as his opposition
to the

•al.

“

«

I
In
spite

Stamp Act and

I,
It

was

u
that

Hutchinson

u
u
that
he considered so

of the moderation
of many

his unwillingness
to

tamper

».

political

system and to engage
them

in

an effective dialogue
proved to be

his

undoing as governor

By

the time of the
Revolution, the puzzle
for the Massachusetts
polity had

.he protection of their
libenies against an
executive they

According to the colonists,
the

ability to

felt

had become too powerful

hold several offices
simultaneously, combined

with control of
appointments and power over
the legislature placed
the executive
position to deny them
their rights

executive

in a political

system

in

The

which

become

solution, ultimately,

his

would be

in

a

to place that

duty to execute the law
was joined with the

necessity that he answer
to others in that system.
Jefferson’s assertion that
governments
are instituted to protect
the rights of the governed
had to be
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made

to

fit

with Hutchinson’s

perfectly reasonable
assertion of the hppH f
d for a

law and order

e passage of the
Constitut.on of

.

government powerful
enouah

7S0 Pnot to

that date, the
cit.zens

t

niaintain

of

h~,passed,^et.7S0,ho.e.t,aao.eee.^^^

” e~e and a poht, cal fanction

,.

was

a separate
^ ^ «uty and
ahtllt, to

car^ out

the law

,t

was

also a

through the veto
power ,0
^
^ the
check
behavior of other
mst.tutlons The
question of how
h
to balance

these (unctions

~

-e- P^Sta. Of

^

elections^

The answer

in

the early years

governance

that

of the Massachusetts
Constitution was

the constitutional
executive

^^^^^^^^i!^ggtJtiv e

Propo.sed

in

i

77 ^

The Massachusetts
Assembly
towns whether they would
consent

Towus such

as Boston, Lexington,

beyond the powers of the

sent out a notice

on September

to having the
legislature

Nonon

draw up

and Stoughton balked

17,

,776 asking the

a constitution

at the Idea

It

was

legislature to draft a
constitution, protesters
claimed,

and an
attempt to do so would
amount to usurpation The
only proper authority
to delineate a
constitution

would be one with a popular

.owns recommended

base,

calling a convention
to

chosen expressly for

that purpose. Several

draw up a plan of government
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It

was with

the promise
that the

document would he

freemen's approval
necessat, before

The

legislature

February 26

,

began work on
June

c

k

^

ratification,

17,

u

^ntajorityofthe towns
assented.^'

1777 and
approved a

at best

What

separation there

,n the

r
*^°"*‘"“tion

of the constitution
on

proposed

in

1

778

was
=flfe«ively within
the

,

legislature Politics
did not take nlae„

P

draft

1778

The separation of
governmental powers
moderate

that

possessing political

.

;“---~-er,po,lt,cstookplacew.thm
annual
legislature against

popu.^

one another

The proposed

legislature

(The Genenl

r ourt) was

divided into a

House of

Representatives and a
Senate which:

ceedings, and each
nate or reject any

sLrha: an "Tr;;'?

bill,

resolve or order

to nro"^'"

and resolve

le™. nsTnTvlb^

Clearly, the authors

o°r

of the Constitution
meant the branches of
the

legislature to act as

checks on one another
Propeny requirements
for holding office
were proposed The
proposed property
requirement for the Senate
was twice as large as
that
for the

This could serve to
assure that the two
bodies represented
different interests

The

i

proposed legislature held
the power to establish
courts, “make and
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establish

House

all

manner of

wholesome and reasonable
orders
. a
ers. laws and
everything they shall
judge
ge to be for th
the

statutes.” levy
taxes and

good and welfare of
the

government and ordering
thereof”" The

judicial h

“do

State,

nsulatmg them from

Gwen

governor
.0 report

m

direct political
influence

good

behavior, presumably

and allowino them
‘s mem a

certain
certa'

the limited separation
of powers, the
governor proposed

this

state militia

case was to be a
legislative leader

on “the condition of
the

State, and,

nratters to their
consideration, as shall

welfare and prosperity

and for the
mention, though

did hold their
thetr nffi
offices during

.He Senate and
Commander-in-Chief of the

and

t,

'

,, K
members
ofc the judiciary

all

in

,n

and Admiral of the

the broadest sense

autonomy
V7S was guite

I

state

He

navy The

had the duty

from time to time, to
recommend such

appear to him to concern

The property requirement

its

good government

for serving as
governor

was more

than twice that for
sennng as senator, seemingly
separating the proposed
governor from
e other members of the
Senate, perhaps for the
purposes of checking them "

Even

tins influence

true that the governor

over the legislature was
greatly circumscribed,
however

was popularly

senate due to his position
as
legislation

and the

relatively

its

was

elected and that he
stood apart from the rest of
the

President, his duty to

recommend

a broad course for

expensive property requirement
for holding office However,

while the Governor was
popularly elected,
the Senate and the

It

if

House together chose the

no candidate received a majority
of the

votes,

victor, potentially joining
the legislature
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and

the executive

more

th

closely than
they already
were Far ft„
^

•tesovernor could do

h-

duties as

httle

Without the
approval orat

Comma„der-.n-Ch,ef “

of checking the

Finally
many, the

^

u
independent
of the Senate

least that

governor was

hod

1

exolicitlv a

^

legislature

uS

hy the Gove^rno:
and Senate
provided that the

Govemot orTnT

State, the
Lieutenant Governor’
hall'be
ate to enable
them to proceed on th! h
"

•hem by

thts

ConstitutL
^uiurion, as
afr
Governor and

The Massachusetts
executive proposed
H posed

in
m

Senate.^®

1778
778 ywas not a
1

vital

member of a

---m-o«cewasne,therseparatefromtheleg,s^

among government
antong Const.tut.onal
epuals

mst.tuttons w,th

.n the Senate,
the

di.eong tuncuons
Merely one

Governor had

l.ttle say over
laws that were
passed The colonists
had seen actions on
the part of the
Royal Governor that
they

-erpreted as attempts to
deny them

powers

in

nghts Certainly the
d.m.n.shing of the

the proposed
constitution

prevent tyramiy

The members of the

778 proposed the executive
as an
institution

the.r

with any significant

was an attempt

legislature

who

to safeguard those
rights

drafted the Constitution
of

ineffectual, barely
existent office rather
than

political

power of its own
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an

If the

men who

™ore .han cautious
regarding

potential tyrann"

t

from alone The
nature of the
execut.v
executive
proposed
general

mood

in the

in

1

77s

,

United S,
Lntted
States regarding
execut.ve power
Othe

“

executives that
were even weaher
than thts one
Ueg.slative o

nferionty had
become the rule

amon»

the states d

""""

'

“

’

-urned out to be
even weaker

-ak
was not followed,

usually appointed
by
'he leaiciaf
y the
leg, Slature,

were re.ned,n

similarly to the

served to weaken.
he executtve.™

Commonwea1tutn™shail"“°'‘‘''’®

statute

any

’

or”

^^e

:f

Hxecuttve power rarely
entailed any sor,
of check on

~s

were

a, most

executtves

State, exercise

pretence exercisp an,

of any law,

Most

councls

Governor of Virginia

»ecuZ\“
the laws of this

as

legtslattve

never strong, vtabie
members ofa

power and

polittcal

in

pracltce

system Separa.ton
of

-ers.dno.enta,mth,s,ncarnat,on,anexecu.,vewathanab,l.,to^^^
legislature.

New York was the major

exception to this rule Her,
Here, a unitary
executive existed

with no strong
gubernatorial council
such as existeH
i,
existed elsewhere
i

executive power wiih
only

Cep.,.,

some

He was granted

the

full

influence by one
council on appointmeni
and another on

„ ,pp.
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York were

quite extensive

He was °oiven

th.

r
Const,

tutional authority
to check and
direct
the legislature
through the use of
a q
qualified
I'hed veto P
vr
Providing
the legislature
with direction

was mandated by
making

it

“the dutv of ,h
the legislature
at every

session of the
condition of the state

ui

ta

such matters to

was a

relatively

political

powerful executive
with

official nhirt

their

as an important

member of a

system^'

New

York's Constitutionally
powerfirl executive
was strong

Covernor George Clinton
urged members of
the other
departments

in

institutions to

which the constitution
has placed

us,

,n practice, as
well

“remain

w„Hn

the

and thereby preserve
the same

It

shall always be my
strenuous endeavor,
on the one
hand to retain and
exercise for the
advantaoe of the
people the powers with
which they have invested
me
on the other, carefUlly
,o avoid the
invasions of fitr'
rights which the
constitution

has placed

in

Clinton used the strong
executive power to
great effect

commander-in-chief of the

recommended concerns

state militia rigorously
to maintain

deftly that Alexander

party machine Clinton
also used the veto

executive

1

777 and
in the

1

787

He used

his

”

power

Here was the

He

wielded the

Hamilton could accuse him of
building a

power

firs,

as

law and order He often

for legislative action,
usually with great
influence.

power of appointment so

between

other persons

extensively, issuing fifty-eight
vetoes

and most prominent
example of a powerfti

nascent United States. This
executive was separate from
and equal to
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other branches
of government
so that

-e,

,t

was

a, so

a v,able

member of a

given by several
towns for reiectiny

ac

it

could exercise

poht.ca, system

r onstitution

thr.

Of a B,„ of .ghts,
propeny ,ual.hcat,ons

for

its

""

onj”""

proposed

holdmg

in

office

1

778 was the lack of
a

and voting, the scheme
of

representation and dental
of voting
Snts to blacks
S rights
blacks, r„H
a
Indians and
mulattoes were also

prominent reasons for

n ^

towns even found the

institutions too
separated

and the governor too
powerful

The most common
was not

sufficiently

theoretical objection

grounded

in the

elections as
“[f]undementual in

was

that the authority

of public

people While some
respondents lauded annual

Eve^

free

Government, and the best

barrier against

Cornrption, and the restless
passions of Mankind,”
others were doubtffil
of the
elections alone to keep
public officials untainted
explicit Bill

officials

™ Term

limits,

oaths of office and an

of Rights were among
the suggested means
of keeping
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ability

elected officials

of

mindful that their office wac fnr
desire to keep

government

in

^
pu ui-he

good and

check by keepi
)ing

It

that tyranny

was unacceptable^" The

mindail of its popular
duty was a

vitally

important one

Another important theoretical
objection involved
separation of powers.
Some
sought to elimmate what

little

The people of Greenwich

separation appeared in
the proposed form
ofgoventment

indicated that they

would “approve of a
General Court

Consisting of One Representative
Body, with a President
Presiding over the same
returns of

while

Hardwick and Boothbay

New

Salem’s return

the Legaslative authority

is

also indicate opposition
to a bicameral legislature,

explicit

When we

The

“Because there

is

two Branches Proposed

conceive that one Branch

of good government much
Better than two

The

will

answer

all

to

make

the Purposes

return of Spencer refers
to the

executive as essentially a branch
of the legislature, while
Boothbay’s return notes that

executive

one man

power ought

The weak

Indeed,

Mendon and

was

to the

towns objected

to despotism

The

to certain specific

bluntly that “they will not

return from

in

the hands of

The towns of

back returns objecting to the power
of the governor

“shall

powers of the

Boothbay noted

approve of a Governor,
that a
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office

The people

be Invested with such Power which

Hurt and Damage of the good People of this
State

Greenwich stated
Senate

and “never

too strong for some tastes

was too powerful and too disposed

of Hardwick noted that the proposed
governor

may be

still

legislature,

rejected the notion of a governor
altogether, feeling that even

Bristol each sent

generally, while other

umcameral

separation of powers

some towns

the proposed executive

Sutton.

to be located in a

Residents of

Lieut,

governor was “needless

Governor, or

in

a free state.

-dw,.h

an their

Li™.at,o„s™y

become da„oerous.o.h
i

Clearly

much of the

b

thinking in
Massach,
ssachusetts regarding
the executive

predominant attitudes
throughout the
states

Not

all

Massachusetts residents
were so deem

however Many
colonists had been
an.red

at the

R

---s,especianyXhomasHutch,„son.ske^^^^

was

u

in r

”
executive, legislative
and

judicial staf

'--~^Manytow„speoples,dedwi.hthereside„.sofUp.^
therefore,

who

indicated

“Ako
AJso

.
appears
to us that
Leoislativp
Legislative, Judiciary
r hand Executivf^
rto
departments ought to
be preserved
more
It

•

distinct, ha

.

form

.

..

.

» h..,

^

c„„,„

or,*.,,

Constitution’s blending
of the offices of
government
emment “I,
'
I, a
appears to said

the State at one
and the
•Ha. perhaps the

Same Time

The

Governor should be allowed
two votes

Originate

Or Negative

a

[Generan
eneral]

Town

that

it

in

Choice ”» The return
from Boston noted
^re so blend-

®

Coun may

monopolize
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will

the Senate, while
residents of

’’that

the

House

to their voice in
the Mlitary, as
well as Cvil Officers
to

Id' a'nd th!f''''i‘r
1

^

return of Williamstown
noted

Spencer indicated some
propensity toward a veto,
noting then preference

of Representatives has
a Right

the proposed

°f ‘he
to themselves a
Variety

«He

'
and the Members
confined^tn
Incumbrance

Keeping the executive
’

Ie«i<;Iati\
o o
^lative

powerful executive
came

in

•

j-

Fo™ of
without

^
and
judicial offices

®

be.

“’'re>y distinct.
particular Duties

•

the “Essex
Result

in distinct

a

invention ofthe towns
of Essex
ounty met and issued
a detailed report
The bulk off thp
i
the work
was written by
Theophilus

-

replace the rejected
Constitution

"

-

““

Manv of the
Many
th.

«-

-n*. P..PO-

specific criticisms
of the

c.„.„

proposed

Constitution involve the
executive

Hssas
tut.on

,s

liable to

executae
xecutive

exception

T"""
officer

That the seventeenth^anicle

"

‘>«cause the supreme

not vested with
proper authority and
because an independence
between the executive and
leofs
is

exceptionable, because a
due independence
'^S'slative, judicial,

powers,
PoZrrno"
rf
nor between
any two of them.

The

principles

not kept up
and executive
is

supponing the judgments and
recommendations of the convention
included

the notion that legislative,
executive and judicial

power

‘•ought to be

and independent of one
another, and so ballanced,
and each having
other, that their
independence shall be

preserved,-

65

in

different hands,

that

check upon the

If these guidelines are
not followed.

.

and power

is

consolidated “the pm/A
^
rnment will be
absolute, whether
these n
hands of one or a
large number

The descnpnon of
an. deal execu,.ve

Office indicates.
Hants

o

"'-“~--w..Hootoppos.t.on,and.ocontto,a,r^^^"^
who

state,

should nffiinge then,

^

Constitution-

A

™der

the proposed

unitarv

A-.a.e„e,otoneco„posedoffewnte.hets,wasnecessa..o
ensure proper
performance

,n office,

while

eleconh '

‘

n^

hy either the
legislature or the
ud.
.

‘"dependence and
accountability

.

^pecitic recommendations
reuardina

r

^

„ ouse

’«

^ P-y councl elected
by the
from members of the
Senate, sole control
by the Oovernor
over the m,l,t.a
term
,

--ota.,on,noffice,andanunco„d,t.onalveto^

“ viable

'

member of a

political

system
and
y
nd given power
necessary to

carry out his duties.

Many of the towns who
i

ns

responded

were concerned about
mamtaining

m

any

deta.l to the
Constitution

proposed

,n

a popular bas.s
for government
as a

means of
checking potentially
tyrannical institutions
The office of the Governor
figured prominently

n many of those concerns Any
separate,

residents

who

felt that

reasonably powerfii,
executive was conceived
by

a strong, independent
executive was a necessary
feature of ffee

pohtical institutions.
These residents

were

certainly
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no more

in favor

of tyranny than those

who opposed

a strong executive

The

task
task, then,
then

was

to create an
executive that

was

independent and strong
enough to perform the
duties
ones ot
of the office
off
n yet
and
would not

become

tyrannical in Ihe
process.

.

here was more, and

more

influential,

objection to the lack
of power

in

the

utive,

and particularly to the
lack of a separate
executive department.
The voters
Massachusetts had rejected
the Constitution
of 1 773 not only
because
they found

legislature

had drafted

of

fhe

1

778,

,t

m

“One of the

principal reasons
underlying the rejection

shon, was opposition
to

members of which had shown
themselves

organization of the
government

-» With the

perceived defects came,
helping lead to
the

one proposed

in

1

its

a constitution

made by

it

m

to be

of the

a General Couit

to be anything but
disinterested in the

Constitution of 1780.
correclions

passage

A

in

these

separate executive, stronger
than

778, emerged in a
constitution proffered by
a constitutional

convention.

Febmai^

In

1

779. the General Coutt sent
questions to the towns asking,

first,

whether the townspeople
desired a new constitution
and, second, whether they
would

empower
thirds

their representatives
to call for a constilutional
convention

More

of the towns favored a new
constitution drafted by a
convention

purpose.'"'

The convention convened

members possessing
efforts in this vein.

Cambridge on September

in

instructions keeping

James Bowdoin was

them

mindftil

called for that

1779,

many

ofits

of the objections to the previous

elected President of what
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I,

than two-

would

later

be called “as

great a

any

number of men of
learnina

talent ^ w

earlier period.”’"^

•

patriotism as has
ever been c^n^
^ u
convened
here at

Ihe ^ecutive nf 7«n
1

ThedraftersoftheCo„s,itutio„of,780
’

An

then had
^

•

Pnp
energetic

-Hou.

balance

government was a
necessitv
n
y A. r ames Bowdoin
indicated “A on
to e.e. ..e,
.s at

W

best, hn. a

.e,e.

p.eee

of„ac.„e.

...o^

-c,onoh_and.at.t.a„.^
epubhc

Accord, ng to the
records of the
Const, tut, onai

-nceofafreeaepuhhc

™

.ng

that the

vll

Convent, on:

is

the

Peop,ehegovernedh..edU.soft^^^^

Presu.ahl, when laws
were no longer of
the peoples
own .ah.ng the

~hadheco.et.rann,caloroppress,ve.hes,a,edpur^
as to

prevent those

was
that

who

are vested with
authonty front beconung
oppressors ” The

to enable governnten,
to protect peoples,
oghts

same government

to

deny those

w„e .ah,ng „ difhcul,

rights

.^nual elections were
only one method
of preventtng an
energet.c government
from becomtng
tyrannical, however
The concepts of
separation of powers
and checks
ba.ances permuted both
strength and control
regarding government
and were

effecvely employed
introducing the

new

in the

Constitut.on of 1780 than
they had been

Constitution,

,n

Bowdo.n wrote

Unless a due Proportion
of Weigh,

is

given to each

of
Powers of Government,
there will soon be a
Conftt,on of the whole An
Overbearing of any one of
its Parts
on the rest, would destroy
the

Its

the Balance and
accelerate

D,ssolut,on and Ruin

for

The Powers of Government
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1778

far

and

more

an address

must be balanced

Thosp

Ihe Administration
should ha
hem, as are requisite
to

'I

It'

spective Places,
and such Checks

every Branch of
Power as^rii^p
Its becoming
formidable and

^

wealth.

Bowdoin went on

prevent

to the

Common-

to indicate the
specific nature
of the separation f
"'P'‘^'"'°nofpowers

balances located

in

and checks

the Constitutional
arrangement

The House of
Representatives

is intended
as the R
sentative of the
f”'"'
Persons and the Senate of
of the Commonwealth
IThe Ciml
f
Power of a
negative on each m„l, .
u

1

ofMen

are liable

,omiIUwaTa%™

pe:pTeXL'rs;r'^^^^^
^

the People ar large,

Bowdoin tunher noted

that, in addition
to

by

the other branches
of government, the

Governor's Council could
also act as a check
on the executive

Bowdoin

IS

striking a balance

between strong government
and controlled

government, between energy
and accountability

He

must be, strong to prevent
a potentially tyrannical
pains to remind people
that this

is,

after

all,

indicates that the
executive

is,

and

legislature yet he also
goes to great

a popular office

It

will

be held

in

check by

other branches of
government, by the Governor's
Council, and by popular
elections The

Governor

is,

and should

be, both strong

and accountable. This
balance also

two fimctions of the Governor
The need
the executive has been
given sufficient

for a strong executive
points

power

in the fact that

to remain an independent
political institution

with a duty and ability to
execute the law The need
for control

69

up

illustrates the

is

indicated by

making the

Governor a member of
a
action

is

political

system

in

which he must be
wilHng to perform

to be taken

™s balance between strength an.

---

control

,s

..rect, mb, cate,

powers Of the
Const.tut,ona,e.ecut,ve

powers an. chechs an.
balances are establ.she.
Vet

,t

Const, tut.on

.„ualelect.on^^

not

mere,

--

^

r

,s

in the

politics if

left

up to elect.ons

oghts Of i„.,v,.uals

-n^ement The

Const, tut, on of VSO
promotes a m,n. set
un.er wh,ch the
Constituhon
other laws shoul.
be respecte.
I

-

to the utmost

The Consututton urges
members of

each nst,tut,on to see
other branches of
government as epual to
themselves an. to hoi.
,

them

in

appropriate esteem

The Preamble

sets out an explicit
separation

of powers and the
purpose of law

in

political society

“,rut‘,on

rfmlu

a

“

Earlier ,n the Preamble,
^security"

.ranqutlity, their natural
rights,

necessity for a government
that

have a

is

ind.cated to be ‘The

and the blessings of life
,s

-

power of enjoytng,

The preamble

in

safety an.

thus d,splays the

powerful enough to protect
peoples’ rights yet must

“And whenever

right to alter the

mode

“ ™Pa«>al interpretation.

and a fhifhfiT^’

also be kept in check:

Con-

of
°^°“''^™"’ent,
to provide for an
equitable

these great objects are not
obtained, the people

government, and to take measures
necessary for

prosperity and happiness.
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their safety,

a

.
.

l,«fcXX..dx„X
government

to

become too

powertlil Article

AA
XX asserts that executive
.

power has a duty
respect&l of the law
and the legislature
“The power of suspending
the laws, or the

derived from

it.

to be exercised in
such particular cases
only as the legislature
shall

expressly provide for

.Article

XXIX

indicates the need
d for “a
an impartial interpretation
'

•

,

ot the laws and
administration of justice.
justice

Tn
To

during good behavior
and fixed salarip? Fmoii,
y,
I,

Article

ensure

u-

this,

•

judges are allowed tenure

separation of powers

is

cemented

in Part

XXX:
n the Government of
this Commonwealth,
the legisladepartment shall never exercise
the executive^and
judicial powers, or either
of them: The executive
shall
never exercise the legislative
and judicial powers or either of them The judicial
shall never exercise
the legislative and executive
powers, or either of them:
to the
end It may be a government
ill
of laws
tive

’

'

and not men

These

articles

show a

desire to maintain not only
a separation of powers,
but also to

maintain a respect for the law
on the part of members of the
separate institutions of

government. While the executive
would have veto power over the
Genera] Court and

appointment power of judges,
provisions are included to
encourage the Governor to
maintain a due respect for the law
and other institutions of government
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'•»*-

."zirr:r,:.“r“ "*
piety, justice

moderation

gaii^, are
absolutely

tP

necessaTt^pTele^^S"^

of libeny. and to
maintain a free
govem2nem
ought, consequently,
to have a n^ni.

™

those pnnctples,
sentatives

And

*°
fte choice of
then offi'"'”'”,"
and reprethey have a riaht t

e

ecutioZTh

r

among many .hose duty

-

‘

^

to expect a certam
character

ofiicals had, as

pan of that

Commonwealth
pnnciples

thtrd that

.ould be

to see, through

Thts publtc tms,
mean, that

their elected
olhctals

It

^

institutions

Constitution estabitshes
the .nst.tutional
framework of the

Separation of powers and
checks and balances are
agatn the guiding

The General Court

House on “the

Of

p™-ed

.t

character, a duty to
the public to respect
the

Consftutton and to respect
other Constitutional

Pan 2 of the

f

good adm,n,strat.onrrc:tot:^^^^^^^^^^

-e ofr-tca,

---ad a nght

People

in

givers and
magistrates an exact
anY^‘'“‘'^^
of them, .n the
format, on and

^aty for the

»'

to those of

principle

,s

dtvtded tnto

‘hr

We

of equality/- The
propeny

and Ho,,se

ofRe„a,,.es

qual.fication for the

House

is

one-

of the Senate, buttress.ng
the check,
ng fUnctton of the two branches by

providtng them with

officials

of d.ffering interests

indtcated above, hold their
offices during

good
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- Members of thejudicial branch,

as

behavior, a, least nominally
Insulating them

opinions of the Justices
of the Supreme Judicial

and upon solemn
occasions
.^at framers

Of Its

political institutions.

ro™.l.„on,

778

also indicative

of ^
a respect tor
for orh
other

The

relationship

was one which was

„„

instill

'

institutions

into the

memhers

to revolve around
the law

ji,

to be held in the
utmost esteem
e

1

is

important questions
of law

of the Massachusetts
Constitution were
attempting to

were

This

r ourt, upon

powers ot the governor
were

In addition to

similar to those in
the rejected Constitution
of

being the •^Supreme
Executive Magistrate,” he
was to hold the

position of Commander-i„

Chief, the

pardomng power and

substantial appointment
power.

Certain of these powers
are subject to the advice
of the Gubernatorial
Council, of which
the

Governor was president and had

discretion, to assemble

and

call

“full

power and

together.""’

No

authority,

mention

is

made of any

advisory fonction on the
part of the governor The
closest to

with

at least five

of the nine members of the

from time to time,

sort

this is that the

at his

of legislative

Governor,

council, “shall and may, from
time to time,

hold and keep a council, for
ordering and directing the affairs
of the Commonwealth,

according to the laws of the land

,4gain, the property requirement
for the

Governorship was the highest of any
public
interests different

who was

office,

from other office holders

presumably providing a governor with

Executive power was placed

to be advised by a Governor’s
Council,
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The governor was

in

one

invigorated by

official

removing him from
the Sen;itP
Rather than merely
another senator
’

a separate
institution in

which the
perform

hts duties
sufficiently

"
^
,

™..

I..

...

the prohlen,
arose of how to
h

.h,
_

veto

power

I^.ve?shalltli:?LwTnTha^^

«over?or^!:'rL:

wh^u^tiu:"

he

signify his approbation
h

after

such reconsideration,

House of Representativpc

•N«.»n.,

«
w.h

''''

t

Jo

.t”S

u

th“ds

Ihe'^H

ii

,r,„ ,,,

...

^

,„H,.

...,..»

that passed

“J

,.

.
.. ...

c'
Senate
or

.r*

...

i«..d

shall

„

would have

to be broad enough,
and presumably just
enough, to satisfy

examination by members
of various
take, but the actions
that

political institutions

Action might be more

difficult to

were taken would be more
thoroughly thought through
as

result.
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a

The executive

that

emerged

^een proposed

While

was strong

for

,ts

it

in ,he

eariier

Constitution of

1

780

and was stronger
than

was not strong
by Twent

r

mol ^

h

time Here
cie was a pol
political
t
executive dr.

strong enough
to aiiow

-,d
Its

occupant to

°™

rf

The

easonably independent
of other branches
and they were
prevent d

encroaching extensively
into

iher
Constitution
he was

was

the

w as

his territory

Ye, the

Go

elso held
responsible to

by both the
electorate and
members of oth

i

institutions.
suffi

also held in check
hv

’

l

fhr.

•

government of MassachiispttQ ru
se'ts The
governor was charged
with executing
also a

inierests

member of a

and competing

*iave little say in

While

i

political

system

in

the law ye,

which ne
he had to
,o contend
with competing

institutions Possession

of the veto power
was

most matters Under the
Constitution of

1

significant in this

S 0 with a strong
separation of
,

powers and
important

a

governor

member of a

matters, the

who

could say, •No,” the
executive became both
secure and an

political

system ,f agreements
were to be reached on
policy

governor, consent became
necessary, unless a
super-maprity

could be secured,
presumably a

difficult task in
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the face

of a governor's

in

each house

opposition.

Yet what would
happen

if

these tu/n

f.

Perfo^g poa„c3, eo..e.
H„.
.ov.e

,eaae..p.

that coalitions
could be built

among and

Ho. .. ,e. .r.e .e

.„e,.o. o. .e execo...
o.ce

and elections could
be won?

x,

Politics in this
sense takes place

within Constitutional
institutions, and the
executive

is one of
three coequal
branches of government
concerned with the law.
John Hancock and
Caleb Strong were

two

early governors

who were

particularly successftil
in providing
leadership as

it

has been

defined.

John Hancnrk
John Hancock served
as Governor of
Massachusetts from 1780
through ,785 and
-hen agahi from 1787
through ,793. Prior
to his election as
Massachusetts'

executive, he had served
as president of the
Provincial Congresses

selectman of the

Town

in

c«

1774 and 1775

of Boston and as
president of the Contmenta,
Congress

two years.- Certainly
Hancock's

legislative experience

would contribute to

understanding of the workings
of poHtica, institutions
and

Ins attitude

for over

his

toward the Ge:

Court when Governor of
Massachusetts.
Notice
sense did not

that

exist.

when Hancock served
Pohtics at this time

certainly faced opposition,
though

it

as Governor, political
parties

was organized around

was not

m any formal

interests.'^

Hancock

partisan in the strictest
sen.se of that

word

Several of the other prominent
pubhc figures of his tune
considered Hancock nothuig

more than a demagogue. John and
Samuel Adams, James Warren,
Eibridge Gerry and
James Bowdoin

all

attempted to thwart Hancock's
reelection attempts and were
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remarkably unsuccessful

Hancock
'

a ,

'0 ‘he poin,

,

where he

;;'°^-----enownasroh,slea.rsh.p.,^
well have been
h.sleadersh,p style

a

was

nouon of respect

hesitant to

wh,chkepr,m

popular

for the General
Court as a coequal
political .nstitut.on,

employ the veto

Tn a

Hancock

sage to the General
Court on February 25

1790
”

-----swtthgteatreluctancethatlstateob,ct,o„s.^
Houses, but the duty

I

owe

Other consideration

the people and
the Const.tut.on,
must nse supenor to

The racp
case

at
at

a
hand
.nvolved a resolve
passed by the General
Court
r,

to allow the dtvorce
of Dan, el and Ab.gal

thus, the principles

The

,

Ch,ckenng Hancock’s

react, on to thts

he held most dear

legislature

cock held to

eve.

this

had granted the
Chichenngs the divorce
they sought. The
objection

was

that the General

Court did not have the
Constitutional

authorit>'

to grant the divorce:

When

the people established
the present Constitution
of
Commonwealth they gave to the
several departments

safe

al

T,"T"'’

“"^idered to be
““ght to have such a con-

f

stmcoo

elThoto'^™
Authority to hear and grant
divorces. Hancock notes,
had been Constitutionally
bestowed

upon the Governor and the
Council

‘“until the Legislature
shall,
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by law make other

provision

The “•"'I
General

C“”^

i

„ ,1,

.1.

Supreme

Judicial Court.

At no time had thp
the

•

i

i

legtslature ever
held the Constitut.onal

aiiowed by an .nshtutton
which was not
Const.tut.onally
the dtvorce

would

empowered

to

power

do so Pemtittino

violate the separation
of powers

Hancoch goes on

to elaborate h,s
op.nton of the
.nst.tut.on of ntarnage

It is

a

vttal

Ptece Of c,v„ socety,
accord, ng to h,.,
and the ,e,s,a.ure
should tahe care to
ensure it is
no. tahen hghtly
That ,s a seconda^
po,n. ,n Hancock's
message, however
H,s pn„a^

concern

,s

the ,nv,olab,li.y of
the Const, tut, on
Separahon of powers and
Constitutronal

pnncpies should be respected
by those
tarst,

,nd,viduais ,n

accord,ng to Hancock
His veto, and thus h,s

tespect for the ,nst,tut,on
of ntarnage. Rather

estabhshed

,n the

,t

,s

whon, the public has
placed

pol.t,cal

conduct.

,s

not based on his

based on h,s respect for
the

Constitution of 1780
Hancock bases his politrcal
leadershtp

Const,tut,on. ,n the fact
that he and

™any

the,r

institutions

in

the

others have been granted
the task of uphold,,
‘Ig

the law, supporting
peoples' rights and safeguardtng
the populace from tyranny.

With a deep respect for the
Constitution and
similar

esteem for the other institutions
located

its

separatton of powers

the document's arrangement

evtnced a respect for the
General Court as a body
representative of the

whose
June 8

,

authority

1

was grounded

,n the

will

a

Hancock

of the people,

Constitution In a message to the
General Court on

789 Hancock opens by indicattng
the importance of the
,

people's right to have their will
expressed through that body

use the veto

came

at all,

He

legislative

body and

reiterates his hesitancy to

given his confidence “that the
discussion of the public business

78

the

will

be

attended with
candour and
unanimity •"«

measures which

shall

He

be by you

“ «»

Cp„,„,.„

pf pp,

and he
his

is

own

f"' .1.

H..

P.i.P,«
,

1,1 .
dated
,

,

s activities,

many

„„

he indicates a
definite sense
that he

times Several
of Hancock ’s

,s

December

com
“mmunications
begin

8

’

1780 “Tn .r.
consequence of a
Resolve of
resolve
ot rh.
the General

” In
a

message on Junee

1
1

0 1 788
0,1
788,

es for regulating
the State Militia.

owever allowing

».

similarly ,o a
letter

^

,

—

,

of

carrying out the
will of the

rv

Massachusetts

.

1.W1.P.. ,.,p„p
.

is

nse of acquiescence,
has been noted
In

,

S'slature at

sure to be as
respectful of
those as he

,p ... ,p.

=

o
Hancock

continues: “I shall
readily concur
in those

that

its

members

He

H
Hancock

is still

Coun of

,

alludes to his having
suggested

deferential to the

‘Vill discover
defects

Oener. Court

which have escaped
„y

. ...
..
.1

,p

General Court

.i.

is

-d

^

^

^

.„

an institution to
which Hancock
HanmrL- owes some
courtesy, the governorship

an institution equal
to the General
Court

He

thus
us feels
feek a. H
duty fto guide
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•

it

as

it

guides him.

is

tn6 rest to the
General Court
Loun

shall

I

He

T-r»:>

communicate

time, as

business

I

may

indicates as

to

m

much

June of 1789:

you such matters from
time to

find to be necessarv for

, 1,

Ifely to call for your
attention but "teiom
and ordmaiy concerns
of supporting
government

.n the

is

same speech, Hancoch
makes

certain

recommendations regarding
the newly

instituted federal
Constitution, but they are
puite broad
relate to the character
necessary for a free citizen.

virtues,”

and education are the
most

broad, general statements,

vital attributes

Hancock recommends

Mainly, his recommendations

-The exercise of the

Hancock mentions

that

specific

and pnvate

- Finally, using

measures be taken to ensure the^

“honor and credit” of Massachusetts,
especially the issue of
public debt

gave more

social

When Hancock

recommendations, they were either
on more mundane matters or
on

matters directly relating to his
Constitutional duties such as
Commander-in-CWef This

would

is

cettainly

fall

into place with a respect
for Congress's capacities
as an institution.

He

acting as one political institution
charged with a Constitutional
duty while allowing

Other institutions to act

in

a similar manner

Hancock's gubernatorial administrations

also

encompassed the framing and

adoption of the United States Constitution.
Here, as elsewhere, he urged obedience
to the

law and promoted

institutional behavior befitting

message to the General Court

in

members of a

political

system In a

January of 1789, Hancock indicates that
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it is

his

duty to

remind members of the
Genp^i
Genera,

^
Coun

.

,ha. .he federal

obedience as does .he
Sta.e Cons.i.u.ion
^t'tu.ion,

Cons...u„on .us.
conr.and

h
Heno.ed.ha.Massachuse..si.se,fwasnowa

-

^

7

--

.He federal
Co„s.l.u.,on and

Hu. .he line which

govemmen. of .he
Commonwealth
he Constitution,

& carefiilly
.he

is

&

well described

m

ought to be obviously
established
maintained, & such
provisions ou-ht to be

c\tzers?fTeV
Commonwealth,

that all reasonable
nor indulge a wish
to derive aid
from any other tribunal,
than those the state
provides

men
en

Being

a

entailed

w

t
will

member of the

m

being a

capacities of other

he
be

/

satisfied,

federal system, for
Hancock, comprised
principles similar to those

member of the Massachusetts
members and

political

system a respect for the

institutions within the
system,

and a deep respect for the

Constitutional bases of authority

This did no. exclude, of
course, popular limits on
authority and public

duty to the populace, as
Hancock goes on to remind

governments are established “by
the

free consent

his

officials’

audience that consi.mions and

of the People

Nor does

a respect for

.he federal Cons.itution
exclude keeping an eye on the
interests of the residents of

Massachusetts:

[W]e

are to continue to support
our

own Government

with unabating anxiety for its
welfare
deed, the general Government

&

prosperity In-

of the United States is
founded in an assemblage of Republican
Governments,
& It depends essentially on these not only for its dignity

&

energy, but for

its

very existence

81

in

the form

it

now

possesses, therefore,
whatever

C ommonwealth

ic

h

support the

has a tenH

interest

Massachusetts public

officials, then,

bu. also to be
.indffil oftthe

arrangement,

this

ftedetal

had a duty ,0
look
Constitution
n

meant respecting
' the

federal

As with
wnh

Tn ,

th

aft

•

as equal with
the

Constitution and show, no
' a certain a
‘‘"’°™‘°f<''=f^^^nce

.

also

meant checking the
^

Van Beck
issues

«

^

th state’s
the
political

,,
‘

^

IC

federal

when necessary

It

an
government
when necessary

Hall claims that

“Hancnrf
^
ncock, a
lazy u
but shrewd
i

That dodginu of issues hna
'

antock was quite
successful

politician,

dodat
^ed

of ^ -yie ofleadersMp
through

electorally

y While Hare

r

may not have taken
bold
stands on divisive
issues, executive
leadership at the
time
^
^ did nor necessarily
require them,
milarly. Hancock’s
respect for the
General Coun and
its capacities
may well have led
to prefer that sort
of broad leadership
Hancock’s playing out
of the executive
cHailenge resulted m
the constitutional
executive On the one
hand, the official was
an
ecutive This meant
that he was one
of several institutions
designed to affect the
law
The other institutions
were his equals and held
duties as important,
even if those duties
fferent

On

the other hand, the
official

authority, while ultimately
popular,

was

was grounded

constitutional This meant
that his
in the

Constitution

The executive was

ntentber of a political
system and, given his veto
power, had to be considered

regarding promulgation of
the laws In practice,

this

meant an executive showed

respect for separation
of powers and the legislative
branch Authority
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in

was based

decisions

a

deep

in

the

a

itution while duty

requued allegiance

broad terms, reflecting
a notion of the

to the public

good. Leadership
was on very

legislature as the law

making body.

Caleb Strong

While John Hancock faced
opposition, he did not
face anything
party.

Caleb Strong

did.

like a political

Strong served as
governor from 1800
through 1807 and
again

front

1812 through 1816. His
administrations mark a
period when poht.cal
developed to the point
where
they affected political
activity

as Significantly as they
parties

would by

the 1830’s. Oscar
and

were based primarily around
national issues and

state matters. Indeed,

parties had

m Massachusetts,

Mary Handlin
at this

write that political

time had

he substantial yeomanry
of the State,’

who

though no.

h.tle effect

on

voted for Jefferson,

also elevated the merchant
Federalist Caleb Strong
to the governorship.”'"

has been mdicated that
one significant aspect of
Strong’s leadership

It

was able

to rise

above partisan

divisions.

A

memorial to Strong noted

is

that he

that fierce partisan

divisions over whether to
side with the French or
the British had rent
Massachusetts
political life

yet Strong

life.

asunder by 1800. The time was
one of ’’pohtical agitation
and party

managed

to win election seven
consecutive years.'* After a
hiatus

Strong was again caUed into
poUtical service upon the
outbreak of the

“in the hope, that by the

wisdom and

Commonwealth might be

strife,”

from public

War of

1812,

conciliatory firmness of his
administration, the

preserved from the disorder, and
turbulence, and manifold

private and public, with which
she

was

threatened.”'^' Strong

enough:
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was thought

to

evils,

be politic

that he alone
could anneasp

o

people, and restore
comparatte plTe to
He was elected, but he
brought nn
to the chair He
strictiv
^ u-

community

m

resentment

of those who had been
driven frtmTffic'f
and resisted all
importunity to

He

This testimonial
delivers an armrtito
accurate assessment
of Strong’s attitudes
as governor
notes that “[tjhere is

no

prevalence of party

spirit

evil to

which

The extreme

free

Commonwealth, and
u not
iiui me
the

in

danger

if the free

Pnhi.v
rr
Public officials
should rise above party
spint
•

i

will prove, that

we

.

are faithful agents
of the

lp;iriprc
*
leaders
or instruments
or a party
of
nartv
•

against .he effects of
pan.sanship

be

the

violence of this
spirit degrades
the character of
a

nation and Vitiates the
morals of a people

because -’our impanial
conduct

Governments are more
exposed than

m the press:

He warns

at

one point

’the Morals and
Liberties of the People
will

Presses in the United
States are disgracehilly
prostituted to

Faction and Falshood

With the development of
rudimentaty

became an imponant one Strong

referred on

political patties, the

many occasions

question of patronage

to the criteria he considered

necessary for appointment
to office
n the distribution of public
employments,
ance to the reputation and
tranquility of

it is

of import-

the State, that

appointments

should be made with impartiality
and with
a due regard to superior
talents and meritorious
servicesBut as virtue and submission to
the Laws are essential to
a
Republic, and form the only
sure basis of its prosperity—
these qualifications must, I think,
be in a peculiar manner
requisite,
those who are appointed to
office in
,

m

such a
not under the influence of
moral principles, can have no just
claim to the public confidence.

overnment

for a

man who

is
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Strong elsewhere indicates
a desire
‘re

-.nsutshe.

i

‘hose for publick office,

for ..hthr.es anh
ffitesnr. h.

If party affihation

Wh„e

c

was not

to gu.de

who

are most

whatever name of poht.ca,
O.stmchon the.

pubhc

offic.als

whtle

,n office,

what should^
renundtng the Genera.
Court of the, r dut.es.
Strong refers ohen to
the Const, tut.on

Rather than pomting out
spec.fic objects for
legislators’ attent.on.
Strong would
refer

them to

their dut.es

under the Massachusetts
Constitution

at

times

'

Cues should come from

the Const, tution rather
than the poht.cai party
Strong’s v.s.on of
leadersh.p involved an
ahthty to nse above
part.san d.tferences ,nto
a respect for the
inst.tut.onal sett.ng

which

in

the governor found
h.mself Const.tut.onal duty
should supplant any
part.san learhngs a
public official

Strong

executive

may
is

possess

also qu.te respectful of
the separation of
powers and hrs place as an

One of the

objects of legislation, according
to Strong,

intpamal interpretation and

fa,thfi,l

execution ofthe laws

reminded the members ofthe
Genera. Court

that they

is

to “prov.de for the

On May

31

autonomy of the judical branch

1803 Strong

had been granted the

power, and that the framers of
the Massachusetts
Constitution had done
assure the

,

,

legislative

their best to

His respect for the separation of
powers

extended to a respect for the
Constitution and the law generally,
“Our Consritut.ons have
Liberty as their guiding Principle,”
Strong stated, “but this liberty

subordinate to the laws

In

is

reasonable and

June of 1801 Strong urged that
“Obedience to the Laws,
,

and Respect for constitutional Authority,
are
citizens,”'”

He certainly

essential to the character

encourages such characteristics
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in

of good

Massachusetts’ public

officials

as well:

“The members of the Onwo
mment

encourage by

n

their

.cated that laws

and directing the

Coun

To

example a love of order

w,ll

on

.heir part think

““w

‘he laws

legislature, that
the

-n dtschargtng thts
tmportan. tmst,

Laws

"»

Earlier,

two are coequal
i

.nstitutions with a
responsibility to

for the welfare

Commonwealth

your del.berate
reflect.ons

of the

State, as

w.ll

more can be done

-.0
“that

that

to

..Our Constituents

mehora.e

In several instances.

may be

the.r

is

you may think necessary

now enpy Peace and

committed

he employed to

respect tor the General
Court appears in hts
respect for thetr
Constitutional

makers He notes

he had

must he Respected
hy those who
make and execute them

you. Gentlemen, the
legislat.ve authority
of the

estabhsh such

themselves obliged to

Tranqu.hty

-

Hts

power

as

law

whatever

Condition or increase
their Security, you
Gentlemen

Strong allows that he

wtll ..cheetfhlly

concur” with any laws

calculated to secure to
them the benefits, of a
mtld and jus. Govertmtent

In his addresses

and messages to the
General Court, Strong

has performed the tasks
assigned htm as executive

He

is

is

careful to indicate that
he

eager to use his position to

“promote Harmony among the
several Branches of
Government ”
General Court the deference
and respect

it

157

-He thus offers the

deserves as a Constitutional
institution on a

level with the executive.

This respect for the legislature
did not prohibit Strong
from advising the General

Court as to matters he

felt

required their attention His
recommendations, like Hancock’s
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^

;;"
^a

.

or example,

-‘^e laws

~

may be

-P-ency ormahtng some add,

n, 0

_.s

. spec.

duly executed,
pernri,

me

.Han

Hanco.

to suggest
.he

.tonal prov.s.on
hor suppress,

ng ho..erles whtch are no.
established or allowed
”'59 * ,
by the le»islatnrp
° ature
A. another po.nt.
Strong recommended
,

el,m,na.,on of the death
penalty

»« ...

“ On more than

one occasion,
occasion Strong
S,
transmitted

w.,

his legislattve
leadership

I

was more along

the lines

of

shall cheerfully

may

concur with you in any
measures that
tend to encourage
agriculture and the
and

liberal

The general recommendations
often indicated that

among

letters

it

would be

that

Strong made were
consistently similar He

to the benefit
benefit

of tK
the r>
Commonwealth to promote morality

the residents of
Massachusetts Educat.on and
religion receive great
emphasis

in

Strong's speeches as “those
Institutions, whtch form
the manners and morals
of the
people, and which tend to
inspire them with venerat.on
for the Supreme Being,
with

reverence for jus. authority,
and respect for themselves

manufac.ur,ng interests

urged a

in his

fiscal responsibility,

He promoted

agricultural

and

messages and urged penal reform '«
Strong also regularly

the need for “a prudent

revenue ’>« The program that
Strong urged,

if

87

it

economy

in

the administration of

was broad, was

also consistent

-a

s

to respect

He

.ndicated

“[o]bl,gat,o„s to
support the federal
Co
f
Constitution”
as

weii'“Ti,
well
The fj
federal government
provided
ded a miliia
militaoi protection
for
,

S For

this

all

the states This

reason alone, he
asserted the
® national
"“onal government
deserved the resnect
.

eneral Court the
need to

jsjm,

as the governor

do

their Constitutional
dut, i„ selecting
electors for the

was a member of
the Massachusetts

held a duty to respect
.he other

Constitutional system,
and

members of that system

the federal system
required the states
to maintain a
political presence
Here,

ercsed

his role as

ordered to

call

a political actor
while maintaining
his devotion to
the

out a detachment
of the Massachusetts
militia

» because, after consulting with

members of the Supreme

ted States did
nhed'iref
d h"''"''?’
not demand

all

th

the o

r

“

*

d

M

remember,

hon guarding them and

did not

Judicial Court,

^“"“"dhon of the Ua compliance with
that re

“P™™'

by

of the government, and
by
*e people of Massachu-

f

se«Tlo“
setts
should

He

that he was, in his

own

estima-

their rights against
the encroach-

ments of unconstitutional
power.

Here

is

a stark example of the
executive challenge. Strong

execute according to the
law. Yet he

is

a

member of a

88

is

assigned a duty he must

political

system with interests to

do

He must guard

protect

against tyranny and
uphold people’s rights

To meet

the challenge,

he turns to the federal
and state Constitutions
and assens a
decision based on
those

documents.

In his reconciliation

ofthe roles of the
executive
ecutive, Strong
<str
^
understands the

governor as a const.tut.ona,
executive He

is

one of a

set

of separate

w.th protecting peoples’
nghts through the
insttument ofthe law
that he

IS

institutions

He

office

of

charged

has enough power

able to do his job
effectively Other
institutions have their
jobs to perform, and

deserve as

much

respect as the governorsWp,
despite their differing
Unctions Yet these

nstitutions are Constitutional
Their authority derives
from the Const.tut.on
and the ability

each branch has to check
the other to prevent
tyranny While other
institutions deserve
respect, if they are acting
unconstitutionally, they need
to be stopped If
policy

enacted,

it

must survive

all

is

to be

branches Strong adds to
Hancock’s conception ofthe

polit.cal

executive by asserting a
need to rise above potentially
lethal partisan division
and by
displaying an ability to

recommend more

specific

measures than Hancock had

Conclusion

The Massachusetts Constitution
of 1780 was
that

whtle one proposed two years
earlier

had contained a substantially
weaker executive branch had been
rejected Separation

of powers and the veto power

was

ratified

also an important

in the

member of a

the political and the executive,

780 document allowed for a stronger
executive who

1

political

became

Hancock and Caleb Strong were both

the

system These two functions ofthe
Governor,

two pieces ofthe executive challenge
John

able to provide leadership by
forming a coalition

based on a program of governance
which was electorally successful
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To

deal with the

-anen,e an. ena.e

Of a

se.

.He

on„s...u.ions

offieeHCe.

wHH

.o

,ea.e.H,p, HancocH
an. S.non,

a duty .o p.o.ec.
peoples' ngH.s .Hrou,H
.He law

governor was separa.e
from .He legisla.ure
and .hejudicia.y
and
differen.

from

.Heirs

As

a cons.iru.ional
office

.

i.s

h.s

THe

funcions were

a„,h„
v was
au.hon.y
based

in

.he Cons.i.u.ion

Th,.

d,

»„ „ p„„,„

^^

^
location of political
au.Hority

It

also

cHer brancHes of government
and

mean, aa recn.
respect, r
for separation of
powers and

thetr capac.ies
THis

.0 gutde those other brancHes
,f necessary and
check
constitutional boundaries

It

also

partisan divisions and
provide

meant an

more

was combtned with

them

ability to rise

tf

a willingness

they overstepped the.r

above potentially dangerous

specific policy leadership
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CHAPTER 2
the partisan
administrator

n»ni
u
partisan
battles

that standard.'

,

organ, zattons that
worked for the.r
..

po

While

erupted esneciallv
especally ri
dunng Strong's
tenure, part.es
as self-sustainino

own

benefit

were no,
Massachusetts’s

.

Itical

culture

r
George
N

They would become
so by the

1840'

"°'^bly with the
election of

Briggs as Governor

With the establ.sh.nent
of organized and
respected political
noi v
,

Governorship became
a partisan
,

.nstitution

Rather ih,

'"^'>tu, ion

.

derived authority
from the Constitution

the pol.tical party.
Rather than

one of a

set
se,

of institutional

p™«.d
P.n,

C.„,

judged solely by
Constitutional measure
other

members of the
The

pol.tical party

whose occupant

Sovemorship now denved
legitimacy and

.

authomy from

parties, the

It
I,

wac
was now

players

who

^

^

a part.san task,
and the wishes of

had to be taken into
account

trans.t.on to a part.san
pol.t.cal culture
occurred gradually
throughout the

nineteenth century
Brooks represented the

claim any strong
connect, on to the
Revolut.on

Once

last

of the Governors who
could

the supply of
Revolutionaty

War

heroes had been depleted,
cand, dates needed some
other basis on which to
establish
candidacies Pol.tical
parties arose to

fill

the void

100

ieft

by

first

this absence.^

their

Yet parties d.d not

e

^^“''-P-^<‘°~Massachuse«spo,«,ca,Hf.^

•

assac use„s
pCa.os,

Wd,„g ,o GeoflVey B.odgen,

- ---

'
P0l..ca, eminence, and

op,

de.e™,ned wHa.

«.d Cose

on

po.rriea,

in

^The par,, dica.ed
,e™s of

.. woo,d . rewarded wr.

.nnovarion or
rndependence

--.cXWOreenda,eser.edasOo.r„or,nrHe™d,s.0.s,d.n,,„o^
B96 fames Nesmr.h
saw

^an. of Massachoserrs,

.0

H.m

Whe

,n h.s ,ife -

When

ro

fir

to dedrcate h.s
biography of
Greenhalge ‘^rjo rhe
Republ.can

whose generoos and
echos, asr.c soppor,
Governor Greenhai.

Greenha.ge was

hrs. eiecred

Governor, accord,
ng ,o Nesrcrh

Repobhcan pany of
Massachosens had honored
him wirh

rhe hrghesr office ,n
.heir

aift.”"

Party Machinpr^/

The
.ns.,fo.,ons

Constirorional execor.ve had
been kep. ,n check by
other consrito.ional

The execorive was given

sofficienr strength to

cany oo.

his doties

throogh a

system of separation of
powers, bo. was kept from
becomrng tyrannical throogh

orchecks and balances He
was a member of a

w

poi,.,cal

With the relocation of
politics from Constirorional

political parries

strength

became important

The governor derived

party, while the necessity

as both checks

a

system

system w,th a duty to execote
rhe
institotions to the electoral
arena,

on the elected execo.ive and
soorces of

the strength to accomplish
any tasks from his political

of holding together the diverse
coalitions

101

that comprised

it

and

answering the
opposition kent
thp Crovemor
pt tne

check Th^ rr^

in

^

l^ke-minded individuals
seeing that

•

the th

—

' ““ “ *“
members of the

party d,d

“^though

"

.f...

0„™, „„

old parties were
disappeanng and

men were

‘

democracy

[in

Massachusetts

politics!
S]
P

themselves democrats
must form their

co„u
could

own

Constitutional institution
to check another

™
not,u
be

party
F
y

removed Those who
considered

Rather than
Kather
rh» counting
on one

members
"’^hers of the
.he

polity sought to
i

form and

sustain political
parties so that
powerful individuals
could be checked

Opposing panies would
want
ther

pam

Marcus Morton,

to check the

power of a governor belonging

to the

a Democrat, took
office in 1840 having
been elected to the
,

norship the year before
The legislature was
dominated by Whigs, however:

'‘^.hough

Monon

at last

had

won

after

more than

ten years in

open contest

governorship, he stood alone
at the head of a
hostile government

deemed

hostile based solely

on panisan

Benjamin Butler, upon

affiliation,

for the

- The govermnent was

and Morton, “would be
opposed

his election to the

Governorship

in

at

1882 found that
,

the “legislature

was opposed

was

in large

to me,”‘ This

majority against

was

me

In

my

council every

member

but one

largely a partisan matter,
as Butler had bolted the
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dominant Republican
party and joined

n

th

Governor’s office

«ses out often

'

was accidental”’

In the election

of

u

.

Boston

/I /A/.v

“devotpfl

itc

mns

M

told the truth

I

th >
"“"S*'

now

'

confess that

it

.

rather than
defending

to unrestrained

Whig

candidates, the

abuse of all Democratic
aspirants

opposition party was
not the sole
means of checking
power The party of the

ornor worked toward
that end as well
The party employed
various tools and

~

P-dures

to enforce

--

its

domination of political

.he late eighteen
thirties

The

machine was David
I

lirst

Massachusetts and to keep
the

politics in

I

One of the

in

II

sot
S2

iile

I

aspect of the party
machine to note

activities

,s

andjihis r'
friends controlled
-

18,10's,

that

tt

Henshaw

was

hierarchical

Andrewl Dunlap, and Nathaniel
and Charles
.State

G

chairtnen

who

central

K

|

.Simpson,

Greene, editors ofthe.VhUc™,.,,
made

Committee of the Democratic Party

Committee appointed County

A

controlled the Democratic

ntachine in his capacity
as Collector of the Port
of Boston "Henshaw,
|T

up .he Central

examples

lenshaWs Democratic
party organisation

Massachusetts by the mid

committee largely controlled
the party's

l

earliest

lenshaw was one of a
group of men who had
founded the

an anti-consci'vative
newspaper
wspaper,

femocratic party

m

whtle allowing
administration of the
laws

o. a self-conscious
political

r/t.vwtr/r,

life

'

Members of the

Central

appointed CoutUy Comm.ttees
Metnbers of

103

the

County Committees

Those

at the

say over

in

turn appointed

top of the party .
held

many

all

too,

were

—

pany

fohnOa.sofWorcester

figures before
decisions
ecsions of any

—

The pany machine had

choosing nominees quite

Chech

at leas, a say in

to select

m the political
,s

members of his own

first

who was

nominating convention

controlled bv a

candidates.
group of

hep.

in

In the

same

system

chech through both

party

allowed to seek, and
thus hold,

to hold their

firs,

in

1837

yet. Until the
1840's the legislative

“recommendations” subject to
approval by the

nominating convention,

Whether

that the

groups within the

it

It

was more formal and

caucus would make

state convention

leaders or a state
convention, the Gubernatorial
nomination

meaning

the final

That decision came
increasingly to be
made through the state
convention.

The Democrats held then

party,

Committees,

He h
H-shaw
had

consequence could be
made.

.He partisan
administrator

the opposition
political party and
other

Whigs

Town

m each party, there was a

that a constitutional
e.ecut,ce,s hep. in

elective office

‘‘PPO'fed

The Whigs of the t'
g
time were

and to mahe plans
for Whig campaigns

With these

wh

beneath them
accountable and

hierarchical

^Pohdcians as Tew Uncoln
and

je

chairs

matters,

The Whigs,

o

Town

,t

was

was

took

until

1843 for the

a small group of party

at least

approved by the

nominee would have to meet
the approval of al, or
most of the

party.
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Under the Democratic
machine
,
,
control
over those

in the

1

830'^

H

i,

had a

fair

,

Whe
When

leg, slat, ve
I

who

sought office under
the

Dem
cmocrattc

amount of

'

,

label in

Massachusetts

'*

,

able ,o

caucuses were

still

a viable means
of n
"ontmatton for office,

u

Henshaw was

^^;--"-----dswerethedom.nantmembersofthecaucus,
ou comes were

and that
benefic.al for

Denrocrattc parry and
controlling a

fair

amount of federal
patronage

Commonwealth, Henshaw
controlled nominations

-- -- -natton

Henshaw

,n the

for office often
based

on the public

process, Nominattons
were marhed on a
sheet of paper

HenshaWs men watched,

its

htm Ha.ng
established .mself
at the head
of the

not.ng those

who

voted aga.nst the
preferred nominee

wHIe
If a

affihate,

the ballots

would appotnt a comm.ttee
wh.ch would always
emerge ftom count,
„g
with the name of the
Henshaw nominee ”

Oddly, however,
Henshaw did not care for
Marcus Morton, the
perennial

Democratic candidate for
Governor
conservative,

ntore radical

.he

Xustom

time

Henshaw

represented the

1

Xountty" members of the
pany The

836 Henshaw stood behind
,

stands

State

-We
The

are equally fortunate

in

purity of Judge Morton's

Morton, too

for the purposes

more

House'' element of the
Democrats, while Morton
represented the
dislike

between the two men points
up

imponance party had developed
Once Morton's nominat.on
had been

party in

foes,

at this

Monon

publicly, despite the
difference

by the

of , heir

the choice of our
candidate for the Governor
of the
life

and character defies the
assaults of his

set aside his difference
with

of elections,

ratified

**
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Henshaw and

other

bitterest

members of the

party

Yet the point of
dispute between

k
^

P .'osopHtcal, Henshaw
.estred to res„„

wHhtn the party
Morton, Henshaw
found

would be appointed

men wanted

to the oositinn

more

H.s posttton
as Collector,

out,

.t

practical tha

He wanteH

controversy raged
from

to be in a position
to exercise
influence
ence

1

83 5 through early
1838

H
Each understood
the importance
It
It

k
was obvious,
however
•

^

w ,.l„

He

had a great aeal
deal of influence
inf,
over who

party had taken on
and wanted to be
able to wield power
P wer

r..,

to

that

O.

holding the organization
together
gether wa<j
was ot the utmost
imponance, requiring
sublimating
intra-partisan differences

.^nominations for elective
offices were controlled
by the pany, non-elective

were affected by partisanship
as well Certainly
the Governor'stobs

governor

is

A

chiefly that

biographer of Roger
Wolcott writes

,/re

made

dn

cc,ref„l .selec, on

adjustment ofthe different
departments whereby
is

of offices was seen as
one of
fact the real

work ofthe

of which the people hear
nothing,-the routine of
administration,

the conferences in the
executive chamber,

administration

distribution

offices

to run smoothly

friction

is

ofsnue

officers,

avoided and the whole

- The Governor had become an
106

and the

administrator

in

that part

of hrsjob rnvolved
the distribution
of offices (with rh
H
Executive Council)
and
^ he
expected to distribute
them to inH
n
'ndividuals
who had been
ftithfi
.
u
faithflil
to the wishes
of the pany
’

,

I

- -V - » .

"
appointment

in

...

.

„

Massachusetts As early
as 1808 one
ne can find a
recommendation to
>

Governor Sullivan

indicatina that “

i

‘He

..

WHar ey ^tippon
,

a certain individual
for Justice of f he p
the Peace

- the General Government and

^

Excellency

••2'

This

is

a rarity,

however Generally,

prior official capacity
or satisfaction to
the public

fitness

who

is

Town of

“firmly attached
to

to republican
pppciples

of character, technical

recommended an

The

ability.

individual to

position.

Recommendations

to various governors
indicate that as late
as 1828

pany

concerns were not of
paramount imponance,
though they were being
more extensively
considered.

the

By

1828, party

makes

a stronger

showing

Governor regarding appointments
Though

for appointment to
office

is still

given to

and general character, one
applicant, a

Commissioner “and considers

ability,

Mr

pnma^

in

the letters of
recommendation to

consideration in recommendation

prior expenence.
satisfaction to the public

Eaton, desired an
appointment as County

his party services
as fiimishing

Republican administration.”^^
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him with some claim

in a

By
letter to

1834, partisan
affiliation had

Executive
executive Council
i

^i-ock

and

member David Mack

we do

integrity are

Ir

'

not think his hn

such as totstifv

[

.

lb.

•

a

^^^^P^^ance par-

ZV™
“"“-ce,

",

Eliflciples

corri^^^htrs

tluen^

orient
em the annn'
^
P
appointment
being made

—

iMOi,

p„„ ...

with

vo'i
^

"“* "" “> »”»•
%

•

of the Peace:

'hn Hope, and

to

test fnr
° anr.

appointment

as a potential
Justice

ties,

becomee an even
stronger

"

.-« «. ......

...

....

-,.

...

,.

Cl..,
„.p.
^

being a whig, there
was but
than family to

some

little

chance for him

Mnally,
Finallv party
nart

was more important

individuals

Brother-an

ttld

line Democrat--,?r'if
‘ir'I.
ho holds
the office of Inspector
General of Leather
you hnd everything correct
in his office, and
I pre''™
tietrimLt to

™

thTwh

f
if you
vou

TT’
by retaining him,

^ Pnnsonal favor But

ththink,

Eiesem or

m the future,

it

will injure in the least

the interest or success
of the
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A

party,

administrator

if the

I

would no. have
you

retain hin,

on

my ac-

an

Om o

u

'

e3,, "

was based on
the

,

^

affibation

allow policies .o
be earned ou.

Officeholders of
.he sanre affihauon
as .he

who

,n

a

G

.ore effecve
ective manner
and were rewards
'^ards

had served .he
party

The

surest path .0 a
career in politics

lhel830,becauseof^V
°'=oause 0 .
service

was .hrouoh, he

for thn
.hose

Pa™- es.ablish.en.

In

'

to Jackson’s

"
nanv
T
y-

.

orcester

was

filled

u,

*he position of
postmaster

with the editor
of the Worce.s,er
^

Co„m ^<^P‘Miccm
Re „

Lieutenant Governor
William Haile was
“a coiorl
I

campaign contnbutor.”
and was nominated

the early

party

when

1

890's

“ An

who

individual

would presumably be
more

necessary, given
what the party had

come up through

the partv
-

go alon»
along w„h
oO
with
done

would
be better ahip
PP®P«‘^^ttble

for

life,

but wealthy and
a

for lieutenant
»o
governor
and governor in

had pursued
P
a career

likely to

Republican

c
Pohlic

lihe

of

r
m politics
through

the political

,h
the
party and bury
differences

him Presumablv
esumabl>,

a

r
Governor
who had

uto sympathize
with and hold
together the

t

various pieces of the
party

n~l,
serve both roles

Governor

I

On

the one hand,
patronage and a conciliatory
attitude

to establish ties with
the various wings
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would allow the

of the party This would
allow

Wm to

keep the Governor
from becoming too
= 00 powerfol
powerfiji A
Atlegtttmate

reiattve

moderatton

in h.s activtt.es

through

opposition could
contest

its ability

to control

nomtnattons and by
establishing a sense
of serving the
party
panv through
thro
N
5
appointments. Thus
parties controlled
executive ambition
estahliQhr^H
"*“‘’''^hed consensus
around the executive's
’

program, and ensured
a

On

faithfrtl

execution of that
program

the nattona, scene,
poitttc.ans were
becoming partisans as
well Mass-based

Congressional Caucus as a
means of selecting
prestden.ial candidates
The national

government also controlled
enough patronage

in the states to
establish

organizations there

for electoral purposes
Finally, state panies
often divided themselves
according to stands

on national

issues. Party organization

had become an imponant
phenomenon

at

not only

the state level, but also
at the national level

The
If this

Whig

was

the machinety of the
pany, what

party resolution from

political parties.

Partisan lUinH

The

1

848 captures the

resolution

was an

was

the

mind

political culture

effort to
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set

of the pattisanP

A

which evolved around

persuade Massachusetts’s Whig
voters to

vote for Zachary
Taylor for President
year,

o
,0

is

R nggs,

scarcely mentioned,
though he

rot

^
Ooventon The

nesoiotton

resolution notes,

,s

the Whigs’

Gubematonal candidate

was the
^

‘he

.e.i, howeven,

was not the

the Presidential
candidacy

first

that

Whig convention

hot the ptctnce
h

choice of
Massachusetts Whigs
for

‘^hose

tned

fidelity to the whig
causl" t'hro'^^h*
"
public service, which
te haTren?. u®n

ents,

and

usefirl to his

th“:^™“
The puest.cn

,s

P"™''

oC”

country and maridnd"™'
Of the people of
our

whether to support
.he

c.fi.en

of another State

Should Massachusetts

W.» p;.,. ,p. „p„,
they should

“From a

^

full

giving our preference
to

and careful view of
of the whol.
k
whole subject,

Gen

Ultimately, the success
of the

Taylor, and in

pany

is

recommending him

more imponant than

we

have no hesitation

for your support

in

-

the success of any
individual

within the local party

The

identity

fellow citizens, as

label

of individuals

m,gs, a

party

Whig means something

Whiggeo- and

is

defined by their party

affiliation:

whose views and sentiments

specific

The

“We

are well

we

cannot abandon them

prosperity of the country,
and while
these fundamental principles

””

we

known,”” The

resolution relates various
principles involved

stresses adherence to those
pnnciples: “These doctrines

as Whigs, and as whigs

approach you,

We believe them

we

111

is

have affirmed

to be identical with the

stand for our country’s
interest,

Partisan interest

,n

tantamount to public

we

cannot forsake

interest.

Keeping

the party alive,
adhering to

Whig

principles,

is

more important than
any

other aspect of

political life

The

resolution goes

on

to state that tnese
these voters are
e
not merely

Massachusetts Whigs. Parties
are

decision.

far

horn

ntonoi.th.c, but
contain

The Massachusetts
Congressional delegation

is

Whigs but

many

factions,

each of

discussed as being a
monolithic

group, especially regarding
the slavery question
y question. Yet
.
Yet, th.T
they maintain their
free
not from any desire
to produce a schism
among
uie Whi^s
wnigs, or tn
s the
ih up
to h
build
•

•

a

but from an honest
conviction that slavery
-

T

et,

slavery

ingulfed

,n

is

far

fislJ
L

an

evil
il,

new

party,

k
u
and rr
ought
to be circumscribed

from the only issue on
the Whig agenda
and should no, fragment
the

a single idea.

We know that

in the practical
affairs

must meet almost every
question, and we have
a platform
great question of national
policy
P
y

of government, our

sufficiently

rulers

broad to cover every

Partite
arties are not single
issue groups, and
•

,

and respect for other party
members

The

soil stand,

is

compromise

necessary to maintain a
coalition

resolution discusses Taylor
in glowing terms,
while excoriating Lewis
Cass,

the Democratic candidate

General Taylor
radica

a safe conservative Whig;
General Cass
reckless Democrat: the one
is an open, frank
is

old soldier, the other a

would respect the

will

sentatives, the other

sly, anflil, intriguing
politician:

of the people as expressed by

would trample

friend of peace; the latter

stand upon our
all

is

a

and honest

is

it

the one

their

Repre-

underfoot: the former

a

is

an advocate for war: the one
would

own soil to improve
the country around us.^’
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it,

the other

would grasp

at

the candidate
of the Whig
Whig, th
the other of
the
electorate are

’

,

he

^

^

Democratic pany

Me
K
Members

.

'’‘‘''"’8

surveyed the whole

»d

field

r

’

wtsdom may

P“"'ons

suggest, and
enlightened patr

-

one being

of the

^

t

r*. .« c„
patriot

IS

clear

.1

Vote Whia a nrrv
s
proper conscience

^

•

vote their CO
consciences, as long
as that leads
them

is a

,n

This

th

and voters should

a d nection

and the on V effert off ho
of the movement
must be either to
democratic candidate

Wtiirr

"

favorable to the
Whios

‘^“uiuaie,

elect or increase
the

d

losing Office

saw both
S

h

the defeat of
Whig nominee

Henry Clay

The

election

James K Polk and the
e of a Free Soil
party The authors
of the message are
blistering in their
to

criticism

o-embersofthethirdparty..Buttheirbhnddevotiontowhattheycalledpnnciple,
persevere, and the evils
under which

--

Chargeable to their
inconsiderate devotion
to

we

are

party«

now

laboring, are in a
great

Presumably,

this last

phrase

narrowly focused group
could detract from the
chances a broadly-based
Whig party would
hold of winning the
race for
office.

113

Yet, the officials in
the

apparently more noble

Whia
Wh,g

Remember

party are not

mete

that the nartv"=

of a

office seekers are

third party

The

best to dissuade
voters

with the public

members of the other
panres

third party candidate

from

his

camp,

is

first

is

a

^

,, e mere

office seekers
Their cause

or those

who would

good

attempt to

Martin Van Buren
and the authors do
!

indicating that he

is

their

not, as he claims,
free soil

They continue

ties
hes

have
hatTecf“'’
become corrupt,

<>« par-

and that

is

it

necessarv tn fx

new pany based on moral
principle But wha7do
po Itical
a

moralists propose to
you'’

'tz

'

r

.

f

.

They propose

in

a school

Whigs, while certainly seeking
the public good, the

t amhrehng, whose
very names
While, theTefore.
in

both do

despair of a refL-

of which Martin Van
Buren was the teacher

office, are not

good of the

to take

TTr

wee admit
d™°:raM^
that there is too great
laxity of morals
iiticai parties, we
confess that we should
mation

thes7

party, for

or he would risk becoming
a Martin

mere

one

politicians

issue.

Van Buren-type

No

43

They would not sacnfice

right-thinking

office seeker with

Whig would do
no

so,

true concern

for the public welfare

If Whigs

saw the members of the opposition

opposition certainly saw the
Whigs

in the

urging that Zachary Taylor
was not

fit

same

you have been,

that he

is

way, the members of the

and charged the Whigs accordingly,

to receive the vote of consistent

members The authors of the message
go on
told, as

light,

in a certain

Whig

to respond to these charges:

party

“you

will

be

not a W}ng, and hence Whigs
cannot support him with
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^

». .w.„

^

1,

»% w

'*"»

. „

i:'""'*""
oubernatorial candidate
George Briaas

Hp

^

n

O

The ,„div.ua,
PO

.Pca, pa„,es

.e

The pan.san

pan.san

affii.aPon

.. und.s.ood pol.ca,

.de„.,v

in

,e™s of

of a cand.da.e
was of panan.oun.
..ponance

in

--"-™.e-c,p,eandeonsc.encew.e.,edop,„a™.^

rebel w.th.n the
party,

P-..C good

,f

was

factious, too narrowly
focused and no. looktng
out for the

an olhce seeker worked
for the good of
the party, he was a
noble hgure

good, he was a ntere
pol.tician

who would

however, of how to conduct
oneself once

The

wntes

that “[o]u.

credit,

and

no one The question
regained,

in office

Parti.s an

The locus of politics had
ntoved, by
pobtical part.es, Pol.tics
of the time

benefit

Administrator

the 1840's. front
Constitutional institutions to

was ‘The warfare of party
and one author of the time

of the discordant elements
of party issue firmness,
moderation,

stability.

Pany government justifies itselfThe

question, then,

deal with the executive
challenge in a political culture
based around parties.
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I

national

was how

How

to

could a

political figure

who

also held a duty
to execute the

leadership with both
vigor and restraint th

i

'he

demands of exercising
*

u

How

administrator look

like‘s

““
instances of gubernatorial

“”"n t»«, »».

objection
n to leuislatinn
legislation ,were
scant Until

three vetoes in the
nineteenth century
y

Levi Lincoln, Jr

in

1827

“ Between

The

veto of the
th
century

first
ttrst

U.„l. ..b

m

h.s

„

ndicating a

second veto that he

is

there

were only

came under Governor
in

^
“constrained to the discharge
of a

cenam amount of self-consciousness
on

power and overrode Everett’s
veto of a
parties,

.

^

Lincoln’s vetoes were
upheld. Republicans

As

85

1

r»
notes

1

18^7
- and ISSI
85 ,h
there were only three
vetoes, two
1

b,

could the executive

in

the

painflil

duty,”

pan of the governor " While

the General

Coun

exercised their

own

legislative pay-raise ten
years later

and thus the legitimacy of
opposition, became accepted

in

the

onwealth, not only did vetoes
increase, but their nature
changed as well Although
Levi Lincoln was self-conscious
about his use of the negative,
his vetoes do indicate
a
greater reliance on what
would be in the public interest,
or responsible policy, rather
than

only on what would be
constitutional. In his

first

116

veto message, Lincoln writes:

117

Table 2

In

entenng upon

nestly sought to

my

1

continued

present office.

examine and

settle

evo ved upon me,

I

diligently

upon

and ear-

the duties, which

in relation to the
exercise of the Executive prerogative in acts
of legislation, and by a careful
regard to the principles of a
Representative Government
and the provisions of the
Constitution, in the arrangement

and distribution of its powers,
that the interposition

I was brought to
the result,
of a negative was to be justified
only
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nown

Charles Rjver Bridge
controversy
ersy. Lincoln
points out “that
the power of
the

government may be
nght&lly exercised

in

opening a

and Charlestown,
Cha
whenever the nnhhr
^

new co
“nimumcation

between Boston

I

Lincoln continues,
“this necessity

Edward Everett vetoed

is

'”‘9'

In this instance

not to be found
und, ” hence
h
the necessity of
a veto

a legislative
pay-raise
based “I’
on
y

unnecessary extravagance

Members of the

n'

perception of it as an

legislature d'
disagreed,

and voted what they

was the more responsible
position
Beginning
nineteen

men who

Ihree pieces

Democrats

in

the

1

850 's vetoes ramp,.,
me much

serxed as governor
vetoing
D

of legislation By the

in

tenacious

if

often

more

at least

trequently, with
seventeen

one

bill

and f
fourteen vetoing

felt

of the

at least

ISSO's, with the
Republicans firmly established,
and the

fiitile

antagonism Vetoes were
evolving,

opposition, parties had

albeit

become an accepted and

very gradually, into
tools for the expression
of

responsible policy rather
than only proper
constitutional interpretation.
Governors became

more

willing to use their

power

to push for discussion

among

Presumably, vetoes rendered
under the panisan mind

political participants

set

would become more

frequent under divided
government, as differences over
responsible policy,
differences, caused deeper
institutional divisions.
Divided

i.e.

partisan

government occurred so

infrequently in Massachusetts
during the nineteenth century
that the most frequent utilizer
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of the veto, Frederic
Greenhalge with
^
twenty-two
negatives, d.d not
even face divided
government Roger Wolmn „ u

Sequent nay-sayers
also did not face
a lemd.t

-her

party Ben.anrin

’

face divtded
govemnrent, as d,d

W-H.sse..w.wasne«o„tHe,,stw.e,evenvet^^^^
e

story,

However, as George
Bontweii, tHe «rs.
governor to use the
veto

.tH

equency, d,d face
d.vtded government
as did Henry
Gardner, another early
and
frequent veto user
Thus, whtle
d.vtded government

Commonwealth

,n

the n.neteenth century,

it

was

an^

relatively

a rare occurrence
,n the

cena,nly seemed to
play a role

in

the use of

the veto.

As

the three case studies
for the partisan
admin, strator,

Benjamin F Butler and
Fredenc

T Greenhalge

will

he used, George Bnggs
represents the

end of an era After
Briggs, governors
were generally
deferential to the leg.slature,
Add.t.onally,

Bnggs

George N. Briggs,

less hesitant to

use the veto, or

less

represents the beginning
of another era

Wh,ch governors were
more consciously and purposely
part.san Benjannn Butler
and
Fredenc Greenhalge were two
of the top three governors
in terms of use of the
veto in the
in

nineteenth centuo. Butler
used h.s veto against divided
government, while Greehalge did
no,. Butler also represents
the

dawn of a new

popular manager Greenhalge,
as the most

era, as

prolific

he exhibits charactenstics
of the

employer of the

veto, displayed a

staunch panisanship, while
also foreshadowing the
Progressive executive toward the
end

of the nineteenth century.
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Ge orge N Rna» ^

being
B an effective
rrective
pieces of the

panies.

compromise candidate
and, date, ” RrBnggs was

WhioPartv Re
'

r,i

Due

to his

able to hold
together
the
*
Ihevanous

c
has written that
“Bneos's

tbe fact that
his personal
the

very well

By

the

ISdOX Bnggs
acknowledges,

”
the political landscape
,e „
ow-citizens,
,

the electorate
has

P°P“'^^'y-hased panics
have

“We

are elected
''

m th

m

"h,ch

expression comes through
political parties Brinosy
P
Bnggs s

,

1

gr.
844

opened np, dne

coalition

to the

become an accepted

we

.

organized into political
parties ”” Amhn
>
Authority

Whig

part

of

hold by the votes
of our

•

i

,s

ultimately popular
while

its

inaugural address
indicates not

approval ot political
parties, but an
understanding of their
necessity: “The
people
Of

all

free

governments

will

be divided into

political parties

The

security of liberty

is

increased by such
divisions Differences
of opinion upon
measures best calculated
to

promote the public good,
lead
in

to discussion, and
discussion leads to
discovety of truth

Bnggs 1849 Inaugural
Address, he

election

saw

-

celebrates the fact that
the previous Presidential

the peacefirl transfer
of power from one
political party to another.
Parties and

.he process which
created them,

when

they promote peace
and harmony, are something
to

be justly celebrated,
according to Briggs
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that
all

th^are

have one country
to serve

^

anrf

*em

AJI are .nterested
alike’in
human rights, all are
alike

tL caurof ^“7

affected bv

dressing the

^

ui uui> passage
could be oenerallv
®

The purpose of a

•

“

ri.ff:

partisan leader

would be

effectively conducted

to

would

facilitate the

'f
j

sen-

•

°*mJsed into the

struggl-

partisans

.imise

Where

au of beneficence among
branches of government,
nstitutions which

*e

: :Se".h7fi

government could be

T

bad?

twrg^pS^^r

minds of our fellnu/r^iti,
of politica”feI^

mg

^

ti,

the sentimenf
to

w.eh Bnvgs

the constitutional
executive sought an

a respect for

members of other

political

conduct of politics, the
partisan administrator
was

concerned with creating
that beneficence and
respect among members
of electorally

competing

political parties.

Briggs’s acceptance by
the various groups
within the
party together and kept
the governor

in

his

He

party both held the

check. His need to please
various elements within

the party led him to
soften his personal stands
and keep

stances

Whi»

them

in line

with general

also often took stands
on relatively non-controversial
issues In

Inaugural addresses are similar

in

content to the
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Whig

Whig

many spot.

party platform discussed above

and other Whig
party platforms,

A resolution

hv xa
y Massachusetts Whigs

in 1849 for
,
example, indicates
that “The
u
1 ne distinction
between the Whuz and n
Democratic parties has
.

,

Learning, arts and
industrv' have rprf:>;y/or^
recetved the.r
tmpulse here almost
ent.rely from the

O

party,

„

•

whtch for twenty-four
of the

las.

twenty-fr. years
has had the control
of the

Whin

sj

a Ptotecttve tanlf,
for interna,
tmprovemen.s, for a
stable currency,
for low postage
rates
tor equal representat.on
and for -safe and
success^, popular
elections

Boggs’s stands as Governor
dtscusses

,n

more

specific terms,

,n that

financial condition,
care for the nonr
P

is

» The issue

openly agatns,

it,

last

party

who complain

controversial

He

tssues ratsed

poson and educational
systems,

its

and
d the uhandicapped,
and possible improvements

on which Boggs takes
the sharpest stand

s.„l

is

the Mexican

in

War He

contmues between our

year would have been
one of general and unalloyed

prosperity to the people
of this North

Whigs,

state’s

noting -[b]ut for the
unhappy war, whtch

country and Mexico, the

more

though equally benign
ones, some of the

above Other tssues he
dtscusses mclude the

the judiciary

year were hardly

-

that “the lust

Amencan republid”«

of doimnion

Briggs’s stands would cause

little

is

This

now cheoshed

is

by the democratic

consternation within the

Boggs’s stands on issues were
generally no. designed to

quite in line with the

Whig

party.

incite inter-partisan

acrimony, either. Another
of his most direct stands,
anti-slaveiy, was on an issue
about

which Massachusetts residents
had established a general consensus,
though
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it

was

quite in

line

wi,h the

Whig

nothlrfrh

parly stance

on the matter

“R
‘hat partisanship
should

n

;--P---he,ro«cers to the need to treat

-ona,

rssue,

Brrggs notes, hut

eason .snot arded
bypass, on,

,„t should he met

others

.threspectS.^^^

wrth hrndness,
candor, and hrmness

ortru.hhy™ie„ce,.Massachuse.^

hnnness, and wrth ent.re
respect for those

who may

d.ffer

from

us,

and wrth the

determination never to
violate the constitutional
rights of any sister
state "« Stands
could
he partisan without
being thoroughly
divisive .n this
unfortunate sectional
question,

would be well

for each party
to consider that the
other has rights

eader was correct to
maintain a
establish

partisan stand, he

would he hept

and maintain the
respect of members of
other

- While
in

it

the panisan

chech by a need

political parties as
well as his

to

own

so that public business
could be properly
accomplished

With the increased
importance of political
patronage

coalition

rewards,

in

in his first

of

administrative offices naturally
took on greater meaning
Presumably, a

would be
i.e,

parties as organizations,
the issue

easier to hold together,
elections easier to win,

if

the party had

offices, to distribute to
its followers.
Briggs indicates his stand

inaugural address;

When

he fixes upon

the number of persons,
he then looks
out for Xhe proper persons
to do his business He will
then
give them such a compensation
as will be a just reward for
their labor,

as he

and

may need

will be likely to secure
such services as long
them. Public offices are public
trusts, creat-

ed for the benefit of the whole
people, and not for the beneof those who may fill them .The
principle laid down by

fit
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some

on patronage

should be ftilly proteSed
in
and the exercise of
the elective
partisan mterferenceTn

officers

of their opinions

^om

pofe

has

sound one
Yet

his stand

is

not as simple as

it

seem<; Rri,.

shown

to be a

•

8gs indicates a modified
position, and

the prevailing one,
on patronage in a letter
to a friend:
believe in the

I

first

place,

that to turn out
a sinnle man
appointed by our opponents,
merely because el
b‘“’
^
d:;:; wL*;:'

nl

hat

It would
be impolitic
power, he found nearly

When Gov Morton cLe

in

the offices filled
with Whigs
who were appointed to places
they held because
they
displace or turn out
a single man
T'^n
I,
0
a those
he had the power to
remove, but when vacan
all

''

precisely
preciseraTo
as our

Removal from

office, then,

own

party has always done

"

should not be contingent
on partisan

affiliation,

but

appointment to office can be
madejustly on that basis
Patronage was not simply
a matter
for Briggs

of removing enemies and
replacing them with

friends

It

does involve

ins.allino

partisan friends into offices
that open up, however.

Briggs vetoed no

bills

during his seven years

in office.

of an era when governors were
not expected to provide any

His tenure marked the end

sort

of policy leadership and

generally did not interfere in
legislative business
Gubernatorial recommendations were
freely ignored

by

legislators

As

a leader. Briggs

was

policy leadership, and he did
not In spite of this, he

winning election

in

not expected to provide
substantive

was

certainly successtlil electorally,

seven successive elections.
Additionally. Briggs’s pany was
successfiil
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in

.mplementing much of its
agenda

in

....

ability to satisfy

s

n~...

Massachusetts BnuosSoS s success coincided
with

and integrate various
parts of the

of other parties

in

hi«
his

own pany and

to respect

his

and to hold

respect and esteem
in the political
arena

-

—

p..,™

i.

__

„„„„ „
».
»,
pf

it

b.

s*„,,

^

.«.« ».

~.«™, i.

.n

1.,

primary position

people.

“By our

He

Briggs notes the benefits
the state constitution
confers on the

constitution and laws,

are entitled to the
cttizens •

-

same

calls

and

civil

all

citizens are placed

political rights,

and

ail

men

upon a common
are,

or

level,

and

may become,

upholding the federal Constitution
the great purpose of the
people

and, thus, the party, and
warns that the great danger of
the slaves issue

endanger the Constitution

if

moderation

of their Constitutional duties
and,

after

in politics is not

followed

is

He reminds

doing so notes:

Legislators of Massachusetts,—
these are the high and noble purposes for which this
government

was

bear the impress of the great

and patriotic people

men who

who adopted

they are written.

instituted.

They

formed, and the brave

the constitution in which

They are purposes worthy of the attention
of the representatives of an enlightened
Commonwealth To
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that

it

will

legislators

forward you are
clothed with the
power of making

1

Bnggs

.s

a partisan adntt^stra.or

who

has no. completely

lost the
characteristics

of a

constitutional executive

George Briggs provides the
administrator

He acknowledges,

underlining them

utility

together, but to create

earliest

and

rs

example of a self-consciously

pleased with the existence
of political parties,

But, as a part.san leader,
he looks not only to
hold his party

harmony among

his

and opposing

parties. This

is

stance wh.ch sought the
ehmtnatton of panies despite
d.fferences. This

of differences among

own pany,

as they

is

the working out

the existence of opposition
kept the

became more pan.san had

The

partisan

could also seek peace with
the other party,

them differences deteriorate
into mere squabbles
The need

own pany and

not the earlier

extsting pan.es, without
discouraging their existence

admrnistrator, whtle devoted
to his
lest

partisan

Governor

for

in

to satisfy the various
groups

harmony within

h.s

check Positions on

issues,

withm the pany.

discouraging extremism on the
part of the Governor
•Administratively,

any power the Governor may
have possessed came through the

appointment of members of the same

opposed the removal of officers
based on partisan

was

affiliation

to dole out certain jobs;

political party as the

Governor, While Briggs

for partisan reasons, he favored
appointment to office

Part of the Governor's job.
with the approval of the council,

when vacancies

occurred, they were

filled

with

men of the

proper partisan persuasion. Whereas the
constitutional administrator, such as Strong,

looked tor individuals possessing the
proper character, the partisan administrator tended
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toward men of the same
different party, the

party. If the

governor attempted to
appoint individuals
of

members of his party
were

j

there to check him.

Benjamin Rutlpr
Benjamin Butler served
as Governor for
one term He

is mentioned
here because
he combines certain
features of the paitisan
administrator with aspects
of the public
manager, a conception
of the executive that
would eventually become
the dominant one.

He

also

was one of the most

divided government.
Butler
as

prolific users

saw

affairs.

that

would allow him
hii
greater

While Butler used parties
to gather

electorate and to check
the

it

as a tool while facing

parties as a hindrance
in attempting
to exercise any

Governor and advocated
reforms

gubernatorial

of the veto, and used

power of others, he sought

own

his

to

latitude to

power

conduct

support within the

overcome them

as a

means of

conducting administration.
Butler understood the

power of political

been a consistent Republican
and acting with
Republican nomination for
Governor

in

1

parties in Massachusetts
He. “having

that party.” attempted
to obtain the

He was

87

William Washburn, bu, he
supported Washburn, feeling

do

so.

He

beaten for the nomination
by
,t

was

his

duty as a Republican to

attempted to obtain the nomination
the next year, but effective
opposition by

the State Central

Committee prevented him from gaining

it

After a quarrel with

Republican party leaders, Butler
“came to the conclusion that [he] could
not be governor
in

the Republican party

After leaving the Republicans.
Butler

made

great efforts to realign himself with the

Democrats. While he ran as an independent
candidate
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in

1878 he also had the nomination
,

Of .he De™o„a.ic Pan.,
.hough „ was achieved
h. ..her dubious
.eans Wh.,e Bu.ie.
had a person. foUow.ng,
h,s efforrs were
.o ob.ain .he
supper, of .he parry as
a whole

W..h support conung
.os. heav.ly fro. .he
Insh wards wi.h.n .he

parry, Bu.ler

was
opposed by .he Brah.ins
who headed .he De.ocra.s,
and were .ore conserva.we
.han he
and

his followers

He

did no. cour. h.s

through the Democratic
Party as a

By 1880

,

Burler

was

own

vo.e as .uch as he

.ried .o

win suppon

unit.

successful in cap.uring
.he De.ocra.s: “In
a Preside...

year, un.ry wi.hin .he
Massachuse.rs

•Democracy’ seemed essemi.

for success,

and a

marriage of convenience
was arranged be.ween Bullet’s
followers and the
conservatives

Bu.ler wen. through great
pains to stress his partisan

suppon of Winfield S Hancock,
vilification

affiliation.

His

the Democratic Presidential
candidate .ha. year and his

of the Republicans on the campaign

trail all

were attempts to win favor with

the Democratic Party
This can be contrasted with
the constitutional executive,

who

did

not practice electoral politics
to a great extent. Politics
under the previous political culture

had taken place

in constitution, institutions

electorate Debates occurred
under the gaze

examined

earlier

took on a

vital

He had
and the

of the

still

Democrat were

once defended

industrialist

for

it

shifted to the

voters, and platforms such as the

had problems with him

whom

in

one

succeeding years

effectively in line with those

deserted the Republican Party, “he said,
for

worker— elements

political parties,

importance, LHtimately, the mass of
the Democratic Party

accepted Butler, though the Brahmins
Butler’s stands as a

Under

he expressed

Jay Gould, yet he

still
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it

his

of a reform

”

party.

had betrayed the Negro, the farmer,
undying devotion

managed

Butler had

to garner the support of labor

P.."=pl.

of,.,

*, P, ,

^

^

inaugural address are
quite reformist,
focusing on suffrage
questions,

reform, crime, taxation
and education
labor, especial,,
reform

be goes mto

little

detail

of child

labor,

He
a

is

also mentions that
reform to the benefit
of

fit.

counteract the political
power of others.

paay and attempt

pany

way

in

He would

which

to

win support and to

adjust himself to the
needs of his

to please others within
the party to win suppon.

a candidate

who had

Whether he

defeated him for the
nomination, or taking stands

ormed more than they might have
political

subject for legislative
consideration, though

fit

Butler thus understood
parties as the

was supposing

serv.ce

Butler took stands
which pleased the
Democratic Party, though

he moditied them when
he saw

political

civil

ordinarily to partisan
standards, Butler

saw

the

as the most effective
instrument for winning elections
and building

coalitions.

Yet Butler’s victory as a
Democrat

pamsan admimstrator,

as he

was

the only

is

problematic from the point of view
of the

Democrat

to

win election

in

Massachusetts that

year,” Indeed, by 1880 Butler
had “taken over” the Democratic
party; by the time ofhis
.

Governorship, “the pany was completely
controlled by [Butler]
the Democratic Party, he

was using a pany

that
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was secondary

While Butler was using
in

an essentially one-party

state Butler
,

,

oing

had managed to use
the Democrats a., c.c
r
' ^ spnngboard
to

for the party
statewide

only so long as

it

served his

own

group of Butler
Republicans
gather support, that
support
ot

.ay

his

own

.

little

He was

success while

m

inclined to use u
mcltned
the

party-in-the-electorate but

ambition. Butler's
sucoorte
supporters even
encompassed “a small

While "e
he used and
supported the Democratic
Party

was

essentially personal,

encompassing individuals
who may

not have been
Democrats. This development
foreshadowed the governor

would seek suppon not
based on
Eventually, support

to

who

partisan affiliation,
but based on personal
following

would come from

the public directly,
without parties as

intermediaries.

It

parties could be used
as an effectiv e

means ot capturing

office, using

them

to

conduct administration was
a different matter
Butler decried the
administrative weakness
of the Massachusetts
Governorship

may

say that the governor of
Massachusetts has less administrative power than the
governor of any other state
Ihe legislature was in large
majority against me Of his
own motion the governor can
nominate officers, but these
o icers cannot serve until
the appointments are
agreed to
by an executive council of nine
In my council every
member but one was opposed to
me
I

The governor cannot even
pardon an innocent man out of
the State prison except by
the advice and consent of the
council
.

In his investigation of
corruption at the state almshouse
in Tewksbury, the
“Republican

party

employed counsel

everything

it

to sustain the officer

could to embarrass

government had become

me

of the

institution at great expense,

and d.d

and hinder the investigation.:”*'
The party-in-

a hindrance rather than a help
Clearly, parlies
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were an obstacle

ad™„is,.a,ion of the laws
for Butler, ntaking

difficult for hint
to build

it

or hold

together any sort of
coalition within the
government

As mentioned above,
Butler entered

the Governor’.
s office with
the legislature
and

most of his council
composed of members of
the opposition
party He found any
action
difficult, appointment
of Democrats
all

but impossible
Butler certainly
attempted to use
i

patronage appointments
and occasionally was
success&l,
in

Concord who was uncooperative
was replaced by

.4

Republican

official at a

a loyal follower
of Butler

However, Butler was
IHtstrated Hts attempt
to appoint the

first

blach.udge

Massachusetts, for example,
was successffil only after
he replaced

his

prison

Mostly

in

Democratic nominee

With a Republican one

An

early advocate of civ.l
service reform in
Massachusetts, Butler called
for

administrative reforms that
affairs

He

would allow htm greater
freedom

indicates, ,n his Inaugural
Address, a

service appointments
While Butler

is

in

conducting gubernatorial

penchant toward greater neutrality

pleased that Massachusetts
legislators have

instituted fixed tenure for
civil servants, he

is

disappointed that the method
of appointment

has not changed;

The “civil service reform” manner
of appointment, by
competitive or other examination,
has been wholly ignored. On the contrary, the
practice has quite generally
obtained, of the officer having
the appointment putting
his wife, his son, his daughter,
his son’s wife, and his sister in office as assistants
and clerks, and into other official

and salaried places. Besides, the
rule

exceptions enough to prove
salaries

and paid

have been, and

its

of a given

is,

with hardly

correctness, that

officials, at least

are,

in civil

political faith.
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all

the

of the higher grades,

Nepo,.sm and partisanship
are bane of the
Massachusetts

civil service,

causing waste of

time and money,
according to Butler
Butler goes on to
elaborate “other defects

Commonwealth which need
.here are too

paid too

many

much He

reformat, on very

officals for the

work

much indeed.”-

to be

done and

Mainly, he Indicates that

that evil servants are
generally

down and

limit the officers
of
the amounts of their
salaries
have indtcated, and give
power to the

Commonwealth, and

as

I

to

do he

wtll

undenake

to

Governor so
cany on the needed business

of the State with the reduced
es

the civil service of
the

asks for authonty to
ameliorate these conditions

If the legislature will
cut

the

,n

will

till

officers, agents,

and employ-

their places,

and any others which may
become
efficient incumbents
selected and appointed under the
most carefully prepared rules
vacant, with equally

good and

of competttive examtnation,
for the establishment
of which
ne trusts the legislature will
make provision ***

Butler emphasizes neutrality
and efficiency in administration
His ideal

.mpediments between the Governor
and the
lead to the

beliefs

wrong

civil

is

to

remove any

service Political parties could
too easily

individual in a given position
simply because he holds certain
political

The proper management of the

civil

service

is

Butler’s goal, and achieving that

goal means implementing an unbiased
appointments process and allowing the chief

executive free reign over administration.
Butler took upon himself a

much more

specific policy fiinction as Governor.
His

recommendations to the General Court were very

was not
were

as deferential as

specific and his tone with the legislature

John Hancock’s or even George Briggs’s Hancock
and Briggs

largely content to allow the legislature
relatively free reign in determining an agenda.

respecting

PPM.

its

role

pp*„,

m the political

process. Indeed,
legislative leadership
by the executive

„ « „„

Esp„,.u,

P.P.

in his

^

recommendations and

his

reasoning
s

ne
He was

an.,„n,attempting
a more detailed policy

leadership than had
generally been seen to
that point.

Butler uses his veto
his objections attached

»

constitutionally-based and

administrator such as

power

to

much

the

same

effect,

sending back

many

more

Edward

detailed than the
objections

Everett

Where

of even a more partisan

the constitutional
executive

slightly less so, but

more

was

make

points about policy rather than
just constitutional
interpretation

extent, Butler's actions as
a policy leader while in
office and his use

make

tenure

sense

He

was, after

all,

facing divided government

in

hesitant to

policy-oriented

doing so. Butler had no
qualms about employing the veto
whenever he saw
to

with

His objections were
usually policy oriented,
rarely

use the veto and the partisan
administrator

It

bills

and using

fit,

To

a certain

of the veto during

a partisan

move designed

Democrat

to

advance

his

Upon winning

election,

Democratic

own

ambitions.

How
Butler

should Butler be judged as a leader^

made many

specific legislative

recommendations

in his

Republican General Court, on issues such as
electoral law and
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inaugural address to a

ballot reform,

his

era.

Alternatively, Butler could be
seen as far from a loyal partisan,
and his rank as a

could easily be interpreted as an
opportunistic

when

women’s

suflfrage, labor

law reform,

civil

service and other administrat.ve
measures and education

tmprovements As noted above,
he also used
General Court,

One

hts

veto power to attempt to
guide the

btographer notes ofButler’s term

vetoes were upheld, they caused
unending comment.

were enacted by the

legislature,

and

his attempts to

in office that,

Few of the measures

end inefficiency

government were met with scorn,”’'
According to Butler

down’ on every reform he proposed ””

much of what
rule

m

” The

Butler proposed

some

Actually,

would become law

most immediate example of this

his inaugural address, but the

is civil

in his

labor reform

in the

politics

activity that

institutional arena, but in both. Butler

was

was

until the

less kind,

he accuses both parties of corruption.

of the

was enacted, and

and

following year, 1884 ,

at reelection, despite his

in either the electoral

less conciliatory,

been. Butler

toward other

openly

is

or the

critical

legislature. In discussing voting

of both

law reform,

Butler uses a discussion of the state’s reformatory

institutions to launch into a tirade against the
legislature as well as the state’s system

boards and commissions, culminating
which, according to Butler,

cognate body

facts.

is

from

in

an indictment of the

my knowledge

of necessity the most

unfit

abilities

of

of the General Court,

and experience of public business

in a

of all possible tribunals for investigation of

Indeed, Butler does not associate the reforms he advocates
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I

‘sat

unsuccessful.

took place not

members of the government than George Briggs had
political parties as well as the institution

Court

ensuing years under Republican

General Court did not pass

was an

the state

service reform which Butler advocated

inaugural address to serve only one term

For Butler,

in

he advocated

himself, “the General

under Republican Governor George
Robinson Butler’s attempt

VOW

“although most of the

in his

address with the

ratio

Party Rather, he portrays
them as his

thought upon the topics

would
state’s

benefit the

problems

common

occumng

State.- These

On

to

me

as

own

views, the product of his
“best

of interest to you, and the
discussion of which

reflections

have led Butler to the best
solutions for the

the matter of education,
for example, he urges
legislators to use their

sense and proceeds to

tell

them where

Those who may disagree with
Butler are

that

common

sense should lead them

”

called “unreflecting” or
labeled as not being

“just-minded

Certainly, Butler’s attitudes
inspired resentment

General Court passed

more

civil

service reform In

1

884

,

respectful of the legislature as
an Institution,

It

among

was under

his colleagues.

a governor

When

the

who was much

and other members of the government

generally This example, and Butler’s
ultimate failure as a leader generally,
illustrates

important flaws

Butler

was

In

the approach of both Butler and
the Republicans in Massachusetts.

less apt to consider others as
legitimate

members of the

to include their views in his notions
of proper policy, he

the other hand, Republicans in the
legislature held up

reforms, indeed

many reforms

that

would come

was

all

the

As

political landscape,

and

more unsuccessful On

what may have been necessary

to pass

soon enough, because they were

not inclined to respect Butler, a Democrat
Partisans had the potential to respect others,
despite differences, as governors such as

George Briggs showed By

disrespect for Butler, however. Republican

potentially beneficial legislation.

indicating a

members of the General Court

held up

Benjamin Butler’s tenure demonstrates how a lack of

respect for the Importance of other

members of the

leadership, as well as the political system

itself,
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political

to falter

system could cause

Benja^n
and,

when

Bu.ler

rejected by

was a shaky

one

it,

He understood

politics as a pantsan
activity

party, eventually
sought the support

than solely stnktng out
on his own.
disagreed with

pan.san.

He was

willing to

of the other party

go along with

rather

the party at titnes

if

he

and saw the party as
the most formidable
means of gamenng electoral

support for htmself and
counteracting the electoral
power of others Yet, Butler
seemed

most tnterested

in

panics as electoral entities
as long as they se.ed

ambitions Administratively,
he advocated a lesser
pohttcal panies Butler
also sought to

through stronger attempts

at

overcome the

tn the electorate,
as

culture, but also wtth.n
political institutions, as

made

made

effects

dunng

needs and

hts

own

term, for

of divided government

executtve policy leadershtp
and use of the veto Politics
was

an acttvity that took place
not only

Panies, for Butler,

role, at least

his

,t

.t

did under a panisan polittc^

had under a pre-panisan

polit.cal culture,

for ineffective admimstrat.on
and stnctly panisan administration

the pressures of the executive
challenge difficult to reconcile
effectively Winning

elections and holding together
coalitions could be difficult
under a panisan system given

an opposition party

in

the dominant position.

Frederic Greenhal^ e

Frederic

Thomas Greenhaige was

elected Governor three times in
the 1890's.

was a staunch Republican who had bolted

the

pany only once

to vote for

He

Horace Greely

rather than Ulysses Grant in 1872,
Greenhalge’s biographer notes that “[b]y
instinct,
inclination,

and education Greenhaige was not a

government he accepted, as
a partisan chief All his

life

all

men must

in

partisan.

The necessity of party

a free country In political warfare he

belonged to the Republican party,
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all

his efforts

became

were directed

to achieve

its

success”^^

As governor,
governor Greenhalge
u
employed
,

,he veto more
often than any
Other governor of the
nineteenth century yet
he did not f
face ^
divided government
during
any of his tenure He
is an interesting
g case because he was
,
a

party

pr.ncp,e with the necess.t.es
of party government:

Repubhcan pany by any
divergence of opin.on
not the

man

to give

up

to party

sacnficed h,s private
opinions
generally comc.ded

w„h

what was meant

pany were

was never separated
from

for mankind,

though he willingly

Greenhalge’s conscience

the Republican
conscience and he

uittma.ely the

was

willing,

on many

of the pany Larger
pnnciples of the

same wh.le

lesser

the

matters of deep
.mportance Yet he was

when consc.ence allowed

to overlook d.fferences
for the sake

the

in

man who combined

matters,

tndivrdual and

ones were allowed to pass,

Greenhalge understood that
the Republican Panv
was a diverse group often given
to disagreement.

A close fnend

of Greenhalge’s noted

that:

[njobody saw better than he
that great political parties
are
necessary in a free democracy.
He understood that no such
party, with its millions of
thinking men, can be an
absolute
unit in opinion

He knew that to decide great questions
each
On the other hand, he believed in

party must act as a unit.
t

e

divine right to bolt

It was weak to bolt
continually It
of conscience with every voter
to decide when
the e^mergency was so great
as to justify him in deserting
^ his
Standard

was

a matter

Greenhalge encountered the
Massachusetts

’

politics.

He was

political party in his ascent

held up because he

up the steps of

was considered too much of a

given his strong opinions. The bosses
of his hometown of Lowell

Greenhalge, “but they feared he was not
‘practical

.

“all

‘admired’”

political figure

of such strong

opinions would have trouble holding the
various wings of the party together.
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risk,

Greenhalge showed
an eiecorai ac.,v,t,

his

panisansh.p more than
Briggs had Poi.iics
conttnued to be

Upon be.ng nom.na.ed

to run for a second
term, Greenhaige ratied

aga.ns. the Democra.tc
party whtie gioriiying
the Repubi.can party
Greenhaige noted that

“’[glood administration

good Repubiican doctnne
and good Repubiican
work

is

The work of the Democratic
party cannot be
<7 to the country,

i,

is

party That

satisfacto-

not satisfactory to the
Democrat-

work is based on no principie,
it does not
even represent Democratic
principie And we have
the
unparalieied spectacie of a
great party ieader-a
cratic

President-sounding the

kneii

Demo-

of his own party

and with blistering words
stigmatizing the mujrmm o,ms
ot a Democratic Congress
as the consummation
ofparty
pertidy and party dishonor
’

We

are treated to the strange
spectacle of a President
without a party, and a pany
without a principle Every
dollar Irom the Republican
system of
.

revenue brought

to
IS

life

our enterprise, every dollar from
the Democratic system
a deadly blow to our
industriesHow
different the re-

cord of the Republican party!

glow

in

the letters of living light

brain of our honored Senator'

standard of the party

Greenhalge's campaigning

He does

not mention

that has not

Greenhaige

individual,

Party

it

is

,s

names

in

my

its

principles shine and

coming from the

You

hands

1

heart and
have placed the great

accept

it

reverently

for the Republican party and
against the

It is

the party that has

done good

Democratic party

for the people, or the party

members are not even mentioned by name, except

refers to “the

and

How

later

when

golden days of Lincoln and Andrew.”'"'
Party comes above the

through the party that good

is

accomplished

in

public

life

*

“Andrew”

is

John Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts during the
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Civil

War

Greenhaige

sees himself as the
standard bearer of th^

Though he
conc.ha. 0 .. as

chast,sed .he

gove™.

men, .on .he opposinon

“demagogue” and

pu u.-lean

Democrats dunng

party, not as a candidate
with his

.he campaign,
Greenhalge

h.s .naugura, address
after .he

.n addition to

mak.ng

more ambiguous

specific

recommendation, he

notes that members of the
legts.ature, without
mention.ng parttsan
to protect

far as

they

legrsiators,

and foster [Massachusetts’s]
every

come withm
notmg

in

firture

it

affiliation,

moral and

have a “duty

intellec.ual,

so

holds respect for the position
of

in

a legislator” given that
“the

of the Commonwealth

elections, but the partisan
leader

Greehalge found

He

1896 “the high publ.c trust
reposed

people commit to your care
the

dunng

interest, material,

.he province of leg.slauon

n,o.e

above ca.pargn, he
does no.

party, reserving his
cri.icisms for .he

“anarchist

was

was more amiable once

Polit.es

took place

in office. Certainly

easier to be amiable than
Butler had, given that Republicans
controlled

the General Court

Despite the fact that he did not
face divided government,
however, Greenhalge

vetoed more

bills

than any governor of the nineteenth
century His vetoes were more

pohcy-oriented than those of a constitutional
executive

Remember

that the latter

was

reluctant to use the veto, considering
that reluctance a sign of respect
for the capacities of

the legislature

The vetoes

that did

occur were based on the projected constitutionality
of

the proposed legislation If it violated
faulty Otherwise,

more

it

some

constitutional standard, the legislation

was reasonable. Under the

directly policy-oriented.

The

partisan administrator, vetoes

ultimate question
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was

became

was no longer whether the proposal

the needs of the
people as filtered through
the party

Greenhalge rejected several
tts

constltut.onal.ty In H,s

bills

based on the nature
of the proposal

ter™, he vetoed a

first

b.,1

w.ch

reared ,n pnvate ponds
and streants ,n th.s
Conunonwealth
,

February and
other reasons

March «’ Greenhalge
1,

the established policy
of the

which removed restncons
on shad

“undermine the whole body of
the law

now

,n

difficult

wrth conunents because,

and perhaps impossible

and were, not only

to

Commonwealth

force in this

is

among

He
i,

fish

work

injury

would

which

remedy,-' Proposed laws could
now be
if

and

rejected a

Commonwealth looking

likely to

they were unconstitutional,
but also

if

artlfic.ally

be used for food during

fish.ng in Massachusetts
because

protection and preservatron
offish and game, and

be

b.l,

allowed .rout

would -annul or .mparr the
pol.cy of preserving
and protecting

game which has become
b.ll

returned the

[to]

itself rather

it

to the

would

vetoed,

they were bad policy, or

against the will of the public,
as defined by the party.
If the nature

of Greenhalge's vetoes

is

indicative

executive, so are the circumstances
under which

some of his vetoes were

three ot his vetoes were, but
the aftermath of one

Veterans’ Preference

Bill,

of the changed character of the

is telling,

Greenhalge vetoed the

which would have given preference

qualified veterans, only to see the

advocacy for attaimng the best

bill

civil

passed over

his veto.

overridden. Only

in civil

service hiring to

His veto message was a strong

service possible, regardless of affiliation:
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to
.ce

secter,hTr
arc/nt ob.ard™XT

pubHc serv.ce ,s conned
by
of bounty or reward

ten,

The

fact that

power -The

aeon

n,i,ht

fffons“‘r

“

‘

inLad of 1

r^

Greenhalge's veto was
overndden .ndicates the
party
soldier vote

is

an ,„,po„ant factor

The aftermath of the overndes
that

,s

indicative

was more personal than

approved of his veto wrote to
express

it

sect, on

work

as a chech on

he represented his

Vet the Republ.cans of
the

Greenhaige from doing so
by passing the

Greenhalge may not have
offended that

at

in the political
party

have offended a lar,e
section of that pany

legislature kept

Greenhalge

--

^

b.II

over

h,s veto

of the pany very much

after

of the existence of a
base of suppon

was

partisan Soldiers and
others

all

for

who

their support

My dear Governor,- As a private

volunteer ex-soldier

wish to thank you for your
courageous attitude
veto of the Veterans’
Exemption

in

your

Bill, naturally

ainmg man

s

estate

[I]

upon atbecame a Republican, and 1 con-

tinued to be a Republican
until driven out of the
party by
disgust with some of the
demagogues who have held high
positions within its ranks.
Nothing that one man has ever
done or said has so inclined me
to a return

of allegiance to

the party which you so
honorably represent in this commonwealth as your last veto, and if
the recording of my vote for
you for any office in the gift of the
people to which you are
willing to accept the nomination
constitutes me a Republican
I

Au

am one

editorial in the

pluck, and will

do

already.

Boston Transcript noted about
Greenhalge: “He has pluck, undoubted
his

duty as he sees

it.

with

little

arouse.”"^
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regard to the opposition his course

may

This supper, did no,
seem ,o be some,hing
Greehalge cul,iva,ed or
promored, bu,

somerhing which grew ou,
of evems.

on many poims.

He was

did no, sph, wi,h

Ms

apparen. ,ha, Greenhaige
differed wirh Ms par,y

no, unpopular because
of , hose disagreemenrs,
however, and he

party based

from sources orher ,han .he

on ,hose

differences,

polir.cal party,

to establish himself
as a Republican

support

., is

may have come from

he

was

also willing ,o

of Massachusetts

no, have to worty about
disagreements with his party

without the intermediary of the

support

may have come

do wha, was necessary

and to remain a viable
member of that

the populace

foreshadowed .he public manager

WMle Ms

who

is

party.

His

,o such a degree ,ha, he
did

In that sense,

Greenhaige

both checked and empowered
by the people,

political party

He

seemed, however, to place the

maintenance of the party above most
personal predilections.
Greenhalge’s appointments were indicative
of the nature of the partisan
administrator .^s noted above, he
favored appointments that were
above party Yet

when

he attempted to implement that policy,
he was largely thwarted by other
members of his

own

party.

He

attempted to appoint a Socialist to the
Commission of the Unemployed,

believing that “with

two (of three members of the commission]

representative (one

conservative and the other radical) of the
labor elements, some thought&l and
practical
solution of the problem might be reached,”"’

approve

this

The Executive

Council, however, refused to

appointment Greenhaige had to withdraw several
other names from

consideration because of the disapproval of the
Council.

The Governor may not have had an extensive number of
appointments

to

make,

but they were certainly an important (and time-consuming)
part of his job. In delineating

I
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h.s idea

of the perfect vacation,
Gteenhalge began by
noting

office seekers

The

actions

members of the

selections

fill

oOvernment. Greenhalge

s

fit

“would be

offices ,n a certain

pohttca, patty Appointments
to office that

were cons.dered

,t

free

of

of the Councl to
counteract ntany of his
appointments

mdicate the partisan
admin.strator was expected
to
other

that

for the

members of the

manner to please

were open

to party-based

polittcal party in control

of the

experiences indicate that
attempts to provide otherwise
would

be counteracted by other
members of the

The remaining question

is

Govemofs

patty

had interests

at

stake

of the nature of Governor
Greenhalge as a leader

Greenhalge was certainly electoraliy
successful, captunng

campaigning enthusiastically as
a Republican,
inclined to policy leadership,
certainly

Benjamin Butler. Greenhalge’s

who

more

prolific

utilizing the

so than

office each time he ran,

Republican agenda

George

He was

also

Briggs, though less so than

use of the veto, and the nature
of those vetoes,

reflected his greater concern
with policy matters Interestingly,
of Greenhalge's twenty-

two

vetoes, fourteen

were of salary adjustments

justified as necessary in times

of economic

for various public officials,
vetoes he

crisis,"’

Two

of these were pocket vetoes and

one was overridden Thus, on matters
of policy, Greenhalge mostly remained

in line

with

the Republicans.

Greenhalge saw the General Court pass several
of the
his

policies he

recommended

in

addresses to the legislature. In his address
of 1895, Greenhalge notes that a “number of

recommendations were made

in

the message of the governor

have been adopted.”’"® These included a

last year,

and several of them

literacy test for voters, the “registration

of

practitioners in medicine” and an additional judge
to help expedite business on Boston’s

144

In the addresses
suggesting these

vanous measures,
Greenhalge had shown

respect for the Genera,
Court as an .nstitution
and for the

of partisan

affiliatton

As

work of legislators,

a partisan administrator,
then, Greenhalge

ntany of h,s leadershtp
efforts The Genera,

Coun

was

a

successful in

acted on several
suggestions he made,

and seventeen of his twenty
vetoes stood. As long as
he showed respect

members of government, he
achieved

regardless

measure of success as a leader

for other

in the

Commonwealth
Fredenc Greenhalge, despite
following that

may have been

partisanship than

theoretically, he

difficulty

his desire for

as persona, as

it

was

a ment-based

partisan,

was a devoted Republican who

split

with his party only with great

tirelessly in

support

his partisan following to

any power the opposition may have
accrued Greenhalge, as a partisan

was

executives such as

was

blatant about his

George Briggs had been Moving
beyond simply approving of parties

and over matters which he did not
consider minor Working

administrator,

i.e.

service and a

was mote

of the Republicans, Greenhalge
disparaged the Democrats using
offset

civil

unafraid to use the veto, certainly
less hesitant than constitutional

Hancock and Strong had been His vetoes were
more

partisan, than those

of the constitutional executive. In assigning

policy-related,

offices,

Greenhalge

reluctantly partisan, and his experiences
with patronage matters point up the nature of

the partisan administrator. Greenhalge
had other
distribution

members of the

party to please in the

of offices and the performance of his job Thus,
some of his attempted
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appomtments were
leader,

rejected for partisan
reasons

and replaced with

loyal

Repubhcans As a

Greenhalge showed respect
for others and
attained success with
several proposals
Conclusion
Popularly-based political
parties came to dominate
Massachusetts

by the

1

840’s

Through hierarchic^ control
over nominations and
dissenunation of

patronage, party machines
were able to control
Individuals

were kept

in

the public good.

much of what occurred

in political life

check through opposttion
parties and, more
importantly

Massachusetts, the members of
one’s

Identification

political culture

What was good

was based on

own

party

for the party

The pany embodied

was good

m

the expression of

for the people. Political

party affiliation, and
individuals

were expected

to put aside

all

but the most drastic differences
for the sake of the
political party

With the

became a

shift

of politics to the electoral arena
via

partisan administrator

party line and

As

a partisan, the

do what was necessary

political parties, the

Governor was expected

to follow the

to hold the party together
This often

meant taking

broad stands or avoiding stands on
particularly divisive issues that
might

incite intra-

mter-partisan battles Stands on issues
could be firm without being divisive,

shown

to ones' opponents and other

members of one's

of the opposition, or the members of
one's

who became

too powerful

As an

governor

own

party. In

if

respect

or

were

any event, the members

party were there to check any Governor

administrator, the

Governor had a

responsibility to

appoint people to office to help carry out the
law Those appointments were expected to

be partisan and, again, other members of the
party were there to keep the Governor
if the

appointments were not properly made.

146

in line

Notes

Formisano.
^ Geoffrey Blodgett,
The Gentle Reformers: MassarhuK^ot. n,
Cleveland Era (Cambridge; Harvard
University Press,

1966),

'‘James Nesmith, The Life

and Work of

of Masmchuseits (Boston: Roberts

ri,

Brothers,'^! 897), p.

p.

”"“'

,

^

2

,

.

^"'’‘''"o’-

275

^

Darling, p. 45.
^

Darling,

p.

25

1

^Darling, pp. 251-252.

^“‘''‘"8’
/ 7
I
Liberal
Movement.,

chimges

'^Darling, p. 199.

“ Darling,

in

Ma.s.iachmetts IH24-IH4S:

m Politics (Cos Cob, Connecticut:

p. 176.

'^Darling, p. 183.

‘^Formisano, pp. 258-260.
Darling, pp. 173-175, 179-180.
‘^Darling, 179-180.

Darling, pp. 196-199.
'^Darling, p. 199.
“^Darling, p. 210.
‘^Darling, pp. 195-211.

147

A Snuh of

John E. Edwards, 1968),

p.

177.

20

^"'‘'""(Boston: Houghton

125,

>^28, Massachusetts
State

Archtvel tsfon°"

24

etoT"
Unknown

pp 124.

Su"'van, Boston, 24
August 1808, Massachusetts

State Archives, Bostm''^'^''’’

Archive!

Mifflin, 1902),

'^34, Massachusetts
State

to

Boston

John Davis, Boston
Mon, 24 March

1

u
8 4, Massachusetts
State Archives,

Formisano, p 249

state

“

ArLteTeo:::”"

^

January ,853, Massachusetts

'*53, Massachusetts State

BotZ"

Archtve!
28

Nonvoodpitj 9351,'p" lo'’
29

T

Princeton, 1979),
pp

/oj/wp„|.-

T

“

o^2“f

D Whi

e

Promise: America 1815

’

L

r

/wttr™
tRprV

(Norwood:

"’''’PP '«3-i97,RtchardHofstadter,

^

r

I

^3/t/to,y/7/ou n/ //^f

rr

Hill

1

1

lH2')-mi (New York:

"dsSt M4

Macmtilan,

1

I7H0-lfi40

L Watson, UHeny a!JZlr
j,e
and Wang, 1990),
pp 72- 97; Leonard

1

Adopted by the Whig State Convention,
at Worcester, September
948 T
Together with the Resolutions and
Proceedings,” (Worcester:
p.’
n

' '

“Address Adopted. ... 848,”
1

^^“Address Adopted

”

“Address Adopted

...

p.

1848,” p
1

848,” p

1

3,

1

148

1

848) p

i

13

Address Adopted.
Address Adopted.

.

.1

848,” p o

1

848,” p 5

,

Address Adopted. ... 1
848,” p 6
“Address Adopted..

1848,”

.

7

p,

Address Adopted. ... 1
848,” p 7
Address Adopted. ... 1
848,” p 7
°

“Address Adopted.

1848,” pp. 7.8

..

‘

“Address Adopted. .1 848,”

“Address Adopted. .1848,”
p
’“Address Adopted

“Address Adopted
Nesmith, p

controversy as “the
Lincoln’s first veto

8

p.

8

1848,” p

10

1848,” p

10

148

^
first

veto eler by a

He had

returned a

Massach"
bill

than one month earlier
Formisano n 19" 4
General Court May^
1824-March is 28

Acts
48

Acts

it

was not even

objections less

,

p.

510

and Resolves 1800-1899

* Acs a,xd Resolves

May 1824-March

Acts and Resolves May
"^Formisano,

^^Acts

” In fact,

/

and Resolves May’ 1824-March
1828

and Resolves Max- 1824-March

Acts

S^^rnor

to the^r^^^^

p.

1 824-March

1828. p 473.

italics

1828. p 519.

italics in original

added

1828, p 519

300.

and Resolves

1844.

and Resolves

1844, pp 368-369.

p.

359. \cx%

149

and Resolves

1849. p 262.

^Ac/s

Acts

October

3.

and Resolves
and Resolves

18-19, pp,

1844,

260-261

369

p.

849”

1

Convention, Worcester,

58

Address and Resolutions.

.

1849,” p 9

Acts and Resolves 1844 nn
3S8 'J7i a *
^
^^^^Ives 1848,
Acts and Resolves 1849
pp 859-871
747 ’753 Acts
4^/0 and/ n
pp.
pp -^1-2^2,,
Resolves 1850,
pp. 527-538
Acts

and Resolves

1848, pp 864-865

“Address Adopted... 1848,”
^

Acts

and Resolves

Acts

and Resolves

Acts

and Resolves

Acts

and Resolves

Acts

and Resolves

(Boston"Sld

.

1849, p 258

1849, p 259

1850,

p.

540.

1844, pp 363-364

“i

^

p,

249

Acts and Resolves 1849,
p 260.
Acts

^

6

1849, pp. 258-260

Acts and Resolves 1849,
^

p.

and Resolves

1850,

p.

538

Acts and Resolves 1844,

p.

370.

’^Butler, p 967.
Butler, p. 968.

L. Trefousse,

Ben Butler: The South Called Him BEAST,
(New York

Octagon Books, 1974),
p 243
’^Trefousse,

p.

243-245.

150

^^Trefousse,

p.

243.

^^Trefousse,

p.

239.

p.

245

78

Trefousse,
^^Trefousse,
80 -r

p 245.

r-

Iretousse, pp. 243,

249

***

Trefousse,

p.

Butler, p

969

Butler, p.

969

243.

Trefousse, p 248
S5

Trefousse, p 247

and Resolves

Acts

and Resolves 1883,

^^Acts
88

89

1883, p 676.
p.

676

Acts and Resolves 1883,
p 677.
Acts and Resolves 1883,
pp 628-691
Acts

and Resolves

Trefousse,

p.

1883, pp 692-783

247.

92

isirms

turner
Bu,kr 1818-1893 (Cranbury: Associated
University Presses, 1969),
93

Nash,

p.

280; Trefousse,

p.

247.

Acts and Resolves 1883,
p 634.
^

Acts and Resolves 1883,

p.

664.

Acts and Resolves 1883,

p.

690.

Acts and Resolves 1883,

p.

690.

Acts

and Resolves

1883, pp 638, 645.

151

p.

280.

Nesmith,

148.

p.

Nesmith,

p.

148.

Nesmith,

p.

156.

Nesmith, p 152.
Nesmith,

317.

p.

'^'^Nesmith, pp. 317-318.

“’^Nesmith,

p.

318.

and Resolves

1895, p 725
.

Acts

and Resolves
and Resolves

Nesmith,

p.

301.

Nesmith,

p.

301.

’’’Nesmith,

p.

302.

1895, p 724
1896, p 682.

’’“Nesmith, p 339.

Nesmith, p 300.
’’^Nesmith, pp. 340-341.
’’’Nesmith,

p.

342.

’’^Nesmith, pp 272-274.
’’^Nesmith,
t

1

p.

315.

o

Nesmith, p 305.

Acts and Resolves 1895, pp. 741-742.
Acts and Resolves 1895,

p.

724.

Acts and Resolves 1896,
p 665.

152

CHAPTER

3

THE POPULAR MANAGER
Geoffrey Blodgett has noted
that
centuty, the Massachusetts
governorship
administratively, the governor

was

in the

years shorty before the
turn of the

was

weak

a

inst.tution. Particularly

ineffectual

fts only decisive power
over legislation was the
veto
unce a bill became law the
governor found himself curiously detached from
its operation
‘The governor has
almost nothing to do with
the administration
of the laws
m the broad and vital sense,’ a veteran

State House obsetver wrote in the early
[eighteen] nineties ‘Ample
machinery is provided for the
enforcement of the

\Mthout any action by the
governor
Blodgett attributes

this

weakness to three

laws

at all

factors. First, other
important executive officers

such as the Secretary of State,
Treasurer, Attorney General
and Auditor were elected
independently of the Governor
They denved their authority from
the same popular base
as the

Governor but were not responsible

business

to

him Next, Massachusetts
administrative

was conducted mainly by independent
boards and commissions, most
of which

had spntng up after the

Civil

War The Governor

exercised

little

control over these

agencies beyond staggered
appointments. Finally, the Executive
Council, given
to

its

powet

approve or disapprove both the
administrative appointments and removals
of the chief

executive,

hampered many Gubernatorial administrative

Over the next eighty

years, constitutional

efforts.

and statutory reforms would address

those characteristics of the governorship
that Blodgett indicates weakened the
other officeholders drew their

power from

same source

the
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office. If

as the Governor, he

is

none.e,ess co„.,..,o„a,„

manor

e„

offices could no.
claim

As

as .He

such, he

cH.ere.ec.ve, an Hone.
wHicH Ho.e.s or

would come

«.recly ,f .he governor
embodied .he will of .he
people,
.ha. .he

embody

.0

,.

became

governmen. me. .he public's
demands Even.ually,
.hrough

s.a.u.00- reform, .he

.he will of .he
people

h.s responsibilhy
.0 see

cons.i.u.,o„al and

Governor would be given
greater control
grea.er
s
con, ml over
„
a
administration and
•

adminis.ra.ive reorganiza.ions
.0 help see .ha. .hose

demands would be me.

Ul..ma.ely, .his mean, a
direc. relationship
between .he governor
and the people,

one

free

of pol.t.cal

parties

partisan politics, with

i.s

According .0 reformers
around the turn of .he
century,

secre.iveness and deal-making,
hampered governmental
effons .0

carry ou. the voters'
wishes. If .he effects
ofpan.es on .he electoral
process were
lessened, .hey believed,
.he direct expression of
.hose wishes could take
place through .he

governor This also required
a direc. relationship
between the governor and
administration With panies
coming between .he chief
executive and public
administration,

with the nile of appointment
being the panisan

affiliation

cormption and inefficiency were
commonplace With

of the appointee, complaints
of

political

panies removed from

administration, and with the
governor exercising greater control
in that area, the

government could run more
truly be carried out

public

manager

In

efficiently

and effectively

by the executive Ultimately,

1

this

In this

way, the popular

will

could

meant the governor would become
a

900 the Boston HercilJ praised incoming
governor Winthrop Murray
,

Crane “as one who promised to be
Progressive reformers

‘efficient’

and ‘non-partisan”’ These were ideals
for

^
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E^^MffktsaLR^f^

.

Governor George Bourwe.l
signed

a

b,ll

requ.ring .he secret
ba„o, a.

Massachusetts eiect.ons
hor state and
hedera. omces, ’
The nerv .aw ordered

“« -

“towns The

leg, slat, on also

that voters

..

forbade such practices
as multiple or
fraudulent voting and

provided penalties for
elec.ons offtcers

who

neglected their duties/

necessity as a safeguard
of the people’s riohts
o

thr.

i

population of the
Commonwealth

had grown, he notes,
representation had no.
grown proportionally:

The value of the
uffi-r’’° Th
suffrage
Th,s latter

right

,s

of representation

depends mater'"''^P«"dence of the right of
not the original right
of the gov-

ernment conferred upon the
citizen, but the
citizen by which he
takes his part

management of the government
The public, therefore, can

right

of the

in the constitution

and

properly establish such regfor the general
convenience

srfe,™ Th'
and safety
The publicity of the
be a regulation of this sort,

ballot does not appear
to
as [the ballot’s] entire
secrecy

IS

consistent with the safety and
convenience of the whole

community.
Motivations behind the

was

new

ballot regulations

also an attempt to break
the hold

Remember

that parties

coercion of voters

were not

entirely selfless,

of the Whigs on the

politics

however The

of the Bay State

had printed ballots to that point,
making voting an open

who opposed

bill

act

and

the pany, especially the
coercion of factory workers by
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.he,r bosses,

an easier nrai.er
Boutwel, belonged ,o a
coalition of Free Soiiers
and

Dentocrats iook.ng to wrest
power fton, the Wh.gs,
deliver

workers votes While the
secret

.he following year,
and

made

reform of party control

^

Civil Service

As

aw of

l

the

in

came

in

the

and patronage had led to
an

they tegrouped

1

relationship to political
parties,

880s

Democrat Benjamin Butler

at the

inefficient, ineffective
administration,

the part

called for reform of

beginning of his single term

.0 Butler, a neutral civil
service with appointments
based on

on

briefly,

1SR4

Commonwealth

administrative control

Whigs

factot, bosses to

the secret ballot
optional rather than
mandatory, setting back

Illustrated in the last
chapter.

administration

ballot did affect the

With resnprt
tn the
u
respect to
gubernatonal

the next significant
reforms

The

who depended on

in

1883 Nepotism

he asserted According

mem, combined

of the governor, could help
remedy these

with greater

evils

The

General Court, under control of
the Republican pany,
rebuffed the cantankerous

governor

When

Butler failed to win reelection,
the victor. Republican
George

Robinson, continued the

call for civil service

reform

Robinson portrayed public administration
Butler had, calling

it

in

Massachusetts quite differently than

“honest and economical Her record,"
Robinson continued,

singular purity and efficiency,”’
Yet, even in light of this achievement,
a

would be necessary

to “secure and perpetuate

all

be sound and successful policy,”^ Robinson
noted

The

D

national

that:

to the destruc-

of the spoils system, and the State of New York
has
enacted a very comprehensive bill, intended to
carry the
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one of

service law

that our experience has demonstrated
to

government stands committed

tion

civil

“is

reform into the departments
and the large c.t.es
The
age of the State and

hH

a fe andT'
emlyed t /cco ’’"f

the

money, shall not be
party supremacy,
and when
lie

fitness

not favor^shall'd^**'^^

^rriTe
is inteia

»t

th:~

of

and~

practicable and

-“-„t

eLie^ra^tye™^
°|^
^

proval will speedily
come.^

On

June

setv.ee of the

selection

that the

3,

1

884, Governor Robinson
approved

Commonwealth and

the Cities

“An Act

Thereof-

of civil servants on merit
rather than on partisan

^

^

to

^P~

Improve the

Civil

This was an early attempt
to base
afltliation.

The Act prowded

Governor, w.th approval of
the Counc, appomt
a three-member,
b,-patt.sa„ Cvtl

Serv .ee Commtssion.
Th.s commission would
draft rules “for the
select.on of persons to
fill

offices ,n the

government of the Commonwealth
and of the several

are requ.red to be

filled

'

Commonwealth and of the

several cities

Rules prepared by the Commission
were to be subject to the approval
of the

Governor and the Council Rules
could

The Act went

also be

changed with the same approval

to great lengths to assure
neutrality in cettain civil setvice

appointments General outlines were
given as to the rules the commission
should
Public jobs

were

political

establish

to be classified and filled according
to competitive examinations These

examinations were to be directly related
to the position to be

mention

winch

by appointment, and for
the selection of persons
to be employed

as laborers or otherwise .n
the service of the

thereof

cities thereof,

or religious

affiliation.

filled

and were not to

Promotions were to be made on the

and semority. Certain exceptions were
made to these

157

basis

of merit

rules, including veterans, elected

officials,

judges and “officers
whose appointment

is

subject to confirmation
by the

executive council

Various authors have concluded
that Massachusetts
did not make
potential inherent in this
merit system,

merpret

calls for the

and

their objections
are fair

the law aimed squarely
at

tmponam
serv ice

One can

power on the pan of the
Republicans

evading [it],- While

that this

use of the

Certainly one can

law on the pan of
Democrats such as Butler
as merely a maneuver
to

lessen the strength of a
powerful opposition.

consolidate

full

this

was an

also see the

Blodgett indicates that
“(i]n practice

Boston Democrats, [who]
quickly went

may be

the case, that

law as an attempt to

is

to

work

to find

beside the point here
Rathe,

ways of

it is

early effon at “the
elimination of panisan
politics" from the evil

“ Reformers
of the

time, such as

members of the Massachusetts
Reform Club,

conceived of proper administration
as neutral and

efficient,

and viewed parties as

hindrances to that ideal
Electoral

Reform

Between the 1880s and the 1920s, the
General Court enacted various
legislation that served to separate
political parties

electoral process

printing

The General Court

from many of the

pieces of

intricacies

of the

reinstated the Australian ballot in
1888 taking the

of ballots and control of much of the

electoral process, and thus the
electorate,

out of the hands of political parties,'* The
law provided for the public printing
ofbaliots

which had to take a very

specific form: Candidates

names were to be

listed alphabetically

under the office for which each was tunning,
along with respective addresses and partisan
affiliations

and

sufficient

space for the voter to register a choice. The outside
of the
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ballot

had .0 have -Official Ballo,
for” ,he respective
polling place, the
date of the election
and
the signature of the
Secretary of the
Comrrronwealth stamped
on

provrded agarnst cornrpt.on

,n

The law

it

also

voting practices and
provided penalt.es for
negligent

election officers. Various
legislation regulated
ballots and vot.ng
procedure even ftrrther.^«
In 1913, for exantple,

act provrding for this

member, through

a three mentber State
Ballot

Law Commission was

commiss.on included provisions

for neutrality

established

on the

part

The

of ,ts

b,-panisan membership and
regulations against conflict
of interest

^

Legislation also gradually
lessened the strength of
political party elites in
the

candidate nomination process
Individuals such as Governor
Eugene Foss insisted that
direct primaries

would take away the decision
making power of parties regarding

candidates for office, and therefore
allow' a better expression
of the public will “Establish
the direct primary, choose
your
faction,

own

make them accountable only

established

public servants without
reference to any machine or
to yourselves, and popular
government will be

Massachusetts installed a direct primary
system

assumed the governorship.^' Candidates
through “direct plurality vote

in 191

1,

the year Foss

for statewide office could
only be

in primaries,”

attempting to separate party

nominated

elites

from the

process

Though an

effectively organized party organization
could, to a certain extent,

control the candidates offered to the
electorate, the threat of insurgents

nonetheless

party

s

It

was

name was

demonstrated

was

real

quite possible that the candidate running in
a general election under a

not the candidate preferred by the party’s

this to the

Republicans

in

officials.

Augustus Gardner

1913 and James Michael Curley would do the
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Cd., to,

1«.

b.» of..p,o„

b„„ ,b, ,„bto

*ii«« ,„ . ,„,

to to.

^

,.„

,. .

„ „ .„to„to ,to.

„to,to,. to

allegiance to the individual.

The Constitutional C
onvention of
Through
from

with

executtve from parties and

some
tie

]

q q
]

begun separating the
execut.ve

h,m to the public

directly,

wtthout part.es as intermediaries

reform helped ensconce a
notion that proper
administration was neutral
and

convention that began

in

and thus potentially
wasteful The constitutional

1917 took the popular-manager
no.ton ofthe executive on
whtch

reforms were based and attempted
to write

constttution

.

success. Electoral reforms
served to separate the

efficent, rather than
party-controlled

earlier

1

the early twentieth
century, reformers
had

polittcal parties,

Ctvil servtce

I

Many

reformers

a.

the convention

it

felt

into the

Massachusetts state

no. only that the governor
embodied

the will ofthe people, but
that he should be a. the
head of a competent, efficient

administration so that will could be
carried out properly Efforts
to strengthen the office
as the

embodiment ofthe popular

governor

will

were more successful than attempts

to link the

directly to administration.

On

January

8,

1914, newly elected Governor David

I

Walsh, a Democrat,

addressed the Massachusetts General Court:

The strong

public

demand

for certain changes in our

Constitution compels the Legislature, year
after year,
to consider the same proposals for its
amendment.

The
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— «rxsr“x--:i

constantly recurring
demands. The failur

of the

Lei

a large body of
mteli.gent, patriotic
citizens

®

Legislature cause to
be L'sembTed
assembled with the consent
of the electorate a bodv
of citizens, who shall
be selected without
to

foliate amendments

muted

to the voters

of the

party

to our

Constituln

S

delegaLn

Tub

State, will tend to
settle other

wise irrepressible
controversies, and

will

make our Const!

TITTfT;”
Walsh made

specific

™

recommendations regarding
appropriate amendments.
Among these

0o.,.o,

,

p,„.

recommendation and found “no

legislation necessary,”

though a

bill

was

filed, failing

by

the slimmest of margins:
103-105

Walsh

called for a convention
again in 1915

amendments, adding
and responsibility

bill

several, including:

in the

Governor

“The short

He renewed

ballot,

his suggestions for

with concentration of power

The members of the General
Court again defeated

supporting Walsh’s suggestion.
Pressure for a convention grew,
however,

until

a

it

could not be ignored.

The demand was so great
Walsh
first

s

demand

Governor, Samuel

W

McCall, echoed

for a Constitutional Convention.
In his 1916 inaugural address,
McCall’s

order of business was to

amendments His

that a Republican

list

call for a

Convention and to offer suggestions for

of amendments was considerably shorter
than Walsh’s, but was
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comprised of the short

ballot, biennial
elections

and an executive budget
The General

Court followed McCall's
advice, and, after
approval by popular vote
and popular election
of delegates, a Constitutional
Convention convened

The governorship was one
of many

issues dealt with in the
convention, and the

views of many of its members
do indicate a changed notion
of the elected executive
report from the convention's

Committee on the Executive

indicates the changes

m

A

thought

regarding that office

However
form

Its

and ably a legislative body
may percannot supply the element
of political

faithflilly

duties.

leadership,

It

of responsible

v^ery election

initiative, its very
numbers its
by a large number of
constituencies, prevent

The executive alone represents
the whole body of
the people because he alone
is elected by and
is responsible to them, in State
government it
this

therefore chiefly

is

to the

Governor

that people look for

improvements or
reforms, whether these are to
be secured by administrative or by legislative means
They expect him to put for-

ward and to push to success legislative
own,
not merely to content himself

—

policies

of his

with ceremonial

and supervisory duties.
Here, the governor alone represents
the popular

an equally important and capable partner

will

Prior to

this,

the legislature had been

the relationship between the
government and

in

the public Previously, the constitution
and subsequently political parties had

between the chief executive and the
to speak for the people

electorate.

of Massachusetts

If

Now,

he,

alone and directly,

he were to do

so,

come
was assumed

he needed to be able to

bring his program to fruition.

The work of the convention regarding

movement toward

the Governor did

much

to further the

application of the notion of that officeholder as a public
manager.
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The

two-year term, the executive
budget, heightened
executive emergency
powers, and the
ability to return bills

with recommendations

year term allowed the
Governor

expected to push upon
entering
resulted

would

more time
office.

all

from

this

convention. The two-

to attempt to install
the

The “ordeal of an annual

from the single-year
term was over

The

program he was now

political

campaign” which

elimination of perennial
campaigning

up the executive, allowing
greater potential for
gubernatorial

free

leadership

resulted

legislative

31

The executive budget would
allow
thus enable a sharper focus
on efficiency

in

the Governor greater
control over spending
and

matters of public expenditure

- The

executive

would have to recommend a
budget to the General Coun
within three weeks of the
assembling of that body .^1
expenditures of revenues were
to be contained
appropriation

bill,

in

through which the General
Court could modify gubernatorial

recommendations as

it

saw

fit

budgets, and appropriations

The Governor would be

bills

able to

recommend supplementary

other than the general
appropnation

bill

had to come

from gubernatorial recommendations.
All appropriations would
be subject
gubernatortal line-item veto.

reasons tor effecting changes

The Governor would then be
in

the appropriations

bill

to a

obligated to communicate his

to the General

Court The

Governor was given more detailed and
substantive power by assuming a more
role in the fiscal affairs

of the

.'\nother effort at

positive

state.

adding to the governor’s authority was the
amendment allowing

the chief executive to declare laws for
the purposes of emergencies.

amendment gave

one general

The

resulting

the governor the ability to declare a law the
General Court had passed as
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effective i^ediately,
provided

he could declare
an emergency

effect before the const,
tut.onally-mandated

mnety-day waihng period.^

defense of the amendment,
one speaker
indicated that
P
that

from the

of interests

evils

that

would disobey the
y me

on order

Legislature

may have

public good,

it

fell

that they

may

forbidden

its

i.

to take

an eloquent

purpose was to protect the
public

legislature

Governor may withdraw from
the power of special
Legislature

that required

“Thu
This simply means
'

,

that the

interests an opportuntty
to hold

up the

gain a few months longer
to do the business which
the

Where

to the governor to

do

the legislature could
not properly ensure the

so.

Another amendment resulting from
the convention gave the
Governor a more
positive legislative role than
the original gubernatorial
veto While he could

with objections, according to
Article LVl, the Governor
could

amendments
have

five

in

which to return a

bill

bill

to the

Governor

for his signature If this occurred,
the

the option of recommending

amendment demonstrates
the legislature

The Governor would

and possibly make the amendments

suggested by the Governor The legislature
could then approve the
it

bills

with recommended amendments.
The General

Court would then be able to reconsider
the

return

return

now recommend

as well, though under a different
procedure than a veto

days

still

amendments

bill,

in

any form, and

Governor would not have

again, though he could veto the

measure This

the desired Progressive relationship
between the executive and

The Governor would have

a greater opportunity for

leadership of the legislature Rather than only
objecting to

bills,

more

detailed policy

he would be able to

make

substantive suggestions to the General Court Rather
than merely making

recommendations

in

an inaugural or state of the State address, the Governor
could suggest
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amendments

to bills that had

been

#•
dirertU/
l
d,rectly k
before the

for both substantive
policy leadership

between the execut.ve and
Also

in

legislative

•

legislature

Here was an opportunity

on the
ne Dart
of the
th<- r„
part of
Governor and greater
cooperation
branches of the State’s
government

keeping with the tenor of
making administration
-more business-1, ke,"

resolution passed that limited
the

the

i

number of executive departments

«

While estimates on

number of existing departments
vaned from just over
one-hundred

hundred, the

move

to limit

them succeeded Oddly, however,
the

executive branch was kept out
of the hands of the governor
and

to over two-

ability to

left

a

reorganize the

with the General

Court Also, there were several
motions to eliminate the
Executive Council, one of only
three remaining

in

the United States, but

convention resulted

remained

in

none of them succeeded

“

Thus, while the

certain augmentations of
gubernatorial powers, the office

still

relatively ineffectual administratively

Th e Popular Manager
What

effect did these various

in

Practice

reforms have’ After the institution
of measures

designed to lessen the influence of political
parties

in

Massachusetts and to augment the

strength and influence of the governor,
what did the chief executive look like in
practice’

Again, as indicated

instructive.

Table 3

in

I

chapter two, looking

at the

illustrates the distribution

though not Item vetoes Most simply,

in the

development of vetoes over time

of vetoes over the twentieth century,

twentieth century, vetoes have been far
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is

more

Table

Year

1900-02

1903-04
1905

1906-08

1909-10
1911-13
1914-15

1916-18

1919-20
1921-24**

1925-28

j.l

Governor

W

M. Crane

John

L.

Bates

Gubematonal Vetoes 1900-1997

Vetoes

16

Vetoes

Divided

Ovemdden

Governments

0

N

29
1

N

1

Y

24

0

N

10

0

N

67

28

Y

David Walsh

20

0

Y

Samuel McCall

27

William Douglas
Curtis Guild

Eben Draper
Eugene Foss

Calvin Coolidge

Channing Cox
Alvan Fuller

4

1

N

1

N

25

0

N

77

14

N

1

N

12

(+1 pocket)

1929-30
1931-34
1935-36
1937-38

1939-44
1945-46
1947-48
1949-52

Frank Allen

12

Joseph Ely

64

17

Y

James Curley

30

7

Y

Charles Hurlev

51

6

Y

L. Saltonstall

90

5

N

Maurice Tobin

21

0

Y

Robert Bradford

35

2

N

Paul Dever

7

0

N (1949-50)
Y (1951-52)

Continued on the next page

The two-year gubernatorial term began with
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the election of 1920.

Table 3

1953-56

1957-60

Chnstian Herter

continued

.

24

Foster Furcolo

0

10
1

1961-62
1963-64

John Volpe
E.

18

Peabodv

Y

Y (1957-58)
N (1959-60)

2

Y

6

N

1

1965-68***

John Volpe****

82

25

Y

97
(-M86 pocket)

37

Y

35

23

N

7

N

(+55 pocket)

1969-74

1975-78

Francis Sargent

Michael EXikakis

(+90 pocket)
1979-82

Edward King

14

(+37 pocket)

1983-90

Michael Dukakis

1

N

1

1991-97

William

22

22

Y

2

2

Y

Weld
1997

Paul Cellucci

between 1900 and 1997 vetoed
vetoing at least twice as

an important leader

many

at least as

many

bills

pieces of legislation

in the policy

as Greenhalge. with seven
governors

As

the notion of the governor’s being

process took hold, governors became
less hesitant about

using the veto

The four-year gubernatorial term began
Volpe

left

office in January

after the election

of 1966.

of 1969 to serve as Secretary of Transportation

Richard Nixon’s Cabinet.
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in

President

Partisanship has played

more ofa

role in

whether a governor's
vetoes are_
;

overridden than whether
a °
sovernor eYPrric«
“erases the veto

,n the first place

Of the 934

(»*d,
»».

-i

w

^

^

vetoes

^

,.

least

one chamber The remaining
so/
vetoes or 44
° 425 vetoes,
44, 5-/o,
came with the governor's
party

domtnattng both houses of
the General Court
These numbers are
supposed by the
that four

of the top

ten,

and ten of the top twenty,
users of the veto did
not face divtded

--‘y -Sht
government

Weld

left

for at least

one term, account,
ng

office in July

Bradford's,

fact

governors since ,900 did face
divtded

for just over one-half
of all vetoes cast.

of 1997

nfMcCall

m2)
^^^2)

Co°t«
r
Cox
(#13),

(#19) and Kimr
o hi
Coolidge and A(len'(Llh #nu''Dr3'(d3'
'''t'""

;:r:“n=r
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<*«)'

Guild (# 14 w/Herter), Crane

govemmem were

Thus,

in

,he twentieth centu^.
a governors
partisan affiliation does
not seem to

much of a

difference as to whether
he vetoes a

When one

looks

at

make

that

bill

overrides of vetoes, the
story becomes a

bit more complex.
as
Table 3 2 demonstrates
The General Court
overrode 204 vetoes
between 1900 and 1997
Notice that this is only 21
84% of all vetoes cast, indicating
that overrides of
vetoes are

relatively

uncommon Of those 204

legislature controlled by
the party

overrides, .47, or
72.06-/„, occurred under
a

opposing the governor's.
Only

27

57, or

94% came

Tabic 3.2 Overrides of
Gubernatorial Vetoes 1900-1997

^Vetoes

Divided Go\crnment

509

Unified Parly Government

from a

legislature

#Ovcmdcs

147

425

57

dominated by members of the
governor’s party Also, of the 509
vetoes

under divided government, the
legislature overrode 147 of
them, or 28

I

88% The General

Court overrode only 57 of the 425
vetoes, or 13,41%, under
unified-party government
While a twentieth-century governor
legislation

is

only slightly more likely to veto a
piece of

under divided government, he

is

almost three-times as

likely to

have

that veto

overridden The Progressive mindset,
one under which partisan competition was
a
hindrance to the representation of the public

will,

took a firmer hold on the Massachusetts

This does not include pocket vetoes or item
vetoes
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;

I

I

I

executive than

it

did on the
Massachusetts legislature,

develop the power of
the office

at the

As

a result, governors
sought to

expense of the party

Thi.

f..».

~

^

orF«i. o
r„,

himself directly with
Franklin
relief

D

Roosevelt and embodied
the era of the

from the Great Depression

administrative programs
This

entailed a

was

more

also the era

New

Deal,

when

central role for
governmental

when

the popular manager,
through

Roosevelt’s leadership, truly
came to dominance on the
national scene. Curley
represented

many of those same

ideas in Massachusetts

James Michael Cnrlpy

James Michael Curley

is

one of the stoned figures of
Massachusetts

Curley was Governor for only
one term, though he was long
prominent
the state's political

himself,

life.

While many

tales

are apocryphal, his behavior

in

in

of his escapades, especially
those

the Governor’s office

is

indicative

politics,

other aspects of

told

by Curley

of the nature of

the directly popular executive
His administrative activities
are not as indicative of the

notion of the executive as manager,
but Curley was caught
political cultures,

support

was

the midst of changing

and evidence of a managenal
perspective can be found. While

his

personal, administrative control had
not yet been handed substantively to
the

Governor, though Curley would attempt
to

more than

in

that

of Benjamin Butler,

is

effect a certain control

Curley’s tenure, even

a precursor to the executive as a public
manager.

170

Curley has a reputation
as a party bos, indeed
as one of the
Massachusetts, and he had
done

much work

eventually taking over the
ward and
ultimately

into a

moved

of the bosses

Democratic Ward 17 during

to the top

of Bay State

politics

”

in

his youth,

However, he

past any sort of strictly
partisan alignment,
as his ambttion carried
him

more personal following

Governor’s

nsmg

in

last

\n I 'd

Do h Agam,

Curley writes of his winning
the

office:

Shan go m without a
promise except to the voters
of
he State .Ml my life 1 have
been a lone wolf in
politics
reusing to take orders. My
campaigns have followed a
certain pattern I’ve had
first to defeat the
bosses in my
own party then fight a combination
of Republican overords and disgruntled fugitives
from the Democratic camp
This

IS

an accurate representation
of the popular nature of
the Progressive executive
Writing

in

1992, biographer Jack Beatty
notes, Curley’ s support
was more

personal than partisan:

The

strongest party

preneur

is

left in

the party of ‘me

the age of the political entre-

That was also Curley’s parideology, Curleyism, even bore
his own name
Like too many recent politicians,
presidents
’

ty, his

Curley specialized

in the politics

among them
of division, using ‘wedge

issues’ to split

groups apart. .In short, look past
his oldtime oratory, consider his crude
electioneering the equivalent of our televisual demagogy,
and Curley

emerges as
our contemporary, a prince of our
disorder. .No machine,
no party bosses, no pudgy men in fedoras
nominated him.
As he had done so often before, he nominated
himself

The

last

two sentences above

defeated Charles H. Cole

in

refer to Curley’s Gubernatorial

campaign of 1934. Curley

the Democratic primary by a vote of better
than two-to-one.

Party elites Joseph Ely and David Walsh,
both former Governors themselves, had opposed
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Cl,'. -..,™
ory,

1

1,

..

eked

my own

party,

... .......... ...
and

now

I

set

out to

Republicans "" With
a
nomination that was against
the wishes of party
eaders, r„rl»
F
y leaders
Curley was obliged
to build

suppon

for htmseif rather
than rely to

lick the

any great extent on
the party to do so

Indeed

.hough Curiey attempted
to coopt President
Prank, in Rooseveh's
hacking, he lacked rhe
support of the White
House in
his

than partisan

He had

nin

in the

the state Democratic
party and

member of the

national

run for rhe Goveiuorship,
wt.h the President
remairuns
O

pnmaiy

won

against the wishes of
the important

members of

.he genera, election
wt.hou, the support of the
highest

pany He had

effectively separated
htmseif from the parry

electorally

Yet, Curley

worked

felt

the personal nature of
his victory

was dubious As hard

to cultivate a personal
following ,ha, could defear
either parry, Curley

support as dependent on wha,
he represented, a

liberal

His was no, a personal vote
of confidence, bu, "a
enunciated by our great leader
Franklin

D

as he had

saw

his

response ,o ihe Great Depression,

vico^

for the

programs and

policies

Roosevelt.”" The evidence bears
out Curley’s

assessment of his victory, as he ran
behind other Democratic statewide
candidates and
significantly behind

personal, he

Joseph Ely’s

total in the election

was accountable only

to the public directly, not to the
party. While he noted

the personal nature of his victory,
Curley also
Will

of 1932 ," As Curley’s support was

saw htmseif as the

of the people represented by Roosevelt’s
programs.
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direct

embodiment of the

he Governor

~en.
Democrats
effectively

s

Council, which he
called an “archaic
appendage of Bay State

an obsolete te„c of
royalist

- Curley’s

rule,

kept alive by Republ.can
tones and fa.th.ess

exasperat.on reflects an
inability to carry out
administration

because of a Council composed
of .ndiv, duals hostile to
James Michael Curley

Curley would turn a
Republican majonty on the
Council into a Democratic
one. In matters
of administrative appointments,
i

however

suppon

partisan affiliation

was not

as important as

for Curley:

My

first

move

in this game of
political chess was
Joseph A. Sheehan, a member
of the Finance Commission, to the
bench of the Superior
Court and replace him with E
Mark Sullivan, a Republican who was my Corporation
Counsel when

to appoint

I

was Mayor

This indicates further the personal
nature of support for the public
leader.

It

indicates as

well the attempt to bring
administration directly under the
control of the Governor, to

make

the

Governor

into a managerial agent

Curley’s concern with his lack of
control over administration was
that
h.s

it

hampered

effons to implement his program In
his Inaugural Address, he
attacked the merit

system

in

administration as politically motivated
and a hindrance to the purposes of the

Gubernatorial office:

The tenure of state

officials

the term of a Governor to
trative offices as

renders

it

impossible during

make such changes

may from

in administime to time be necessary for

the proper conduct of state departments
.Under the exist.

ing system the Executive

is

denied direct responsibility.
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e,t

moon,

pnce .„ such capa
dee.s

Nonce

eha.

..

is

best foe

Cueley's peogean, .ha,

is

be.ng ™p,e„e„.eb

no. deferennal .0 .he
leg.sla.ure. checldng

.he. and o.hers
and ,nrplen.e„.

mpedes

.0 ..plenren. a

,

„

,s

program Ra.her, ..s

deny.ng wha.

,s ,n

.he

Cu.iey

,s

.hrough a ve.o when
proposals are

as efficen.ly as
poss.ble, ,n .he

tha, process,

adnun,s,ra.,on

.,

As

is

h.s program, and

„a.e of .he

.he public

public

good

h„pb ,s .0 pass
If a„y.h.ng

good Seeh.ng con.ro. over

was one ^e.hod of effec.ing
and .™p.e„en.,ng one’s
program wi.h

as

much

efficiency as possible

The

leg.sla.ure

was ano.her perceived impedimen,

,0 .he impIemen.ation

Guberna.onal progra.n was the
legislature Curley was
not adverse
General Court

Politics

I,

mahgning .he

the opportunity arose,
forther indicating the nature
of the public manager.

.f

was not mainly an

administrator

to

of .he

now took

electoral activity, as

place

.n

it

had been under the partisan

both the electorate and
constitutional institutions In a

radio address, Curley discussed
the passage of a
forty-eight-hour-work-week
indicated the nature of the General
Court’s work: “In the past,

it

bill,

and

has been the policy to

consider legislation solely from the
standpoint of what was desired and
what was
acceptable to the large financial interests
of the Commonwealth, rather than what
was
equitable and just to the entire people
of the Commonwealth.’’-" Curley talks about
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“achieving] mastery over
the legislature
senate and

House,-

desoite Ren„hr
despite
Republican numencal
supremacy in both

,n his Inaugural
Address, Curley sought
a reduction in the
siae of

the State Legislature
and a switch to biennial
sessions In his 1936
State of the State

Address, he went so far
as to

Curleys attempts

to

recommend

a unicameral
legislature,

dominate the General

Coun

are indicative of the
public nature

of this type of executive
As the sole embodiment
of the public’s
.0 the political party,
the

legislature

under

his

will,

Governor had no qualms about
attempting

thumb Contrast

this

to bring the

with the constitutional
executive,

legislature as an equally
important governing

body and accords

it

had to be denigrated

in the

who

due respect

were to think of the executive
as the representation
of what was best
legislature

with no obligation

sees the

If

people

for them, the

minds of the voters The
law-making body,

after

all,

could too easily frustrate the
Governor’s program, which
represented the direct expression

of popular opinion,
standing

body

in

the

A

legislature that

way of what

was unwilling

the voters wanted

to

work with

The Governor had

the executive

a duty to

was only

bnng

that

into line

Curley’s use of the veto indicates a
changed relationship between the
legislature

and the executive with the advent
of the public manager Curley was
not hesitant about
using the veto

He

also took advantage of the

recommendations Curley vetoed
for

amendment His vetoes were

significantly bolder than vetoes

appropriating

money

for

power

to return a

thirty bills during his

bill

with

term and returned

at least eight bills

policy- rather than constitutionally-oriented,
and

under partisan executives had been Curley vetoed
a

highway

repair, claiming a certain provision
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was “purely

bill

political

..d

.b„,„
r«

„„„

.h.

dl«™.d,

,f

d«di™i,

V„,

. .„

»«nd„ o„„ |.gi.,.,„.
rationality: Is the

proposed

^
^

^
„.

^

„„ ,

^

legislation
ion a perfect,
s
nerfect

/ ^
pffl.'
.
/.e.
efficient,

means

to a given end. If not,

the legislation could
be rejected as inadequate

Because

was eager

legislation

needed to be passed to
ensure the public’s well-being,
Curley

to send b.lls to the
leg.slature.

He

sent several messages
to the General Court

recommending “immediate enactment
of the accompanying
constitutional executive and the
partisan administrator

recommendations to the

legislature, the popular

bill

’’»

Whereas the

would make broad

manager would send

specific bills to that

body. The elected executive
would no longer wait for the
legislature to enact laws
public good, and then “gladly
concur

see that the public

good was met

justify the bills he sent to the

the public interest.

It is,

but

’’

an

in

He would
efficient

General Court.

more

importantly,

it

the

take direct, concerted, detailed
action to

manner Curley went

It is

in

to great lengths to

not merely that proposed legislation

is

the best, most efficient

is in

means of

meeting the pressing public problem.
If the elected executive

people Curley

made use of the

had become popular, he needed some way
of reaching the
radio to take his case directly to the people.

thirty-three radio addresses during his term
as Governor.'' In

176

many of these

He

delivered

addresses.

cu.e. conceded ..se,f
wUH

coun

p.eces of .s

and

Curley used .he radio no.
only .0 enhance

h.s

own

. influence .e Gene.,

a„e.,s

vis.hi.hy, hu. also
.0 piay

an

the burgeoning Social
Securiry program, Curley
no.es:
It IS

my

pu|pose as announced on
Wednesday

cuss the subject every
Wednesday night

at

las.

to dis

6 30 and

in

°f the most important steps ever undertaken
by a government in
the history
of the world for the
protection of the entire
population
tunity to

do so you

will listen in

and that

information other than that
which
hese wlks will direct his

all

may be

Curley used the media .0
educate the public

what

IS

m the public’s best

media to educate a public

interest

if

The

at the

desire

fiimished in

interrogatories to

State House, Boston

who

me

same time

at the

as he claimed .0 advocate

public executive had .0
be able .0

make use of the

he were .0 draw strength
from an astute public opimon

But what of Curley as a leader’
Again, Curley campaigned
on the New-Deal type
platform of government relief
from the Great Depression
Curley himself claims

“More

social legislation for the
people

of this Commonwealth was
enacted under my

administration than under any previous
Chief Executive

enacted

much

in

the

way of social

that:

Certainly the General

legislation during Curley’s term,

some of it

at

Coun

Curley’s

suggestion, and even approved the
$61 million budget he proposed in
January of 1935,'’'
Yet, as

one biographer notes,

economic

crisis as

this

was probably as much

anything Curley had done

”
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a result of the deepening

Indeed, the pieces of Curley’s “work and

wages" program

that did pass

were often the product
of promises

for jobs

on the

part

of

the governor.

Yet Curley

lost

more

legislative battles than
he

accomplishments. Curley had
claimed

"96%

won. Under

successful leglslahon

accomplishments, Curley makes
no such grandiose claims.

He

his first term’s

- As

his

second-term

notes:

one of the most disastrous
floods in the Commonwealth’s
history where a demand
for relief funds from
the Legislature was marked by two
all night
sible a successfiil flood
relief

sessions rendering pos-

program despite tremendous

A new Old Age Assistance law was
successfully
which was the most forward
step taken for the
protection of the aged in the
Commonwealth
obstacles

enacted

Yet, that flood relief was not
as effective as

seek federal help
form,

» The

Curley was similarly ineffectual

dictator

*'

might have been because Curley

General Court did not approve,
or approved

many measures he advocated

governor’s office

it

m January

in attaining federal aid
in that

of 1937,

it

was amid accusations
in

became

success

m

fhe issue

office.

The notion

More

that the

“

“ When

regard

that he

was

he

left

the

a despot and a

both the legislature and the

where Curley-supported candidates often
went down

himself

weakened

to help relieve the effects
of the Depression, and

Curley had alienated members of both
pames

electorate,

m a ve^

failed to

to defeat

when Curley

Curley’s imperious behavior cost him
respect and possible

generally, the public-manager notion of
the executive had failed

governor alone represented the

interests

of the people and that he

alone should carry out his program had been
Curley’s downfall.
In

James Michael Curley, one can see the emergence of the
public manager. The

elected executive had

come

to

embody

the public
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good

directly, free

from

political parties.

suppon was d.e„,v

public, as be bad

won b

.brougb pn.anes and
elecbons .ba.

response, bty to see .bat
the public good was
enacted

If a bes.tant
legislature

or an
.ncontpetent adnti^stration
..peded the Governor's
tntplenten.ation of his
progran,
the public good), they

would

effectively

necessitated that the
executive

w,th a cooperative

legislature

g.n

be blocking the

of the people

will

..

TWs

greater control over
the legislature and
adnri.stra.ion

and an

efficient administration
d.rectly

the public W.11 could be
earned out as efficiently
as poss.ble

found

(,.e..

As

under the Governor,

a result, the execut.ve

necessary to take b,s case
d.rectly to the people
The public manager would
have

to reach the public
through

some mass medium Curley
accompl.shed

of the radio His use of the
veto ind.cated
partisan, but the

most

effic.ent

that policy

means possible given

this

through the use

needed to be not constitut.onal
or
the ends that needed to
be

accomplished Curley was an early
example of the popular manager,
drawing

legmmacy

directly

from the people, and attempting
to exercise

direct

his

and substantial

control over administration.

The World War

II

Fra

The era between the Great Depression
and
desire for a

more

Saltonstall,

governor during World

feat that

is

the 1960s

saw

officeholders give the

powerffil governor in Massachusetts
further public expression. Leverett

War

even more impressive than

it

II,

vetoed ninety

bills

between 1939 and 1944,

a

looks, given that the General Court did
not meet

during 1940 and 1942 except for a brief
emergency session each year.^^ Saltonstall vetoed
these

bills

despite the fact that his party, the Republicans,
controlled both houses of the
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Genera, Coun,

i„d, caring .ha, ,he

vetoes occurred dunng
wart.^e,

veto was no longer
s.ricly a part.san

when one would expect

to see a

.ool. Finally,
,hese

show of untty antong

the

mentbers of the govenunent.
Sal.onstall also .ssued
seventy-five executive
orders benveen

nd 1944. Most of these
were connected with wartime
matter of those orders was
banal, and few,
to handle public problems,

if

is

a

bit

though existing commissions
were given

misleading, however, as

Much of the

subject

any new conrntissions
or boards were created

Governors between ,945 and
,966 averaged only ,0
average

activity

Maunce Tobin

certain dut.es.

3 execut.ve orders.

Even

that

issued twenty-two orders
while

Paul Dever issued nineteen,
accounting for over one-half
of the seventy-three executive

orders issued

the

Korean

in that

conflict

Much

period

of their output was
war-related as

well,

corrected with

The subject matter of most of
these was equally nondescript

previous executive orders.

No

as the

executive commissions or
executive boards were created

With the return of peacetime, the
governor no longer held as much

direct policy-making

power
Governors around

this

by constitutional amendment

time did, however, begin to make
use of the power, granted

after the convention

of 1917, to declare laws effective

immediately due to an emergency. While
Saltonstall only used

over

his six years in office,

Bradford eight times

in

Maurice Tobin used

two

years,

indicating an increased desire

it

part

power seventeen times

eleven times in only

and Christian Herter

on the

this

two

years.

Robert

thirty-six times in four years,

of the governors for a more substantive policy

role“
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Foster

Fiirr.nln

Foster Furcolo,

P-tston more

served as governor from
1957-1961, invoked the
emergency

often than any previous
governor,

.he executive as

that

who

it

wnh

thirty-nme acts. Furcolo
represents

had developed hy the
1960s, with attempts to be

pol.t.cally

powerhrl

were not supponed by a strong
administrative framework,
He continued many of the

trends Curley had started
and
control Also, while

became even more systematic

Democrat Curley had gone up

in his bid for

administrative

against a Republican
legislature,

Furcolo faced only one chamber
of the opposing party, and
then only by two members,
during his

first

term and unified party
government

Furcolo, a Democrat, served
election in 1956 and again

particularly convincing,

that year

came

strong victory

m

two terms

as

in his

Governor of Massachusetts, winning

1958. His victory over

coming by

second term

Sumner

a margin of over 140,

G

Whittier in 1956

was

000 votes,“ Furcolo’s victory

as Republican presidential
candidate Dwight Eisenhower
registered a
in

Massachusetts Given that Democrats

won many

elections in

Massachusetts, Eisenhower’s victory
indicates that Massachusetts voters
were not hesitant

about ticket

splitting for

top posts Party had become

less

of a force

in

gubernatorial

politics

Much

else

about Furcolo’s election indicates the more
personalized nature the

executive office had taken on by the
mid-twentieth century.

Furcolo following

his election indicates

Democrats ten years before
indicates that this

is

rise.

sketch of

he had been unknown to Massachusetts

his election to the

a meteoric

A biographical

Governor’s office

Furcolo’s quck
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The tenor of the

rise is certainly indicative

of an

article

individual

who

has not “paid his dues”
through setvice to the
patty or worked his

way up

through the party ranks.

The campaign
than

in the

pan.san

itself

era.

saw much

Remember

party activity, though
accounts seem

that Frederic

Greenhalge's attacks,

in

more personal

the late

ntneteenth century, were
directed mainly at the
opposition party Policy under
the

opposition party was anathema
to the interests of the
citizens of Massachusetts.
Rhetoric
directed against the party
as an entity

Furcolo’s speech had

Democratic

was present

in

Furcolo’s

campaign, but

first

become personalized Where
Greenhalge had

party, Furcolo attacked

much of

attacked the

Sumner Whittier

[Furcolo] struck out at his
opponent for ‘voting against
measures which favor the consumer
’

On

tour different occasions,
Furcolo stated. Democratic leaders have tried
to push through legislation
to protect the public against high
prices and ‘on each of these
occasions, Whittier cast his vote
against the interest of
the people.

Furcolo “challenged

his

Republican opponent to ‘campaign
on

the record of any other public
officiar’“
indicated that

hittier,

it

was

the candidates

for his part, took

calling for

its

umbrage

Much

who were
at the

his

own

record’ and not

of the speech during the campaign

doing

battle, rather than the parties

personal nature of the negative campaigning,

end.^^

The changed nature of the Governor’s

office

Boston Globe the day before Furcolo delivered

is

evident

in

an

article

his inaugural address.

from the

The piece opens,

“Gov.-Elect Furcolo’s prospects for cooperation
from the legislature improved today,”

upon

election of Newland H.

Holmes

as President of the Senate/®
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Holmes had not been

on

.he

firs,

chcce of .os. RepobUcaos,

bu. had

won .he

Sena.e Presidency
.hrough a

coah.,on of Sena.e
De.ocra.s and five Republicans.
This
parties.

Holmes was

article is also indicative

was seen as

is

providing

it

fortuitous for Furcolo.
a Democrat.

The Governor

with direction.

It is

cooperating with the governor
rather than the other

is

stressed

is in
i

in relation

a supenor position to

the legislature that should
be

way around The

conceptions of the office had the
relationship reversed
cooperation

of .he dechne of

of the changed nature
of .he Governorship

to other institutions,
especially the legislature

the legislature and

.nd.car.ve

a Republican leader
in a Sena.e
con.rolled by .he
Republican party

Ye., his eiecion as
Sena.e Preside.

The

is

It is

previous

also significant that

The mstimtions are not checking
one another

to ensure protection

ot rights Rather, they are
cooperating to maintain the
public welfare

This

m many
happy

new

relationship

between the Governor and the
General Court

also present

of Furcolo’s speeches and proposals,
John Hancock and George Briggs
had been

to concur in any

measure passed by the General Court
provided

Constitutional for the former and ,n
the public
as the

is

embodiment of the
It

public

(«.

partisan)

good was not so ready

good

it

was

for the latter Furcolo,

to capitulate:

has been the policy of the Chief
Executive to forthright-

meet the many and complex governmental
problems of
when this has meant the advocacy of unpopular programs and proposals. The
standard had always been
ly

the time, even

to espouse that which in conscience
has seemed required
for the public good, rather than that
which has been expedient.''

The Governor had taken on
public

good He

is

a

more

direct,

more

detailed, policy role in the

name of the

therefore seeking the cooperation of the legislature
in enacting
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programs to

effect that public

good, Furcolo openly
acknowledged the legislature’s

cooperation ’’The Executive
Department wishes to
express

cooperation received ffom
members of the General
Court,
beneficial proposals

The

shifted to the legislature’s

relationship

institutions,

only

,n

become

support of farsighted and

between the executive
and the

legislature has

inferior position.

far less important
in the relationship

Furcolo faced divided
government during the

the Senate, and then
only by

firs,

two members During

controlled both houses
of the legtsla.ure
hts firs, term, in the
face

in

gratitude for the

approving executive
proposals rather than the
other way

around The legislature had
taken on an
Party, too, had

its

’’

his

Furcolo vetoed ten

of divided government, and
e.ght

between the

of his two terms, though
second term,

btlls

in his

his party

over two terms, two

second term, wt.h

ir

hts

party controlling the legislature
While Furcolo did no. veto
a large number of bills

compared
little

to

most other twentieth-century
governors, he

is

instructive in that party
played

role in his uses of the
negative.

In hts

second Inaugural Address, Furcolo
recommended that the General Court

pass a rule allowing that any
petition could only be heard
once
legislative sessions This

legislative

in

any two consecutive

would, according to the Governor,
“increase the efficiency of the

process”’^ Efficiency was a theme
sounded repeatedly by Furcolo throughout

his administrations

the General Court

Greater efficiency and cooperation
with the executive on the part of

would allow the

effectively Otherwise,

institutions to carry out the public
will

problems would go unaddressed This

notion of the Governorship and

its

is

the classic Progressive

relationship with other institutions.
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The

executive, as
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education

The media became an important

link

between Furcolo and the

public, indicating a

popular leader had to be medta-sawy
Where Curley had used the radio.
Furcolo made use

of television

On July

23. 1957, for example, he spent
t.me explarning to the public the

tragedy that had occurred

when

the General Court Furcolo

would be

his

was

proposal for a limited sales tax had
been defeated

quite deliberate in explaining

beneficial to the public, using the

office to Illustrate his points/^

Toward

order to solve these problems.

I

the Legislature as well.

these problems

.

,

as an intermediary

I

why

hts limited sales tax

example of a conversation with a

the end of his address, the

in

citizen in his

Governor noted: “In

need your [the public’s] help and
cooperation and

that

of

ask for that help and cooperation and for
your understanding of

Here was the executive going

He needed

to educate people

following.

As

legislature

and push for measures

the representation of the popular

that

would

if

directly to the people without the party

public opinion were to be worth

will,

he could take that authority to the

satisfy the public
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good

spons.ve and more efficient

In a

summary of Furcolo’s
accomplishments

Streamlining of the Executive
Branch”

is

as

Governor

considered significant
Important goals were

“greater efficiency and
co-ord, nation of programa,
and oflong range
planning as
as well” and
“the development of
sound businesslike state
s
procedures designed to
create greater
efficiency and reduce the
cos. of public services

take the lead

in

effecting matters

””

It

had become the Governor'sjob
to

of public concern, and

l-urcolo intended to
accomplish

that with as efficient an
administration as possible

A

report to Furcolo by the

Commission on Administration and
Finance

indicative of the nature of the
e.xecutive-as-manager Notice the
connection

Governor himself and the

will

is

between the

of the people

Our present laws establishing and
controlling the operanon of over two hundred separate
departments, agencies
boards, and commissions within
the Executive Department
in theory
but often not in

place them

—

the Chief Executive

The

practice

— under

policy which has characterized

the organization of the Executive
Department, frequently
separating responsibility from authority,
makes the state

government

commonly
I

less

responsive to the democratic

will

than

is

realized/**

he problem, according to the report,

is

“to create strong and responsive
Executive

Departments genuinely accountable to the

electorate’’

and “to immediately equip the Chief

Executive with the necessary tools of modern
management and administration
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The report goes on

to delineate the
“2enpral
general

management of government
whether

at the FpHr.
Federal,
i

principles

of effective and
democratic

state or local
level

"» By

reorganizing

state

government according to
these e
pnnciples ,oy
by “makino
making ihe
the governor
responsible
administration and sivins
= vmg him authonty commensurate
with his

for

responsibility the twin

goals ofadministrative
effectiveness [and efficiencvl,„H
y] and

r
political responsibility
,

can be

achieved,”*' Consolidation
of agencies
=ences, clear lines
iin».
of authonty and effective
gubematonal
staff are among the
principles of administrative
management adhered to in
the report.

More

important than the specific
recommendations of the report,
however,

notion behind

it

This notion

is

that the

Governor can become

the

is

effective administratively

through the reorganization
of the executive branch
The executive-as-manager
would

orgamze the depanments and
results

staff under

him to achieve the most
effective and

efficient

Furcolo certainly sought the
benefits of reorganization,
submitting major

reorganization proposals to the
General Court, one of which

executive cabinet form of
government

in

the

was

said to “presage an

Commonwealth. tt82

Foster Furcolo represents the
popular manager type of executive.
His authority

based directly

in the

people, and his support

detailed policy leader

is

more personal than

and looks for cooperation from
the

partisan.

legislature

on

is

taking his cues from them.
Administratively,

if

he

is

is

a

his proposals.

Representative of public opinion, the
popular leader must educate the
public

time as he

He

is

at the

same

to carry out the will of

the people effectively and
efficiently, he must be given
direct control over administration.

The

ability to

organize the executive branch to ensure
proper reaction to public issues
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is

indicative

of the executive-as-manaser
ger. Foster Fnrr^i
Furcolo never gamed
that pnvilege, though
he certainly attempted
to make use of the
princinles ot
Pnncipies
of the
th^
executive-as-manager.

The
>n the ,960s. the

196fl<;

Massachusetts govemorshtp
took on more of the
characteristics

nature of gubematona,
politics Constttutional
and statutoty reforms that
passed in the

mtddle of the decade gave
the state’s chief
executive greater power
over admimstrative
matters such as reorganizabons
of the execut.ve branch,
and appo.ntments and
removals

of other executtve
interests

The governor had become

the direct representative
of the

of the people of Massachusetts
and was given powers
designed

ability to act

The

officials

on those

Election of

1

to facilitate the

interests

QfSO

The gubernatorial

election

of I960, between Republican
John Volpe and Democrat

Joseph Ward, revealed starkly the
changed character of the executive
from partisan to
directly popular or personal.

The Democrats

through whtch the party indicated
election

would be decisive This

its

preference for the nomination, though
the primary-

led to a spiteftrl electoral
battle

candidates for the pany’s nomination.
Joseph
the

first

ballot at the convention.

the partisan system,

D

Ward won

among seven Democratic

the backing of the party

on

Robert Murphy had been Ward’s main
opponent for the

endorsement and within days announced

Under

held a pre-pnmaty-nomrnat.on
convention

that

members of the

candidate regardless of personal feelings.

he would

fight

Ward

party were expected to

Remember
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for the nomination

fall

“

into line behind the

that in the nineteenth century, for

«ss or™.ua,
than pn.anes, as the
the latter encouraged

races

W
.He.

T.dit.ona,,, eo„ve„,o„s
Had Heea
d.scouraged cHaHenges
,o .He

In MassacHuse.ts,

.ess d.vis.ve for

>„,.s

However, winntng

pan.es

cand.da.e" wHereas

at .He

convent.on was

and ntoved against .He
party to build suppon
for Wntself personally
Five otHer candidates
also decided to
challense
allenge Warri fr>r

Ward

for .He nonuna.ton,
IdrtHer indicating .He

weakness of .He

party

Ward went on
stnrggle that

tactic

s

He

saw h.m accused of corruption
and

primaoi ballot to his

Ward

to victory
tne primary
nrimarv
y in tHe

victory

He

own

advantage

u.a so. u
did
However, only after a bitter

fixing the

The endorsement of the

also outspent his opponents
and had

makes sense given

nomination convention and
the
party

was one reason

for

more media exposure “ This

the personal nature of
the candidacy If campaigns
were more

personal than they had been,
there had to be a way,

in

addition to the political
parw,

which the individual candidates
could reach the voter
Newspapers,

television, radio

in

and

other forms of communication
could be used to reach voters
on behalf of individuals as
effectively as they could

on behalf of political

parties.

Indeed, the media itself had
changed. Originally, newspapers
had been developed

by and tor

political parties.

tvventieth centuries,

to

employ

it,

With the development,

of a professional

print

in the late-nineteenth

media separate from

politics,

and early-

candidates began

rather than the political party, to
reach voters.'" Radio and television later

serv ed individual candidates at
the expense of parties as well
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The

professional media.

from

parties,

gave candidates a
chance

to reach voters by
themselves and ..
on

behalf of themselves
Given the expensive
nature of using the
media, the requirement

-ney, and Ward

had no financial
problems

in

the Democratic
primary of ,960

was

"

publicans were better
organized than the
Democrats and put up only
one

primary Yet,

in

the general election
campaign, John Voipe
would

efforts to obscure his
Republican identification
Volpe's concern

of John Fitzgerald Kennedy
and the
election for

coattail effects his
candidacy might

state

the attention of the
electorate

and

fix

the popularity

produce The

Governor was a contest as much
between Republican candidate
John Voipe

and Joseph Ward as between
the Republican and
Democratic

draw

was with

make

,t

away from

parties

Man, Vote Voipe

Joseph Ward
In essence,

voters to vote for him rather
than for the Republican party,
per

Voipe," was the Progressive
candidacy captured
at dissociating

himself from the Republican
party

easier to capture split ticket

in a

,ve

He

Voipe urged

“Vote the Man, Vote

phrase Volpe’s effons were aimed

in the voters

minds This would make

Democrats and independents, both of
whom were

Corruption

w as

in

making the

election of I960 largely into a
personal battle.

the theme of the election, with
each candidate attempting to

other’s integrity.*

Ward

attacked Voipe

in

a series

impugn

the

of television and newspaper

advertisements targeting alleged conflict of
interest regarding both Volpe’s contracting
business and his tenure as Commissioner of
Public
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Works Voipe answered

it

plentifhl in

Massachusetts

Voipe succeeded

to

the Republican-Democratic
axis of the

on a contest of individual men:
John Voipe

therefore ran on the slogan
‘Vote the

-Voipe attempted

the charges

effectively through his

own

use ot
of televts,
television
j
on limo
t, me and
newspaper space, accusing
Ward of

distortion and threatening
to sue for libel

Ward’s circumstances

,n the

the gubernatonai base
of suppon

general elect, on also
indicate the changed
nature of

As

the Democratic
nomtnee, he advocated
party loyalty,

hoping that the Democrats’
majority pany status

in

Massachusetts and Kennedy’s

populanty would push h.m
into the Governor’s
office Unfortunately
for Ward, however.
his

behavior

costing him

in

the primary had

much

party support
P

many Democrats with an
impression of him

left

He was
as

oivf^n
^iven

State or Nat.onal Democratic
Comnuttees

.gnored or opposed

Ward -

behalf In Kennedy’s

State-level

that

Ward

final

Finally,

no

•

i

financial assistance

Those he had defeated

came out

from

either the

pnmary

in the

John Kennedy refused to
tour the

stop in Massachusetts, he

as corrupt,

state

either

on Ward’s

enthusiastically for the other

Democratic candidates, but was quite
reserved when discussing Ward.Given
received so

I,

trie

support from the party, he seemed
to have

choice about a

little

personal candidacy, despite his
emphasis of party loyalty.

Volpe translated the personal campaign

into a victory. Indeed, the
results

of the

general election are indicative of the
nature of the campaign. Volpe ran
far ahead of

Richard Nixon, the Republican nominee
for President, 1,269,295 to
976,750. At the same
time,

Ward

ran far behind Kennedy, 1,130,810
to 1,487,174.

Ward

votes ahead of the Democratic nominee for
United States Senator

also ran only 80,000

who was

running

against Republican Leverett Saltonstall,
an enormously popular incumbent."®

gubernatorial level, personal support had
electorate by the 1960s, and

it

become more important than

On

the

party support in the

reflected in the race for the chief executive’s office.
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primary, and

was not supported

enthusiasticallv
nmusiast.cally h,
by fk
the party organization
in the general

election, desprte his
calls for party
unrty

Repubhcan's victo^

in a state that
rs

The Repubhcan nomrnee
had not had any

predomrnantly Democratic,

popular Democratic
Presidential candidate,

firrther .ndicates the

Support for candidates for
chief execut.ve was no
longer deeply

,n

the sanre contest
as a

weakening of part, es.
partisan,

„ had become

personal, based on the
character, strcs of the
.ndivldual rather than the
party Politics

no longer pan.es combating
one another Rather,
status independent

for

to

embody

pany Thus,

their

movement

The

the direct

office

fiercely

who

could claim a

and with

little

nominations and ran campaigns
with
.As

a

result, the

little

Governor came

of the Governor became a
personal

suppon of the people

room

office

regardless of the pan.san

1960«s

the governor

came

to develop a personal following
separate from his party, the

to strengthen the office administratively,
so that

popular demands, had

its

greatest success

would augment or change
1917,

individuals

of either

Reforms of the

As

won

support became personal,

the public will directly

whose occupant could claim
affiliation

became

from the parties battling one
another, often

compromise. Gubernatorial
candidates

help from the

it

was

drastically

The Governor was granted

in

the 1960s.

its

occupant could meet

Amendments

to the Constitution

much of what had emerged from

a four year term in 1964, though
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it

the Convention of

started with the

elect.cn of

,966

through Article
the Governor

^ He was given

XC

.n

ten days

in

w„ch

to return a bi„ with
reconuuendations

,968 .Most importantly
for purposes of the
ntanageria, executive,

was given

substant.al reorganization

power

,n

,966 Art.de

LXXXV,,

atmuhed An.Ce L.XX^ whtch
had g.ven the Genera,
Court powers over organ,
zations of
the executive branch

The amendment gave

the

Governor the power to present

reorganization plans to the
General Court:

For the purpose of transferring,
abolishing, consolidatino
or coordmatmg the whole
or any part of any agency
or°

the O.nct.ons thereof, within
the executive department
of
the go vernment of the
commonwealth, or for the purpose
of authorizing any officer of
any agency within the execu-

hve department of government
of the commonwealth to
delegate any of his Oinctions,
the governor may prepare
one or more reorganization plans,
each bearing an

fying

number and may present such plan
or

general court, together with a
message

in

identi-

plans to the

explanation thereof”

This provision involved the same
reasoning that had buttressed the
efforts of earlier
reformers

to

do

that,

It

was

the governor’s task to see that
the popular will

was

satisfied

he would have to have an
administration that ran effectively and

If

he were

efficiently

and

over which he could exercise some
control.

The governor

also gained administrative authority
through a reduction in the

powers of the Executive Council. As Blodgett
efforts at

notes, the Council

hampered the governor’s

appointment and removal of officers, by virtue
of its power to approve or

disapprove them.'®' In 1964, however, the approval
of Question #5 on the November
ballot eliminated the statutory authority
over appointments the Council

Appointments and removals

in the

3

had maintained.

executive branch no longer required the approval of the
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Counc,

.03

.e

„

cou. no.

_ve an. appoint... .a.

W.
initiative

finniy separated the
governor front the

much

ot any provision of
the General

Counc,

,n adnt.™strat,ve
ntatters: ^dn addttion,

r.
c
Laws or
of
any

so

T

special

law requiring the advtce
and

consent of the Council
‘with resoect
espect to anv
any action or onnsston
to act by the Governor,
or
any officer, agency or
instrumentality of the
executive department’ is
”'“3
repealed

Governors had been

calling for greater
control

the 1960s, they received

With much of the
jurisdiction

over administration for
nearly a century. In

it.

civ il service

of the Governor even with

being ostensibly neutral
and beyond complete
his

enhanced powers, the question
became one of

control If the executive
embodied the will of the public,
administratively

was

to

make

if

much of the

civil

service

how

could that will be carried
out

was out of the Governor’s

hands’^

The answer

the Governor’s Office,
rather than only the
General Court, the location of

responses to policy problems
Executive orders became an
accepted means of dealing with

popular concerns, and their number
grew

at a rapid rate

beginning

m the mid-1960s. As

noted above, prior executive orders
had been mostly war-related and

their subject

matter

had been almost uniformly unremarkable.

Both the number and the nature of
executive orders changed around the
time the

Governor was given control of administrative
reorganization Executive commissions
and
executive advisory boards sprang up

over public

affairs. In

fairly rapidly as the

Governor sought greater control

1965, with John Volpe’s Executive Order

Number

Forty-eight,

which established a Governor’s Committee on
Fund-Raising Within the State
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Service, the

vi« ..««,

.„ „„„, „„

publ.c problem or

established

wuh

^

^

the reorganization
of the executive
department Eight of them

new Governor's Councils

or Governor's
Committees

Francs Sargent

issued forty-eight
executive orders from
,969 through ,974
Again, most of the
orders

addressed pressing social
problems or reorganized
the executive
department
fashion Sixteen of these
established

Task Force.

some

- Executive Order Number

sort

tn

some

of Governor's Commission,
Council or

Seventy-four established
a Governor's Code
of

Fatr Practices regarding
discrimination, while
fourteen other orders
created boards,

commissions or councils
Further, the

prominently

m the

that

were not

emergency power, which
governors had begun

1950s,

saw even greater usage

forty-six laws effective
immediately

During
laws,

six years as

wWle

specifically labeled
Gubernatorial

dunng

his

in

to use

more

the ,960s Endicott
Peabody declared

one term, more than any
previous governor

governor, John Voipe declared
one-hundred twenty-five emergency

Francis Sargent declared
two-hundred ,wen,y-,wo.‘»’ The
desire for a

powerfiil governor, or a

more responsive government, had
pushed

more

the officeholders to

using their constitutional
powers to a greater extent than had
previously been attempted

The Governor had acquired both
and heightened powers to effect
changes

Governor
straight

a

more

in the

positive,

and more

detailed, policy role

executive branch. The notion of the

as directly representing the
public will translated into administrative
directives

from the Governor’s

office,

and the establishment of commissions,
committees,

boards and task forces under the Governor’s
name to look into matters of public concern.
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The

c. se^ce Ha. Heco.e neu.a,, so

Genera.

Coun

.0

do

Oove.o. .ooH

.o

ceaHn, co^ass.ns

„

cou.d He bypassed Even
..He Genera, Cour,
Had

au.Hon.y .o crea.e .He
comnnssion,

power

.He

so, ra.her .Han

do.ng

i.,

..

was

s.gn.fican. .ha. .hey

.He

,o

Governor

were granting Hi™ .He

or deal.ng w..h .he
problem themselves The

governor had come to represent
the public

will

and was given the policy
and

administrative capacity to
carry out that role.

Conclusion

w..h

political parties losing
influence

and control over the

political process, the

executive changed from a
panisan administrator into a
public manager. His source
of
legitimacy

was now

the public directly. Parties
no longer mediated the relationship

between the executive and the

came

electorate.

Being directly popular, the
elected executive

to be considered the sole
representative of the will of the
public

his responsibility to

entirely

concede the

implement a program for the public’s
benefit The

As

fiinction

such,

it

became

legislature, did not

of representing the public to the
executive however, and an

uncooperative legislature, or a reluctant
executive branch for the matter,
could too
thwart the plans of the Governor and
hinder the realization of the

The public manager needed somehow
control

Through appeals

to bring the legislature

to the public and by placing

many

easily

of the people,"”

will

and administration under

policy decisions in the

executive branch or the executive office, these
objectives could be accomplished

Appointments to

office

were no longer

partisan, but

professional competence
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were

ideally based

on

technical or

Even

m the heyday of political

parties
notenti;,l
P
»
potential appointments
,

a iin.e

of the Oovetnofs
personal

-e personal than

taste

With a

partisan, Massachusetts
has seen

were often touched

political culture that
has

more than

its

always been

share of administrative

scandals Allegations
of conflict of interest
and favors for cronies
are relatively

common

-

In this sense, the

emphasis on

came

at all.

image of the public
executive as a manager,
with an

efficiency, neutrality

It

did come, however,

and professionalism,
came
in

late to

Massachusetts

the person of
Michael Duhahis, a three-term

governor and the 1988
Democratic Presidential
nominee.
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CHAPTER 4
DUKAKIS
There

,s

a chailenge inherent

in

the office of the
Anrencan elected execuuve
That

officeholder faces pressures
arising ffon,

const, tut, onal possess,on

role,

along w,th other

two

institutional roles

of the veto, the executive

members of the

serves an admnnstrauve
role:
necessarily

I

it

,s

his

is

whtch nray no, be

a pol,t,cal figure

polity. ,n a poh.ical

who must

play a

system But the executive
also

duty to execute the law
These two roles do no,

complement one another For
example, an adm,n,stra,ive
appointee may be

pointcally aligned w,th the
chief executive ye.
execute the law poorly Poor
execut.on of

.he law leads to charges
of incompetence or ,neffic,ency
on the

pan of the

elected

Yet. ignonng poll, real activity
leads to accusations of
arrogance or aloofness

official.

Attempts

a,

reconciling these pressures and
meeting the executive challenge
have resulted in three

concepuons of the

office: the constitutional
executive, the

popular manager The
office in

American

latter

conception

ma,menance of a victorious

governance

the dominant interpretation
of the executive

politics.

The problem then becomes
the

is

panisan administrator and the

the exercise of leadership
Leadership here

electoral coalition based

that the elected executive

is

successful

in

on a

stable,

is

defined as

coherent program of

implementing once

in office

How

does a pres,dent or a governor exercise
leadership given the executive challenge of

compet,ng

pressures'. Voters expect chief executives,
ideally, to run

the candidate will implement once elected

on a program which

Each of the above conceptions of the executive
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provides a means for achieving
ms end Yet whet
g this
what measure of success
can an elected
executive achieve under
a »iven concentirm
onception of the pos.t.on'Can the prospects for
success

be affected by choosing

among

the

vanous concept.ons of
the executive

In order to investigate
the potential for
leadership

office^

each of the three major

concept, ons of the execut.ve.
the political experiences
of former Massachusetts
Governor

Mtchael Dukalos make an
effective case study
Dukak.s

,s

an exemplary case study

the

executive challenge because
he modified hts conception
of the office over time.
This
chapter will present Dukak.s
from h.s days as a state
representative through his defeat
the 1978 Democratic
gubernatorial primary This
politic, an,

is

Dukakis

in

as a Progressive-type

or a popular manager, and
his battle with a
partisan administrator. The
next

chapter will detail Dukakis’s
1982 gubernatorial primary victory,

his successful

second

term, his reelection to the
governorship in 1986 and finally
his defeat at the national
level
in the presidential

was due

campaign of 1988

It

will

be asserted that

his successfitl

to a modification of his conception
of the executive office as he

constitutions! executive
c. His
iiii idVK
Isck oi
of success
snrrpQc in
in iqsq
1988, moreover,

once again adopting a popular-manager
conception of the executive
Michael Dukakis’s

political career

is

j

was due

i

•

largely to his

office.

It

offers insights into

all

executives and thus allows one to compare
and contrast them. Further,

The

became more ofa

thus useful from the perspective of the

executive challenge for two important reasons.

malleability of the executive office.

second term

three types of

it

shows the

executive, while being constrained by the

pressures stemming from the roles of the office,

is

also able to

work

those roles and shape the office into an instrument for
leadership
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within the bounds of

Mv Dukakis

the General Tnnrf

Michael Stadey Dukakis came
out of Brookline. Massachusetts,
a town bordered

on

three sides by the c.ty

of Boston, Brookline has

as the area located near
Boston University.

however, and

is

quite wealthy, with a great

members of the upper
formative years.

An

class This

was

It is

tts

home

also

many

share of urban ne.ghborhoods.
such

residents

to

mote upscale

who

subdivisions,

are professionals and

the environment in which
Dukakis spent his

excellent school system helped

instill

an achievement ethic

in

Brookline’s young people, while
Dukakis’s mother and father taught
him the value of hard

work and

frugality

'

Dukakis translated these values

of family, principle, honest

effort

and

into a lifestyle that stressed
the value

financial soundness, values

he would take into

politics.

When Dukakis

entered Brookline town

situation that paralleled

scale than in a city like

sought a more

of the values

were

activist

that

old-style,

developments

had been

more

of nineteenth-century

that

instilled in

was

him

machines

^

of a new generation of reformers

part

less corrupt

in his early

traditional, often Irish, pols

political

1950s, he faced a

the rest of Massachusetts, though
on a smaller

in

Boston Dukakis was
government

politics, in the late

who

and more

years

efficient,

who

along the

lines

The reformers opponents

ran local governments by the rules

The reformers

also had few,

if

any, ties to the

Yankee, Brahmin class of old stock.
Working-class

at this time,

and

their

Irish

pols dominated the Brookline Democratic

methods offended Dukakis and other reformers:
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Town Committee

The Town Committee,
discouraged broad representation and grassroots
activism had no interest in
progres-

sive causes nationally

nate hacks,

Wide

Dukakis and

local level,

office.

his fellow

Town Committee

.[and] voted repeatedly
to nomifighting the Yankee-Irish
wars, for state-

still

reformers were able to wrest
control of Brookline’s
Democratic

from the pols

in

1959

Dukakis and the reformers

in a

stunning upset/ After their victory

set their sights

actions as Governor Dukakis

social issues.

Dukakis

s

He was

not,

was

ambition was apparent to

all

in

been

who knew

agenda without regard for deference to

his friends.

He had

little

the Massachusetts General Court

would color many of his words and

toeing the party

by the traditional party structure At several
points
electoral

in

a Democrat, certainly, and voted
as a liberal

however, interested

the

on the General Court

Michael Dukakis’s election to and
experiences
effectively demonstrate the
Progressive mind-set that

at

line

From

him, and that ambition

in his career,

the start,

was not bounded

he pursued his

his party’s leaders or

on most

own

even those

who

had

patience for the traditional party structure and
often worked

outside the party to pursue office

In 1960, with the

(C

OD

)

formation of the

Commonwealth

Organization of Democrats

Dukakis and friends Fran Meaney, Herb Gleason and

Bill

and Carl Sapers were,

according to the then-Democratic Chairman ‘“out to destroy
the party
accurate representation of their aim

ilk

was reformation of the

despised the glad-handing cronyism, often resulting

more

party Democrats of Dukakis’s

in outright

corruption, that

characterized their state party’s established leadership”^ The goal was to dislodge

entrenched party leaders and replace them with the younger reformers
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who saw

the party

as programmatic rather than
as a

means

that bothered Dukakis, but
the nature

for distnbuting benefits/

of the patronage-based party

Dukakis’s unsuccessful run for Attorney
General

in

for

Democrats

experience

in

as

his elders,” calling his

opposed to “the same old

was not
in

1966 also

impatience with the traditional Massachusetts
party organization.

speck of deference to

It

party,

per

se,

Massachusetts

illustrates his

He “show[ed]

not a

candidacy “a choice for reform and
change”
tired voices.”'

Given Dukakis’s

limited

the House, he needed something
other than his record on which to
base his

campaign His theme became clearing away
corruption Fighting corruption was
above
party for Dukakis, and he

Along with
gift

came

his

would carry

maverick

that

attitude,

theme throughout

Dukakis had a

his career

definite gift for organization. That

to the tore often and early in Dukakis’s
political career,

benefit of the party Again,

it

other young Democrats with

organization that

was

was not

whom

party that Dukakis

he worked

able to win elections

at the

was

it

was employed

against. In fact,

for the

Dukakis and

time favored a strong party

They were

active campaigners, going door to

door and sending mass mailings.^ Members of the organization

also

were

far less

uneasy

regarding the nominating convention than traditional Progressives, favoring
a twenty

percent rule for

eligibility in the

primary

The

difference

was

that they sought to elect

issue-oriented candidates rather than patronage-oriented ones. Their goals were ‘“reform

and having better people elected.

Traditional partisan channels

were eschewed

corrupt or too resistant to change to be of any use to the reformers. They
organization to match their

own

purposes.
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set

up

as

their

own

Certainly,

Dukakis and other members
i^ers of
or L
C

express, on of .he

OD
n
U

j-

u*
sought
a direct and effective

of the people Dukakis
had •^always dreanred"
of‘a spectacular

nowering of denrocracy,” and
was constantly active
“recruiting
political

process

in

order to change
®

on a pohucally aware and
democracy and produce
according to

,ts

C OD

Indeed the
inaeea,

it

active electorate,

nn
COD

“r

strong chief executive

u^
u
philosophy
was predicated

which would panicipa.e

responsible, issue-onented
candidates ”

reformers, should be the
executive

strongest expression

in

life

in

The

The popular

a vigorous

strongest office,

will

had to receive

the executive, and “the key
to a successful democracy

Dukakis asserts

that,

“An

was a

executive has to be a cheerleader,"

and must take advantage of the
opportunity “to create a better
the quality of

participants ,n,o the

society, to help

improve

of your fellow citizens

Dukakis pushed many of C

OD

’s

goals while he was a

member of the

Massachusetts House of Representatives.
Beginning a case study on the executive
with a
governor’s legislative experience

is

appropriate given that the governor had
his

political success in the legislature. Indeed,

on the Governor’s

office

He had

even as a

legislator,

Dukakis had

first

his sights set

a definite idea of what the office should
entail and

many

of the reforms he sought were designed to strengthen
the State’s chief executive. These
reforms were directly connected to

come

to

govern honestly and

should be doing so

much

as.

strengthening the Governor.

C O.D

fairly.”’®

.

’s

search for a Democratic party that “could

The concern here was

how government

A four-year term,
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not '"what government

should be doing it.”” This involved
a governor and lieutenant governor

who

ran as a ticket, and consolidation
and elimination of minor
elective, administrative
offices

were among the

COD

proposals

In the legislature,

power

for the

generally,

Dukakis pushed

for these reforms and
greater reorganizational

governor as well as elimination of
the Governor’s Council

'*

COD

Like

Dukakis was particularly energetic on
“matters of process dealing with

governmental reform and the structure of
institutions

In a typically Progressive

manner, Dukakis focused on the process.
The notion was

that with

good, clean

government, the public could be heard, problems
could be addressed and special

interests

could be purged The focus of Dukakis on
procedural issues would carry him through
first

gubernatorial campaign and into his

Though Dukakis

s

term

first

his

in that office.

main concern was with issues of institutions and
procedure, he

did not completely avoid social issues, expressing
concern for housing and race relations

His greatest success

insurance

bill,

in

the legislature, however,

one of the

earliest in the nation

instructive for the insight

governor

s office. First,

it

was

Dukakis’s handling of the no-fault issue

offers into the political

Dukakis looked

the passage of a no-fault automobile

at the

is

methods Dukakis would bring to the

automobile insurance issue

in

Massachusetts as a problem with a solution. Massachusetts possessed the highest car
insurance rates

in the nation, a

problem Dukakis

felt

could be solved rationally.

advocated a solution that had been offered by two professors

who had

He

studied

Massachusetts’s insurance system exhaustively.^*^

Car-insurance reform represented an attempt to professionalize something that had

become corrupted by

political interests.

Due

to the nature of Massachusetts’s insurance
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laws, .o.ons.s

who were

involved

able .0 collec. damages.
Delays

,n

accden.s had ,o prove
fauU

overcrowded courts often

no. receiving proper
contpensat.on for their
claims Dukakis
tort

lawyers and insurance
comnanies
P

power

in

cour. before being

resulted in insurance
holders

was

fighting a battle agatns.

•

hese political interests
had gained substantial
i

Massachusetts and were eager
to keep the money
they had been earning.
Bu,

Dukakis saw these

interests as was.elhl

and corntpt.ng, and
sough, to cleanse

the

.nsurance system of the
extravagance and misuse
brought about by powerful,
entrenched
interests

funcon

In place

of that waste and abuse.
Dukakis sought to

install

a system that

would

profess, onally, free of abuse
from political .nterests, for
the benefit of the people

of Massachusetts could proper

Pol.t.ca,

,

nterests

were cor^p.ing and only
through

results, or properly efficent
results,

be attained

Dukakis was adamant enough about
no-fault to remain beh,nd
General Court

When

the

bill

was

finally

profess, onalism

passed and signed

,t

for s,x years in the

1970 Dukakis's actions are

in

,

indicative

of the

institutional attitudes

Senate had each passed a no-fault
diflferences

between the

when he was

bills

b.Il,

he brought ,o public

The

insurance companies than Dukakis’s original

a deep well of

the

bill

bill

original committee, but

House and

had been

in

Once

the

knowledge to describe the

the

House

to

amended

bill

on

had

answer questions.

bill’s intricacies

implications,” earning a standing ovation from his
colleagues
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was removed

that resulted was. ironically, tougher

been passed by both chambers, Dukakis took the
floor

He “[drew] from

Once

a conference committee was appointed
to resolve

Dukakis was on the

unwilling to compromise

life

and

Here was Dukakrs’s

major

firs,

political success

He was

successfi.1

because he had

been competent, because he had
advanced a rational solution
and because he had
successfirlly debated the

political interests

ments of that

solution. Furthermore,
he had

done so

of

which he saw as inimical to
the public good. Like
the focus on

procedure, the reliance on competence
would follow Dukakis into
h,s

campaign and

in the face

his first administration

An

executive

who

is

first

gubernatorial

knowledgeable enough and

persuasive enough with the facts
should be able to convince
others of the rightness of his

cause Dukakis admits that his

first

term as Governor was colored
by

his legislative

experience

Some of [the
ial

nature of the problems of a

first gubernatorterm] has to do with what you do
as a legislator .You’re

one of one-hundred
ing

forty,

one-hundred

sixty

You’re

.

the time to try to get your stuff
through.
need these kinds of skills [consensus building.
all

.

.

You

fight-

don’t

coalition

building

involving people] quite as much Now,
good legislators have those skills but the likelihood
is that you won’t do
that You might join with other
like-minded legislators as I
,

did often, but

Dukakis’s

first

it’s,

when you’re Governor

different,

term would be marred by a lack of these

activities as

he carried the culture

of competence into the Governor’s office

The
attained his

culture of competence

first political

success.

was

A

the institutional structure behind which Dukakis

political figure

with a proper grasp of the facts and a

mastery of debate could push an issue through. People had to be made to see
the rightness

of the solution to an issue regardless of the

political interests that

may be

at stake. Further,

Dukakis focused on the implementation of professionalism, rather than what he saw as
political corruption, to facilitate reduction

of waste and increase of efficiency. Improve the

process,

make

would be

i,

more

profess.onal,

more

rat.onally based,

results

of that process

better for the people.

The
Between 1971. when he

left

Election nf

the General

i

Q74

Coun, and

Governor, Mtchael Dukakts kept
Wmself occupied with
his

and the

1974,

when

he was elected

activities that both

demonstrated

burntng desire to hold statew.de
office and illustrated
Dukak.s's Progressive not.on
of

the Govemorslhp. Dukakts
kept himself on television,
as moderator of TTte AJvoca.es,
a

show which presented arguments

for

This provided Dukakis with powerfitl
television-savwy

television as a

“ The

public

and against national issues
visibility

manager needed

means of reaching

voters,

in a

courtroom

setting.

and allowed him to become
more
to reach people

Given the importance of

Dukakis was able to gain valuable
exposure

at

next to no cost

Dukakis did not

however As

rely solely

on

television to gain exposure in
Massachusetts,

early as 1970, he began building a
statewide organization to

election in 1974. This involved building

run for Lieutenant Governor

work

in

in 1970.

work

for his

upon the supporters Dukakis had gathered

A law

student, Alan Johnson, did

in a

much of the

foot

organizing and Dukakis managed to build an impressive
roster of activists and

supporters by election time.

traditional party lines

Here was a

potential candidate

and was canvassing individuals for

his

who

own

did not

work

within

benefit rather than for

the benefit of the party organization. Indeed, supporters
were often attracted to what they

perceived as Dukakis’s

integrity.

His eagerness to supplant “politics as usual,” the
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machine

politics

around the

on which Massachusetts
was organized, was

attractive to reformers

state.

If Dukak,s fought

circumventing

it,

what he saw as corruption

he fought

it

head on

in

the electoral arena by

in the administrative

arena

On November

Dukakts announced the format,
on of an organtzation to
invest.gate
Sargent's administration and

make recommendations

for reforms,

act,v,ty in

24, ,970 ’

Governor

“The Dukakts Raiders”

comprised a volunteer organizat.on
made up mainly of reformist
lawyers whose pnncipal
targets

of investigation would be

state regulatory agencies
Several reports critical

agencies under the Sargent
administration would

Dukakis was targeting the Governor

were

to be run professionally,

did not, he

and

it

in

come

out over the next

order to set up a run for office

was

in

two

of

years

1974

»

the Governor's job to assure
that they

Agencies

were

If

he

was negligent and should be held
accountable

Dukakis attempted to break away from
patronage, politics

in

both

his

campaigning and

traditional

Massachusetts partisan,

his administrative efforts.

He

i.e.

assembled an

organization for Michael Dukakis rather
than working through the traditional
party
system. In administrative matters, he attempted
to expose a lack of professionalism,
and

what he saw as overt corruption. Thus, the executive
was both

directly popular, with

no

partisan intermediary', and a manager, responsible
for professional, efficient administration

of agencies and programs.

Dukakis would combine these approaches

in the

campaign of 1974. His election

1974 was based on a pledge to “clean up” Massachusetts’s government.

A

in

system that had

been revealed to be corrupt and wasteful needed to be made more professional
and more
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efficient

Dukakis connected

this

system to the public

mood

at

the time Calling the

patronage system a “‘cancer’ on state
government, a system that ‘must be
destroyed,”’

and the public’s disposition “angry” and
“unhappy,” he claimed “the
governor
the taking

feelings

In the

wake of Watergate, Dukakis found

it

is

there for

easy to capitalize on public

of resentment toward what they perceived
as a corrupt system.
For

Bob Quinn

his purposes,

Dukakis faced the perfect opponent

in the

Democratic primary

represented everything against which Dukakis
was running. Quinn was part of

the “old-boy network” of Massachusetts
politics and relied on that network
to carry him
to victory over Dukakis in the primary Indeed,
at the start of the

conventional wisdom had Quinn running

most of the major

old-line

President, backing

and to focus

season,

of Dukakis. Additionally, Quinn had

in front

Democrats, including the Speaker of the House and
the Senate

him These two factors caused Quinn

his efforts

pnmary

on Governor Sargent

to pay

Quinn’s based

no attention to Dukakis

his

campaign around

efforts

to unite Irish and Italian hard-line Democrats, further
solidifying the primary as a contest

between the old-style and new-style
refused to debate him even

polls.

In the last

politics."^

two weeks before

Quinn thought so

little

of Dukakis that he

the primary, with Dukakis ahead in the

week of the campaign, Quinn attempted

to blast Dukakis with negative

ads (such as those portraying the reformer as “an ‘advocate’ of abortions”) which were
ultimately unsuccessful.^** Dukakis, for his part, criticized Quinn’s

Massachusetts’s Attorney General, questioning

federal crime-fighting grants

The campaign was

from the U.S.

a personal battle

Law

his

as

competence, especially

in

handling

Enforcement Assistance Administration.^^

between two
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work

different styles of politics.

In disseminating his message,

honed

was

in

working on The Advocates

telecast across the state,

Dukakis made use of the

A simulated

house party

at

which Dukakis spoke

and voters were urged to hold house

watch the program.^^ Dukakis employed technology
to
public as to his

television skills he had

message Quinn was more

parties

of their

own

and

benefit himself and to educate the

traditional in his campaigning, targeting
ethnic

neighborhoods personally while other major Massachusetts
Democrats stumped for him/''
Thus, campaign tactics demonstrated the nature of the
1974 Massachusetts Democratic

primary

it

pitted the traditional partisan pol against the

modem, good-government

reformer

Quinn thus represented exactly what Dukakis was mnning

against; the party-

based, patronage politics of Massachusetts’s traditional Democrats
politics attempting to defeat

of the same

if

He used

Quinn were elected Governor Quinn had underestimated the force of

following and was able to capitalize on the anti-cormption

Quinn

of

Dukakis, and, Dukakis intimated, voters could expect more

Dukakis’s personal organization and Dukakis’s message Dukakis had

defeat

that type

handily: “Citizens

a reform spirit,

who

felt

built a

mood of the

strong

state’s citizens to

independent of the old-boy network, but united

were expressing themselves by

pulling the

Dukakis lever

all

in

across the

Commonwealth.”-’*^

With
to ‘the

to the

his

primary victory, Dukakis called for the ‘“dawn of a new

buddy system of politics on Beacon

Hill.’”'*^

era’

and an end

Yet Dukakis was not completely blind

Democratic party In achieving electoral success, he recognized the necessity of

placating the old-style politicians, and

made some
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efforts to

do so through the general

election season. His

0

mnning mate was Thomas

Ne.ll Tip helped pull
together the old-line

P,

O’Neill

son of the legendary Tip

III,

Democrats to keep the party united
through

the general election," Again,
however, Dukakis

was a

reformer, and concentrated
on

maintaining professionalism once
elected. The party Dukakis
was after was a reformist,

good-government party

The party was
people into

to be a

rather than the spoils-based
party of the traditional
Democrats,

means of facilitating the

efficient, effective action

special interests or friends

of party

In the general election for

themes he had used

in the

direct translation of the wishes
of the

through the Governor

elites to the

Governor

in

agencies was poor

was not

to be a

detriment of the general public
1974, Dukakis emphasized

promoter of

"

many of the

primary His image of the Governorship
continued to be one

based on professionalism and good management

While the economy was

It

in a

in

carrying out the will of the people

downturn. Governor Sargent’s management
of government

at best, and,

Indeed, Sargent did spend very

according to Dukakis, spending was out of
control.
little

of his time as governor managing

state agencies,

and

preferred to spend most of his time on “what generally
might be labeled the ‘ceremonial’

functions of the governor,

Martha Wagner Weinberg

management and

such as proclamation signings or public appearances.'^^ As
notes: “he did not especially enjoy the detailed

therefore did not accord

Dukakis played up

his

own

it

a favored position

among

work of agency

his duties.

perceived competence against Sargent’s mismanagement of

the State’s administration/^

But Dukakis offered

little in

the

way of an

which Sargent ran the government and offered
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agenda. While he ridiculed the

clean, efficient

government as an

way

in

antidote,

he d.d Httie .0 address
social issues
state,

but

it

was

largely in terms

« He did address

of the need

the poor economic
condit.on of the

for “productivity
increases, better cash

management and reduced use of
private consultants”

in

government

« The

issue

of an

unconst, tutional budget deficit
arose, and Dukakis issued
a “lead-pipe guarantee”
that he

would not

ra,se taxes to balance the
state's

books Dukak.s was making
a promise to

“save $100 million or more through
better management
the process, on

how

the government should
conduct

its

Dukakis remained focused
on
business and

concerned with

little

what the government should be doing
Dukakis's message resonated with
Massachusetts’s voters He defeated
Sargent
with margins as large as three-to-one
areas, Dukakis’s

in

some

areas,

though

showing was not as strong as elsewhere

popular-manager conception of the executive,

won

in

more

ideologically-liberal

“ Dukakis had,

a major electoral victory, his

statewide office In doing so, he had defeated
the partisan-administrator

seen

how

through the

It

the Progressive conception of the
executive would play itself out

first

for

remained to be

in

a leadership

role

Dukakis

Dukakis

s first

The executive was
popular

will.

term

is

illustrative

I

of the nature of the Progressive-type executive

to be popular, directly linked to the people and
kept in check by the

He was

also a manager, insuring that programs ran efficiently and
leading the

legislature in providing for the popular welfare.

It

was through

professionalism and

efficiency in government, through the removal of corruption and
waste, that the public will

could be properly attained. Dukakis made efforts to keep

219

his

Governorship popular and

maintain direct connections
to voters educatina ti,
them
’

at the

great lengths to attain
professionalism in
administration
duministration and

Commonwealth more

,n

also

i.
make
government

went

to

the

in

efficient

According ,o Gaines and Segal,
-Dukalas entered
though, was nght,

same time He

office detemtined ,o

do wha, he

the abstract sense,
w.thout reference to the
poltt.ca, context,"

attempting to work apart from
“politics as usual

I.

was not

that

Dukakis was

attempting to without politics
Rather, wha. constituted
poIit.es for him was no.
what
constttuted politics for

many

other

members of the

State's government, Pol.tics,
for

Dukakts, mean, the Progress,
ve sense of the word, open
debate and persuasion through
appeals to reason rather than
appeals to interest In his

rehed on h.s

to

own

reason and vtsion with

full

first

term, Dukakis consistently

confidence that eventually others
would come

understand and follow him ’ This vision
of the executive extended to

his relations

with

the legislature in these years

Initially,

Dukakis made overtures toward connecting
with the

legislature. In his

inaugural address, he claimed “he
understood the legislative process, and that
he intended
to involve the legislators ‘deeply

and

discussing “his belief that political

system.

House

power had

work of his

administration,”

to be diffused throughout the political

Early in his tenure, Dukakis met with both the
legislative leadership and the
s

rewards

cajole

actively’ in the

Democratic Study Group.
in his relationship

Dukakis had claimed

that he

would not

rely

on

with the General Court, that he would not “threaten or

Rather, he would use reason to persuade the legislators to
follow his course.
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Eventually, however, hts
attitude, and the attitude
of the administration
generally

became

“callous and detached

disdainfully,"

irrelevant,’”"

It’s

Legislators

felt

as though they had been
“treated

and “[a]s a pohtical force on
Beacon

Dukakis admits that

temfic and pass

making process, and

if” Except
legislators

in his first

term

Hill,

Dukakis had 'become

h.s attitude

was one of ‘Here

and

it is

formally, he did not include
the legislature in the
policy

were understandably

infuriated

On

a

bill

to reform the

court system in Massachusetts, for
example, Dukakis ignored
Senate Judiciary Committee

Chairman

He

^an

S.sitsky: “‘[T]he

governor hasn’t even bothered to
speak to me about

hasn't indicated a readiness to
negotiate ’’”

deal with the legislature

was Dukakis

Dukakis had spent much of the

able to

Only

after

making more

effective efforts to

win passage of the Court reform

political capital

it

bill

he held with the legislature early

in his first

term

Dukakis’s words about the involvement of
legislators and actions early

were

indicative

of a Progressive

style

of executive

lead the legislature rather than following

The executive branch would take
economy. There

is little, if

more

friends than he

legislators felt they

legislators should

dealt with

more

lead, or

the sense that the governor

even cooperating with

all

made

his

Hancock or even

legislative involvement,

Dukakis

General Court

in his first term, largely

because

in the

feel as

effectively. Yet,

to

as a partner.

motions toward

were being ignored.

be made to

it

was

the lead in policy matters, especially regarding
the

any, deference to the legislature that John

George Briggs evinced. For
far

its

in

term

in his

lost

If the executive should be leading the legislature,

though they are being considered

for policies to be

Dukakis, other than nominally, expended
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little

effort to

involve leg.slators substantively
in decisions of h,s
administration If his effons at

persuasion did not work, he simply
attempted to push a plan
through regardless of
legislators’ wishes.

Wh,le Dukakis suffered stormy

begmrang of his term,
indicated early

his relationship

in his first

term that

relations with the General
Court almost

with the public was less
shaky

from the

at the start

He

government would be open and
accessible

his

to the

public Cabinet meetings, for
example, were to be public
affairs,” Indeed. Dukakis
fairly

was

popular with the public even while
he was not respected by many
fellow

“

officeholders

Yet. by the end of his term.
Dukakis had lost

much of his popular

appeal,

being told by one woman, “Yes, you’ve
been a pretty good governor, but I’m
not votin«
for

you

People generally considered Dukakis
“self-nghteous, unfeeling,

condescending.”^^

A Progressive-type

executive

was

had taken that position to the point of arrogance
or

Dukakis entered

office with the ambition

administration, and several of his practices as

filling offices

was based

Grandmaison,

who had

strictly

staff

alooftiess.

of cleaning up Massachusetts’s

Governor

reflected that fact. His practice for

on professionalism rather than patronage. Even Joe

run Dukakis

his administration. Individuals

to be a public leader, but Dukakis

s

successful gubernatorial campaign

who had

been

vital to

was not

Dukakis’s election were

left

part

of

off of his

and administration so that there would be no signs of impropriety or patronage.

Indeed, Dukakis

was so adamant about

that personal friendships suffered.

the maintenance of professionalism and rectitude

Sumner Kaplan and Fran Meaney had both been
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personally and poH.ically

dose with Dukakis Both

actions surrounding their
involvement in public

Dukakts’s general

criteria for

split

sharply with ht„ over
Dukakis's

life

appointment, especially to

his cabinet,

was

that

public administrators should
not be politically influenced

[H]e wanted
and

his cabinet officials to

have management ability
and to be compassionate He
wanted genand he wanted to be sure that
each cabinet post

political skills,

eralists,
filled

by someone

groups active

in

was

who

did not have ties to the
constituencv
the part of society the
cabinet office served

Neutral objectivity was the key, and
Dukakis went so far

m

“

this policy that

“members of

Sargent or Quinn’s campaign actually
got tapped for important state
jobs for which

Dukakis campaign workers were turned down.”^^
Being

meant pursuing a course of action perceived
as

members of the

public Insurance

beneficial, regardless

community

to be a “knee-jerk

Secretarv' for

in a

consumer”

wishes of members of the business community

Murphy, Dukakis’s

of the wishes of other

Commissioner James Stone and Banking Commissioner

Carol Greenwald are indicative of this, regulating
the business

politically uninterested often

.

Environmental

manner

that

seemed to members of

mentality, with no regard for the

The Boston Globe
Affairs, as a

described Evelyn

“New York-based

while Dukakis noted that she

was

was

to the Director of Massachusetts Forests and Parks

an

unknown

Association.

quantity

a “professional environmentalist.”^^ Further,

Thus, Dukakis sought professionalism, which found

its

planner,”

Murphy

embodiment

in

‘“a

relevance’ between the appointees and the offices they [would] oversee,” but not to the
point

where appointees were

‘“captives’ of special interest groups.”’®
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In keeping with the
Progressive ideal,

Dukakts desired broad
power on the pan of

the executive branch
to deal with matters of
policy.

He

sought to

the Governor’s office to
the cabinet secretanes,
delegating
policy matters as they

saw

fit.

some power from

shift

them authority

to respond to

while ultimate authonty
would remain with the
governor:

In theory, issues, matters

of disputes, problems and
initiawould be defined and evaluated
by the cabinet secretanes, who, with the advice
and consent of the governor
would proceed toward action according
tives

'

to an approved

of pnonties. The governor would
see to it that cabinet
initiatives were coordinated
and not in conflict/'
list

Thus, the Progressive assumption
guiding torce

the other

policy matters.

in

still

remained that the executive branch
should be the

The executive should be

leading the legislature rather
than

way around

Dukakis focused, as promised, on management
practices

government
practices

m

Progressive

A

commission formed, with Fran Meaney

Massachusetts public

life

Branch agencies

his staff

and

effectively.”^^

his

as chair, to study

administration.

It is

top administrative appointees

More

Massachusetts

importantly, proper

[to]

manage

management

The 807

specific recommendations contained in this report are based on sound business practices and general-

accepted industry standards and were made without

regard for political considerations.

mental changes

in the traditional

Commonwealth

to

manage

its

Many

resources.

fective implementation of these proposals

administration

is

to succeed in

require funda-

methods used by

its
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the

However,
is vital if

is

an important function

carrying out the wishes of the public:

ly

management

and to make recommendations The report

m its attitude toward governmental

of the “Governor,

in

ef-

your

efforts to reduce gov-

is

all

Executive

tied directly to

eminent spending and
conserve the limited
sources

now

financial re-

available.

This will not be an easy
task, but the taxpayers
of Massachusetts deserve efficient,

economical management

01 their government.

Fundamental to achieving the public
good
every citizen

out

Its

To

carty out those ftinctions

capacities had to be strengthened

The authors of the

m

in

many important

in the efficient

more

and effective

effectively, the State’s

The measurement of how well

government, particularly the executive,
functions

is,

state’s limited capacity
to carry

Thus, the public interest was
wrapped up

ftmctioning of state agencies.

management

professional, efficient
administration: “Nearly

one time or another, encounter
the

will, at

functions

is

is

how

report note that the “climate

respects, antimanagerial ’’”

well

managed

Massachusetts

in

They note

personnel and budgeting areas, the “General
Court has

it is

the

state

government

that through over-regulation

made senous

incursions into the

managerial authority and responsibility of
”"*
the executive
They also wrote that the
cabinet had to be strengthened, especially
regarding “quasi-independent” agencies
whose

members

often ignored the Secretariats in attaining
what they desired:""
In

all

cases, however, the Secretariats

authority to

With

manage

this authority,

plementing agency
jective

is

must be given the
the agencies under their jurisdiction.

they will

to provide the

ber of individuals

become

responsible for im-

and programs The major obGovernor with a reasonable num-

activities

who

will

be accountable to him for the

performance of the executive branch."^
This

is

the Progressive notion of the executive branch

need for “cabinet government,” and Dukakis ordered

The

report

adamant about the

that Cabinet officials or

heads themselves, rather than lobbyists on the department’s behalf,
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is

testify

Department

before the

General Court.

Here, again, Dukakis
was concerned with the
process, with keeping

government “open,

rational, honest

Despite hts loss
a complete failure.

in

and

efficient

the I97S Dentocrat.c
primary, Dukakts’s

He managed

to win passage of many

Automobile insurance, the Court
System, welfare and
all

received attention from Dukakis
once the State’s

He

control

degrees

achieved some measure of success

As noted above, however,

bills that

in all

term was

were important

revitalization

fiscal crisis

first

far

from

to him.

of certmn urban areas

had been brought under

these areas, though in varying

his success is instmctive

It

came mostly when he

attempted to involve others rather
than attempting simply to
implement

his personal

Vision

This had been Dukakis’s

first

term as Governor, and he had

tried to

Progressive notion of the elected chief
executive: the popular manager
office with a rational plan

under

this plan, the State

implement the

He had come

and attempted to persuade the legislature and
the public
could prosper.

He

into

that,

had attempted to professionalize

administration and strengthen the managerial functions
of the executive branch. Dukakis

had some success. Yet, a year into

would

his term,

lose the Democratic primary to

he was reviled by legislators and

Edward

King.

What had

Progressive vision of the governorship been so unconvincing
into the

happened*^

in

Why had the

in this incarnation‘s Insight

breakdown of the Progressive governorship can be gained by examining

of raising taxes.
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1978, he

the issue

^^ALead,Pi^e^uarantee

The
because

i,

not to say

issue

issue

of taxes has been chosen as
an

”

illustration

it

led dtrectly to that loss,

though

,t

definitively as a catalyst in
the

mtnds of voters
part

in

Dukakis held and acted upon

and an

illustrates effectively the
attitudes

that

1978 Thts

is

no

ts

single

1978 The reasons

effective corralling

enemies by Edward King Budgetary
issues were important

however, and the taxation issue

,n

cettainly had an impact
There

were varied, including an inept
campaign on Dukakis’s
s

of the Progressive governor

encapsulates the reasons Dukakts
lost the Democratic
primaty

which serv ed

ukakis

Rmir^n

in

of

the election,

and conceptions that

caused people to turn away ffom him

in the

votino

booth

As mentioned above, one of Dukakis’s most
prominent campaign
had been

that, if elected,

Massachusetts

s citizens.

pledges

in

1974

he would not raise taxes. Taxes were
an important issue to

The

state

had a deserved reputation for high taxes, largely

because of exorbitant local property taxes.

Once

voters elected him, this issue marked

the beginning of Dukakis’s often bitter relations
with the General Court, setting the tenor
for his first term,

and

his handling

of it did

stir

up resentment among

certain citizen’s

groups. In the 1978 Democratic primary, one of Edward
King’s most prominent pledges

was

a tax cut, and this

was

certainly an issue

which helped propel him

to victory over

Dukakis. Dukakis admits: ‘“Some people were angry about taxes, other
people didn’t

my

style

Dukakis

s

like

handling of the issue of taxation was also an important illustration

of the limitations of the Progressive type of executive.
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The

issue of higher taxes

is

projected budget deficits,
Dukakis

linked directly to th,
y ° 'he issue of balancing
the budget In

was confident

sufficient to close the
unconstitutional

th»t k
that
better

management would be

budgetary gap

hon, an

amount that a Dukakis
supponer House Tax^ion
Committee chairman Jack
Buckley, told a
paign aide the size of
the revenue shortfall

DukrJca^
would

be,**

v», ,.o

« .1. ...... d„id.d ,d,

^

i.

^

worth winning!’”**^

By

the time Dukakis

won

astonishingly bad fiscal
condition
million

the governor’s seat,
Massachusetts’s government

A deficit

was eventually found to be
$600

which was

originally thought to be

million This deficit

Massachusetts’s requirement for
a balanced budget Yet,

in

was

was

in

$100-150

unconstitutional, given

the earliest phases of his

administration. Dukakis had
no intention of reneging on his
pledge not to raise taxes: ‘“He
said he

was going

him we didn

t

to balance the budget by
cutting programs and
economizing

think he could

do

that the

need for

and offered to push through a tax
increase

outgoing Sargent. Dukakis refused the

We told

claimed Senate President Kevin B,
Harrington

that,’’’

House Speaker David M, Banley claimed
knowledge,

.

offer.**
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new

that

taxes “‘was

*'

common

Dukakis could blame on the

Dukakis was too adamant
even
While others were

u/h<in
en fk

the situation

insistent that hiaher
taxation

not Dukakis blames

information and on

much of his

civil

servants

was made reasonably

as necessary, he

was

plain

insistent that

it

was

handling of the issue
on a lack of correct or
complete

who

reported figures only
reluctantly

- Once

everything

had been n,ade pla,n .0
hi., he did understand
the necess.ty of a tax
.crease and sent a
bill

.0 the legtslature that
called for raising the
,nco.e and sales taxes
significantly

Dukalus claims

that critics such as
Representat.ve

Barney Frank

‘m them

desire to be helpflil to
people, and compassionate and carmg, they had
paid very little attention
to the
fiscal side of the ledger
and somebody had to
come along
and straighten the mess
out, and 1 was the
governor
that

so

was my job

Dukakts focused on process, on

his “job," ,n the

most technical sense of that term
This

focus precluded any stands
people thought Dukakis had taken
or any impressions he

have given

solutions

Many

fell

liberals

were disappointed

onto the poor Dukakis, however,
saw the

one and therefore,

his role

was one of setting

of others. Even as he was losing

acknowledge

that the greatest

that his

success Indeed,

question, Dukakis

others and this

became

was not

Dukakis

lost

fiscal crisis as

livid.

the most important

called Dukakis’s

of the desires

with the legislature, Dukakis refused
to

competence alone could not bring him

when Harrington

burden of Dukakis’s early

that crisis straight, regardless

political influence

may

political

and budgetary

competence as Governor

into

Harrington had to point out to him that he had
alienated

a plot on the part of old-line pols to ruin him."^

much of his

political capital

with the members of the General Court

over the issue of whether to increase taxes Legislative
leaders and members of the
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Democratic Study Group
attempted to convince
Dukakis of the
ncrease and the necessity of
passing

He

it

as

base of support

in the

As noted

would

deal with the fiscal crisis

House, the

D

S G,, eroded as a

above, Dukakis retained

legislative regard

Indeed, legislators

of a tax

soon as possible Dukakis would
have none of it:

had been elected to reform
the government, not patch

legislative leaders that he

inevitability

when he was ready

- Dukakis’s

result z"

much of his

would have

up Dukakis told the

it

public popularity even after he
lost

benefitted greatly

if

Dukakis had

televised earlier than he did a
speech urging Massachusetts voters
to support the looming
legislative levy

of tax increases Once Dukakis decided

to raise taxes

and to cut spending,

he had gone to the people, televising
the announcement of his proposal
proposal had been submitted to the General
Court, Dukakis

initially

’’

Yet, once that

refused to use popular

persuasion to provide legislators with enough
political support to raise taxes as he had

proposed

Dukakis was,

at that point, the

only person

in the State

with any

ability to

persuade the people of the necessity of a tax increase.’*
Yet, he refused to do so based on
his

perception of the role he had in the political system
Going to the people would have

been beneficial for the
should

work out

its

legislature, but

own

Dukakis “continued to believe

that the legislature

problems.

Eventually, however, Dukakis did take the Progressive
approach to pushing his

bill

through the legislature and appeared on statewide television to
persuade voters of the
necessity of a tax increase.

He

admitted his error

in

promising not to raise taxes and

defended the need for increased taxation over spending
General Court had passed a

bill

that

was

sent to the
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cuts.

Twenty-four hours

Governor

for his approval.^*

later,

Even

the

after

Dukakis had broken

raftng

’’

was due

his

As mentioned, what
to the maintenance

.nterested

Dukak.s His

Massachusetts
enjoyed was,

pol.tical

campaign
uHiise, ne
promise
K 5 H
he

still

respect he matntatned

,n

of a

political

h a sixty
enjoyed
percent approval

the

ftrst

year of his administratton

certain popuianty
wtth Massachusetts’s
cit.zens Yet

successes

it

came when he engaged other
branches of the

system The extra-const.tutional,
popular support that Dukakis

in the end, not

even enough to car^ him
to victory

in the

Democratic

primary of 1978

Michael Dukakis’s handling
of the taxatton issue during
the

first

years of his

administration gives insights into
the problematic nature
of the Progressive executive

Havtng a

rational plan can be useless
in the face

information or recalcitrant

civil

servants

of political

reality

such as incomplete

Pubhc suppon alone may not be

sustain any effective governance
in the face of a hostile
legislature If the

lead the legislature,

it is

those closest to you The Governor

may be

may have

his

is

to

be professional,

it is

is

to

easy to alienate

a rational plan to address an issue, and
that

the “correct” one, even given the political
situation However, other

of Ihe political system need persuading

his

Governor

easy for that leadership to become,
or to seem to become,

overbearing and noninclusive If administration

plan

sufficient to

members

of the correctness of that plan Dukakis’s sense of

popular suppon, the sense that he was “winning
converts” to

his

program, encouraged

arrogance and the notion that what the Governor wanted
should be enacted as

proposed.
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it

was

Dukakis certainly recognized

that

he was not the only
member of the

Massachusetts governmental
system. Often, however,
he acted as

who

if

he were the only one

mattered. Conceiving of
the executive as the
repository of the public

will,

and as the

harbinger of a rational plan
to enact the public
will regardless of
political interests
involved, can too easily

become arrogance and

not. Leadership, the
enacting

of policies that had been
advocated

maintenance of coalitions around
those

of taxation, though
of why

his

it

was one of several

in the face

still

Spring of 1978, following
Dukakis's strong

blizzard that winter, sixty-seven
percent of 998

percent leads over his potential
opponents
far

Dukakis

inability,

s loss

in

enough by September, 1978,

The case being made here
It is,

is

not that taxation

the primaries

that he

was

would

'««

He

also enjoyed thirty

That approval, however,
lose the Democratic primary

the only, or even the primary reason
for

however, emblematic of the most imponant
reason Dukakis

or unwillingness to consider others' visions
of the public good

own. This

trait is

innicative

held a high approval rating
with the public

voters surveyed by the Boston Glohe
approved of the governor

would drop

was

led to that loss.

late as the

ofa paralyzing

and the

Dukakis's handlint

factors that led to his loss
in 1978,

Yet, as mentioned earlier,
Dukakis

even after he raised taxes Even
as

electorally

issues, has to involve
inclusion

approach to the executive office

performance

lead to exclusion,
whether intentional or

in

lost

an

formulating his

symptomatic of the Progressive conception of the executive
the popular

manager.
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A ^rimarv

I

Michael Dukakis faced
opposition from both the
Ideological spectrum in the
1978 Democratic primaty

right

From

Ackermann, Mayor of Cambridge,
who dended DukaWs
Dukakis's welfare cuts,

was

unfriendly to

his

many

workfare proposal and

liberal

House Democrats were

Democrats and Ackermann
embodied
a businessman

Authority

who was

a friend

in the late sixties

The

fact that

his

that

anger

and the

the

left

of the

came Barbara

for selling out his
liberalism.

approval of a redistricting
al,

From

bill

being held against him
by
the nght

came Edward

J

that

liberal

King,

of Bob Quinn and had tun
the Massachusetts Pot,

and early seventies

Dukakis was attacked from both
ends of the ideological spectrum

indicates that the problem

made overtures toward

may

either

members of either group His
pleasing “special interests ”

not have been so

much

ideological as institutional.

role as governor, however,
precluded any effort toward

He

that public interest

Had he

end of the ideological spec,
mm, he could have placated

had come to the Governor’s chair
to implement

regardless of those he perceived as
cormptors of the public interest

embodied

left

and had a duty to implement

it,

As

his plan,

the Governor, he

regardless of “political”

concerns Thus, political-minded members
of the polity were upset, regardless of their
political

persuasion

Edward King
different conception

beat Dukakis in the Democratic primary in
1978. King held a

of the executive than Dukakis

administrator style to the public manager.

politics in 1974,

King ran against Dukakis

did, preferring the partisan-

As Dukakis had run
in

against establishment

1978 King played up
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five essential issues

and

brought together groups

He

who

had been alienated hv n. l- i.y ukakis

•

s

u

handling of those issues

sought the executive
office as mnrh
u
much tn
to Hicf
dtstnbute
rewards to

his associates as

he did to

concept, on of the executive
office than they d.d
in Duhahis's
conception

What does
King’s victory over
Dukakis say regarding the
relationship between the
two concept, ons
f the executive What
does the partisan conception
have that the Progressive
conception
lacks'^

King was not
Republican

To

call

strictly a

Ed K,ng

Democrattc panisan, as he
would eventually become a
parttsan

,s

structure ,n cooperatton
with fellow party

gubernatonal pnmary and

,n

to .ndicate that he

members

worked within

a

pany

or at least a party faction
In the 1978

the subsequent election
campaign, he aligned htmself
with a

factton of the Massachusetts
Democratic party, and as newly
elected governor promised
to use that faction

thes.s,

of the party to conduct bustness
As indicated

the introduction of this

Massachusetts has been a one-party
state through most of its
history Except for a

thirty-year span

been anemtc

from the

at best

As

late

1920s

until the late 1950s, the
opposition party has generally

a result, confrontations that
might have played out hem-een parties

elsewhere, such as the battle Dukakis
faced with old-time pols

mihin

in

a party

Massachusetts

By

Brookline, played out

the time King assumed office, the
Democrats had

politics, especially the

Democratic party (“the old-boy
an important role

in

in

align himself with the legislative

to

dominate

General Court. The legislative wing of the

political

King’s election.

come

network”), issuing “a plea for party unity,” played

Once

wing of the

elected,

King

initially

party, declaring,
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made

overt efforts to

no doubt with reference

to

Dukakis's governorship,
“‘The era of
anti-politics
politics

King was

also less hesitant
than

is
IS

a r
e
As
former Senate
President

over

Dukakis
KaKis ahrmt
about nt>t
patronage appointments.
More

concerned with disseminating
the rewards of the
governor's
associates (“cronies''). King

than Dukakis had been

As

was

iess

office to his friends

and dose

concerned with the
competence of his appointees

indicated, first-term
Dukakis, deeply

committed to neutral

professionalism, had been
concerned with avoiding any
appearance of patronage

appointments, to the point where
personal relationships
suffered and

who had worked

The

were male, and

five

were

difference between Dukakis
and

the Governor's

supporters

hard for him were alienated
King was quite different, not
afraid to

appoint his friends and loyal
partisans to positions
white, nine

political

in his

affiliated

King

is

Of his

first

ten appointments, nine

with Boston College, King's
alma mater

well illustrated by their
respective handling of

Commission on the Status of Women
While Dukakis responded

to

disagreements over the annual budget
through discussion. King responded
to the

commission's disagreement by dismissing

competence on the

part

were

all its

members

Dukakis above

all

sought

of administrators, while King sought
to repay those who had

given him political support and looked
for agreement with the Governor’s
wing of the

Democratic party
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Initially,

King evinced more of a aift
g

an rA
Dukakis had for involving
people as
i

i

•

had a„ena.ed Tax-cu.
advoca.es, death penalty
hachers, nsh.-.o-,ife
advocates, the

nsurance industt^, bankers,

big pot

and

let

,t

bo, I

-m

state

one

employees and labor leaders

sense, thts represents
the

Of the

primary victor

same son ofcampatgmng

D.rkak.s had done aga.nst
what he perceived as cormpt
Massachusetts politics four years
earlier

He was

reacting against Dukakis
and gathering people

who were against

the

incumbent

"t

et

King

also

managed

to

campaign /or something He had

five essential points

he returned to throughout the
campaign, each of which
diametrically opposed

that

Dukakis's stands, Cutttng taxes,
reinstating the death penalty,
mandatory sentencing for

dmg

dealers and burglars, increasing
the drinking age to twenty-one
and ending state-

fttnded abortions for

Its

points. This

Medicaid recipients were King's
agenda, and he continually pressed

gave people something positive to
which they could attach themselves

King also asserted that Dukakis was
disliked by business

make

the state

more

attractive to those interests

King was able to appeal to voters on some
end. King

was

Through

and

his agenda,

beyond, “I

am

that

King would

however

limited.

against Dukakis,” In the

effective with his pitches, as the issues
he addressed directly tapped into

sources of concern

were desperate

level

interests,

among Massachusetts's

citizens:

“[T]he data

.

showed

that the people

for tax cuts, furious about crime and desirous
of a higher drinking age.”"'
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King
e

s

.

approach to the campaign
showed why Dukakis'
s suppon

fell

between the

^7;“-------shadahenatedma„ypuhhcgroupso.erh.ste„^^^

Ouhakts's performance

m

the

hl.ard had

esree of name-recognitton,
groups
issue

is

indicative of DukalfiQ’c
i>»UKaias s

who

faded, and once
the cand, dates
had acpu.red a

resented Dukakts
began to defect The
taxation

actions in this regard
Until
until thp
^
the Spnng, raising
taxes had

not been that vexing
5 on Dukald*;’?
xaKis s n.tKiir.
public support. Indeprl li'irwY’o
King s campaign
manager
Oeorge Prattaroh satd that,
as he had been
prepanng hts candidate
for the pnmaty,
,

"Our

prehm,„ary polls showed
[tssues such as
percent of the people

increases"-

we

polled blamed

ta.xat,on]

Dukakis

weren't cutt.ng issues

for those th.ngs,
even the tax

June of 1978, however,
the state of Californ.a
passed Proposition

In

strong tax-cutting measure

At the time, Dukakts
dismissed

it,

Massachusetts citizens "were
‘too sophisticated'
to swallow as
thetr

taxes

pocketbook problems as

would

fall

as a result

that,"

and increased

- But Dukakis misread the

public,

they considered an
important issue.

that,

in

taxes

was

Propositton

1

3

necessary, and could ease
fiscal

while King did later

in

13, a

saying that

simplistic a solution to

local atd in the

people would not accept such
a flippant remark and
such an

decrease

Only about 35

hopes

that property

one newspaper noted, and

.nsufficient solution to

what

helped persuade people that a

woes

Dukakis did not pick up on

the campaign.

But, again, the taxation tssue
itself was not sufficient
as an explanation Rather, as

“a Democratic source close to
the governor's campaign"
noted “Everyone’s blaming
Proposition 13, but

it

was

his personality

More
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broadly, Dukakis

saw himself as

it

the

on

sole repository

of the public

will

oopers had not had a
pay-raise

anH

k

een too adamant

in three years.
In the

[took] a hardline .insisting
that his pos.tion

with Gov. Michael Dukakis
on
goverrtor wanted White to
use
the

money

how
,t

was

in his

stands as a result.
State

ensuing dispute, “the
Governor

correct and not
negotiable

Dukakis

to spend
snend S6?
S62 million in additional
state aid.
•

to reduce the property
tax

The ntayor contends

already has been eaten
up by inflat.on and other
fixed costs

Boston ,0 K,ng by more than
13,000 votes.

- Dukakts,

in

a

The

manner

ntost

Dukakts

indicative

of

lost

of the

Progress, ve notion of the
executive, held up the
governor as the sole repos.tory
of the will

of Massachusetts c.tizens
As such, he “was frequently
accused of arrogance and
deafhess

m

the presence of would-be
advisors.”'^'

State D[epartmen,

oq

P[ublic]

—

King was

a result, Dukakis had
alienated “State police.

W[orks workers], ami-abon.omsts,

and professionals, bankers, the
insurance
leaders

As

industry, state

employees

Businessmen and pro-tax cut voters
last

part

won

in

particularly difficult for

1974. Further, he had

of state government’s role

primal from

,n the

Democratic

h.s

party.

cast their ballots for King, as did
urban residents and

two groups were

groups had supported him

and labor

King's support came from
expected sources, given

professed alignment with anti-Dukakts
groups and the “regulars”

The

in general

effective a, corralling these
groups, and took the

Dukakis by over 76,000 votes

Irish voters

licensed technicians

in his first term.

only nine.
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Dukakis to take, as both

made urban development an

Yet, Dukakis lost thirty cities

in

important

1978 and

There were other factors
generally anti-.ncumbent

in

Dukakis's loss
According to reporters,
there was a

mood among

voters that year

- Dukakis dso

Democrats' support on two
fronts One was
Ackermann's candidacy,
votes .Ackermann
represented the liberals

approach to social programs

However,
the vote

tell

so

was

as

first

black Senator

liberals felt a

good about

broadly,

it

was

53 2^0

betrayed by Dukak.s's
"meat-cleaver"
States Senator

was involved

note, “[e]ven

on the incumbent

More

w.ch drew

Edward Brooke,

in a difficult

need to vote Republican
to help him

Kenney and Turner

a referendum

felt

The other was United

Brooke, a Republican and
the

and many Massachusetts

who

lost liberal

more than

in
it

primary race.

retain office.'^*

most such

elections,

a rejection ot the
stewardship that Dukakis
a referendum

on Dukakis’s notion of the

executive the popular manager
Under that concept, on, Dukak.s
had not read the public
correctly H.s effons to
educate the people as to the
ach.evements of his administration

were ult.mately unsuccessfbl Thus,
both ends of the
the executive had failed

relationshtp

between the public and

him His relationship with the
public had broken down, he had

weak suppon among members of the

legislature

and he had frozen the vast majority
of his

administration out of his campaign. With
both his popular and his institutional
support

eroded, Dukakis had

little

chance for victory

Dukakis did not increase

He

his

in

1978

chances by running a lackadaisical primary
campaign.

misinterpreted greater economic stability and
what he

saw

as a productive term as

governor as greater satisfaction on the part of
Massachusetts’s voters, and allowed himself
to

become more confident than was

did not pay close

enough

necessary. While he did sense a negative feeling,
he

attention to

it.

Dukakis allowed himself to be outspent by King
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better than two-to-one

on advertising

debate among the cand, dates,

listing

He seemed smug

The shortcomings of Dukakis’s
campaign were

A

Giesser, by his

campaign

admission “had no idea

Thus, the

initial

the

'''

largely his

Giesser, a businessman with
extraordinanly

own

at

what he perceived as
accomplishments of Ws

administration while not responding
to King’s accusations.

hired Richard

and over-confident

how

own

doing.

little political

He had

experience

to organize a statewide
gubetnatonal

decision to spend nothing
on media campaigning

was

Dukakis’s.'” The decision to prohibit
members of his staff and cabinet, with
few
exceptions, from taking an active
part

when

in

the campaign

considering appointments to office
early

been active and important

in their

in his

Governor’s office was
Interestingly,

Dukakis had held elective
Despite

this,

who had

little in

in

the legislature and had vaulted him

evidence

Dukakis’s experience before the governorship
had been almost

entirely political while King’s

office.

term, Dukakis cut off people

support of him Even the strong,
effective electoral

organization that had supported him from
his days
into the

was Dukakis’s.'" As he had done

had been almost

office

entirely

managenal,

much of his adulthood

albeit as a civil serv'ant.

while King had never run for

King attempted to come off as the more

traditional pol, with his

declarations about the end of “anti-politics,” for example.*"^
Ironically, as Governor, King

found himself as roundly disliked as Dukakis had found

many of the same

when

himself, and,

more

ironically, for

reasons. King, too, did not take advantage of political opportunities

they arose. Unlike Dukakis, however. King was also perceived as an incompetent

manager

Winning

office with an anti-Dukakis base
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was

ultimately as ineffectual as

wmning

office

based on an an,i-poli,ics-as-usual
message Tha, topic, along
with

Dukakts-s resulting victon,
over King

,n 1982,

is

the subject of the
next chapter

Conclusion

Michael Dukakis

most prominent

in

ts

an example of the
Progressive-type executive,
certainly the

Massachusetts

political history

General Court encouraged him
to pursue a

and

rationality

political

His frustration was not with
a

corruption he saw eroding efforts
to

work

His early pohticd
success

,n the

course based on techn.cal
competence

political party

for the public

so

good

much

in

as

it

was with the

Massachusetts

He

attempted to take over the
Democratic party organization
without working through the
traditional

pany establishment

Traditional party organizations
such as Massachusetts’s

old-boy network were part of the
corruption that had to be cleansed
By the time he was
elected

Governor

Dukakts and

in

in

1974, he had established a personal
organization that worked to elect

doing so to help establish a government

that

was not based on patronage

but on professionalism, competence
and a proper expression of the
public will

Dukakis

s first

term as Governor saw him attempt to
implement the Progressive

vision of the elected executive

He wanted

a legislature that

would follow

the lead of the

executive branch, and an administration that
would be professional, rather than partisan,

and devoid of corruption or conflict of interest
The problems he addressed were most
often the problems of promoting a

free administration

When

more

he addressed

efficient

government and ensuring a corruption-

less process-oriented issues,

through legislative leadership and regulation by agencies
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he attempted to do so

Dukakis's

pnmary

to

Ed

first

King, a

term as Governor ended with

his loss in the

more partisan-type executive
King was

focus on substantive rather
than procedural issues

better able than

m his campaign

stands that were both opposed
to Dukakis’s stands and
were more

of Massachusetts’s

citizens

The popular

1978 Democratic

Dukakis

In doing so, he
took

in line

with the wishes

leader had misread the
public and cut

much of his

support out from under him King
also gave voters issues
around which they could
offering a notion of what

way

in

government should do. rather than
basing

to

rally,

campaign on the

his

which government should be
conducted
Ironically,

Dukakis’s failure as a Progressive-type
executive came

in

an

environment which could have been
conducive to the Progressive notion
of the executive.
Massachusetts has

historically,

except for a brief period, been a
one-party

then Whigs, essentially the same political
persuasion, controlled the state
the Republicans

was

who

held

sway

until the late 1920s.

The

the only period of competitive two-party
politics

gamed

control by the late 1950s and have maintained

late

1920s through the

since.

is

late

of

1950s

Democrats

A single party

devoid of party competition, as Massachusetts
has been for most of its
party competition

until the birth

in the State’s history

it

state. Federalists

history.

state

is

A lack

of

the Progressive ideal. In the absence of party
competition, with a

reasonable amount of agreement, politicians could focus
on important issues and follow
the lead of the executive in implementing policies to
benefit the public

As
in

indicated above, there

was

substantial agreement

on the need

for a tax increase

the months before Dukakis assumed office and during the period before
taxes were

raised

Democrats held 191 seats

in

the

House and 33
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seats in the Senate, an

ample

maionty

in

- The leg.slative leadetsh.p made

both houses of the Genetal
Coutt

effotts to

convince Dukakis of the necessity
of a ptotnpt tax mcrease
Yet, Dukakis handled the
issue meffectively and an issue
that could have run
teasonably smoothly cost htm

pohucal influence His misreading
of the public
partisan persuasion helped cost

him a primary

executive could not carry Dukakis
to success

in

in

a state predominantly of
h.s

own

1978 The Progressive notion
of the
a state that, given

in

much

lack of party

its

competition, could have allowed
success
In fact,

misses

IS

what the Progressive notion of politics,

that parties often contain
disparate elements, the

competition regardless of party

affiliation.

The Democrats

contained both the “old-boy” Irish pols
against
class,

as ideally free of party competition,

good-government reformers

(the

more

whom

members of which would be
in

in

Massachusetts, for example,

Dukakis rebelled and the upper-

typical Progressives), such as

Dukakis

himself Thus, a lack of inter-party competition
did not lead to harmony, as Progressives

would have hoped As Madison
are thus

sown

in the

to achieve success,

had by

indicates in Federalist 10, “[t]he latent causes
of faction

nature of man,” and

Dukakis would have

his reelection in

may be

intra-party as well as inter-party. In order

to modify his conception of the executive, as he

1982

Dukakis comments: “Losing kind of wakes you up a

you have

to ask yourself what happened.

very clear goals and

first

I

wanted

term governors...: ‘Here

shown

to get

it is

And

I

think

them done and

and

it’s terrific

I

And when

little bit.

what happened. was
.

.

was one of these

and pass

it.’”^^^

that

I

I

lost...

had some

guys, like a lot of

Dukakis’s

first

term had

the hazards of the Progressive approach to the executive challenge. Yet he went on
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.0 defeat

Ed King

in

.he 1982 Democratic printaty,
win election and achieve
a substantia,

electoral v.ctoo- in 1986

between

his firs,

success (“I

around

was

Dukakts agrees

that hts

approach to the executive

office

changed

and second tenures. The story
of that change, Dukak.s's
increased

a

much

better

governor the second time around
than

and ultimate disappointment

in the Presidential
election

subjects of the next chapter
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I

was the

firs,

time

of 1988 are the
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During

his first

CHAPTER

5

DUKAKIS

II

term as Governor of Massachusetts,
Michael Dukakis attempted

to

implement the Progressive notion of the
executive He sought a powerfirl
executive branch

which would lead the
the public good.

He

legislature in

sought to

rid

implementing a rational vision,

his rational vision,

Massachusetts state government of
corruption and

waste, focustng on efficient use of resources
and neutral, professional administration

won

election based

of

on an anti-incumbent campaign, and
proceeded to

members of the General Court through

his handling

alienate

He

many

of the issue of taxation. By the time of

the primary election of 1978, he had alienated
the public enough to bring about
a loss to

Edward King
Yet
primary

in

in

the Democratic primary

1982, Dukakis

He would go on

was

to recapture the Governorship and to achieve
a resounding

reelection victory' in 1986. While

may have changed
easily

in

able to defeat King in a repeat of the 1978
Democratic

it is

possible that only public opinion

the eighties, Michael Dukakis

and was able to project an image that was

previously, a change that

different

was not

assumptions during

had Dukakis done

his

differently"^

lost

won

these

less arrogant

two

Massachusetts

gubernatorial elections

and aloof than he had

on observers.^ Presumably, Dukakis operated under

second tenure than he had held during

How

in

had

his

his first term.

What

conception of the Governorship changed to

allow greater success as a leader"^

252

Between Electirm^
Dukakis’s loss to Edward Krng
was a humbling expenence.
one his wife l.kened to
a “public death

Massachusetts

Yet, Dukakis

pol.tics.

would

ultimately learn from his
loss, at least in
terms of

Eventually, he “would

himself as he never had before

in his life

come

to see

that he

- More broadly, he would

needed to humble

come

to see that he

had ,0 present a more positive and
substantive vision of the nature
of government and

m

role

society than he had

m

He

hts first term.

also

would

realize that his

was not

,ts

the only

vision and that he had to account
for others’ ideas if he
were going to sustain a success&l

leadership role as

Governor Ultimately, Dukakis would
have

make himself less of a

to

popular manager and more of a
constitutional executive to achieve
success

in

Massachusetts politics Dukakis partook of
various experiences between 1979
and 1982
that

would

facilitate a

much more

successful Governorship

Dukakis spent much of his time

m those years teaching at Harvard University

experiences there, as he readily acknowledges,
affected the

of and conducted
to

his

way

in

which Dukakis thought

Governorship," His teaching involved case studies
which were meant

be ambiguous and plumbed for the various answers

that could

be proffered. Yet,

Dukakis often was adamant that there was only one correct
answer
Student evaluations, which were not positive
this.

much

His

in

the

first

to a case study.

semester or two, tended to reflect

[H]e pushed a right solution to case problems and did not encourage or
entertain
dissent

.

.

.Dukakis ‘sometimes doesn’t

listen to people’s

carefully as he should.’”^
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comments and questions

as

Indeed, Dukakis took his position
at Harvard at the time

was occurring

at the

when an

important debate

Harvard's Kennedy School of
Government The question was

whether traditional academics or government

officials

should be teaching classes

in

public

policy:

Dukakis s arrival the basic message at the
Kennedy School had been that the problem in
government
was the lack of careful analysis at the top, that
better
Until

analysis resulting in

power and
find the

answers to

United States was

The irony was
during his

first

that this

In

set to the benefit

why
in

cities

were

way

the

to

one would

in flames,

why

the

Vietnam.^

of his

political career

One of the

Kennedy School

here,

Dukakis

who had

his legislative career

operated under an academic mind

becoming an academic, Dukakis would

educational experience

happened

was

and

term as governor In acquiring an experienced
public policy maker,

political career

at the

results

had been Dukakis’s approach during

Harvard was receiving someone

people

optimum

influence, that through analysis

why were my
s attitude

As Dukakis

says “Teaching

is

during his

some of that mind
a great

things that trying to teach this stuff to mid-career

did for

me was

to force

me

to kind of think through

what

[relations with the legislature so poor]'’”^

during his

Progressive notion of the executive.

first

As

semesters

manager would not always be open

public

good Dukakis’s experience

at

at

Harvard

is

indicative of his original.

the sole representative of the public

public

interpretations of political

learn to shed

set

will,

the

to others’ notions of what constituted the

Harvard helped him open

phenomena than

his

his

mind to other possible

own. Thus, he would

people and to make certain concessions to allow greater room within
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learn to discuss with

his vision.

At the

Kennedy School, Dukakis learned
again

that being an effeclive
executive involved

tangible and effective efforts
to listen to and include
other

The most important

political association

legislative dealings during his

services,

first

political skill that enabled

in that,

in the 1980s. In
discussing his greater success
in

because Sasso had a great

in [the activities

Dukakis brought into

his

system

Dukakis to

second term, Dukakis notes:
“There’s no question

Sasso was very, very important
people and to involve them

political

Dukakis made between 1979
and 1982

was with John Sasso Sasso embodied
much of the
achieve both electoral and policy
success

members of the

making

of government]

”*

ability to

that

John

reach out to

In acquiring Sasso’s

governorship an element that had
been absent during

his

tenure

Sasso was from

New

Jersey and had attended Boston
University

He

had run

campaigns for Massachusetts Congressman
Gerry Studds, been manager of Studds’
district office

and been a

field

organizer for Senator

tor the Presidential nomination in

1980

^

Edward Kennedy

in

Kennedy’s run

In these experiences, Sasso developed
a

reputation as having a strong presence and being
highly effective at bringing people

together and performing “insider”

politics.

bid for the governor’s office in 1982 and

Sasso would go on to run Dukakis’s successful

would be named Dukakis’s Chief Secretary

for

Dukakis’s second term.

An

important meeting, though not the

four days after Dukakis

s

first,

between Sasso and Dukakis took place

defeat in 1978 at a whistle-stop train trip to support an

ultimately successful tax classification campaign that Sasso

was managing. Dukakis’s

resilience struck Sasso while Sasso’s ability to bring together disparate groups of people
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struck Dukakis

«

Indeed, at the train stop
where Dukakis and Sasso
nret. Dukakis took

note of the w.ngs of the
Democratic Party that were
present. According to
Games and
Segal, “It

was not

lost

on

either of them that Sasso
had organized the coalition
that

Dukakis would have needed to beat
Ed King

Members of the

old guard mixed with

reformers, and Dukakis recognized
that he would need
to bring these groups
together, as

Sasso could so effectively,
That

ability

If

he were to taste success

of Sasso's remained

Massachusetts, two years

classification

if

later,

in

Dukakis mind, and the next time
they talked

Dukakis questioned Sasso

campaign Dukakis also noted

Sasso would be interested

in helping,

remarkable success not only on

in

at

length

on the tax

his interest in running
for

" Sasso

enlisted

He would

winning an election, but

in

in

Governor and asked

help bring Dukakis to

implementing an agenda as

well.

Edward King helped Dukakis’s

position by running what

to be an inept administration. His
appointments,

more

his

resume with

false

observ'ers perceived

partisan than Dukakis’s

appointments, were often technically incompetent
or corrupt.

augmented

may

One

cabinet appointee had

degrees from prestigious European universities

An

appointee to the position of insurance commissioner
was forced to resign because he had
little

knowledge of insurance. He had been

selected because he

was favorable

to the

Commercial Union Insurance Company, which had donated thousands of
dollars
campaign. The

of King

s,

new Commissioner of the

brought

in as

to King’s

Metropolitan District Commission, an old friend

an associate commissioner an individual

who had been named

Congressional hearings as an associate of crime boss Raymond Patriarca.
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in

These scandals

all

occurred within weeks of
King's assunting the
Governorship In 1980, the Ward

Commission, a group

that

Dukak.s and

investigate political corruption

historically corrupt

legislat.ve leaders

m the Commonwealth,

government was continued

King, despite being

more

in the

had estabhshed

in

1978 to

noted that Massachusetts’s

Port Authority under King

partisan than first-term Dukakis,

was

also unable to

provide an effective Governorship
The partisan administrator was as
exclusive

way

as the public

manager had been Where Dukakis
had looked

and included only those people
interest,

he made those

who

who met

had supported him actively

King, by including only those people

made those who
others

m

his policy initiatives

ot the conduct

who

did not feel excluded

He

for technical

that criterion, provided
there

agreed with

King made as

in

his

little

was no

in its

conflict

policy,’ said a

of

the campaign feel excluded

wing of the Democratic
effort as

party,

Dukakis had to include

spurned the legislature and many public
servants

of his administration His management

own

competence

style consisted

in

much

of contacting

administrators he saw as loyal to him in order
to have problems handled '“That’s

made

'=

how

he

former associate.”’^

King came to be seen as an inept Governor, one who
could not

deliver

on

his

important promises. Having promised a tax cut. King
attempted to take credit for the

passage of Proposition 2

issue

cities

He had

'/

.

Yet King had vacillated on the measure when

also attempted to forestall state spending by freezing the

and towns, resulting

passage of the large tax

to Dukakis,

2

in

cut.

it

became an

amount of aid

property tax increases that were important

in

to

bringing about

After having portrayed himself as tough on crime, according

King saw violent crime

rise

during his administration.'*^ Thus, under a more
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partisan conception of
the executive,

Edward Ktng

Michael Dukakis had during
Dukakis's
•After hts loss to

would return to

politics

Edward King

” Yet

in

first

,n

suffered the

same

political fate as

term as governor

1978, Dukakis had his
doubts about whether
he

1982, he returned with a
vengeance to defeat his
nval

the Democratic primary
Dukakis notes that losing gave
htm a start and forced
him to

consider where he had

made

his

provoking experience of losing,

mistakes.^ In addition to the
sobenng and thoughthts teaching experience,
his enlisting

King's scandal-ridden
administration

him resounding victories

in

all

moved Dukakis

of John Sasso, and

a direction that would
allow

in

both 1982 and 1986

A Rematch
Dukakis beat Ed King

in

the Democratic primary
of 1982, in another

between the two wings of the
Massachusetts Democratic
“reformers" In terms of the executive,

this

was another

showdown

party: the “regulars”

and the

contest between the panisan

administrator and the popular manager
While King would not always be a
Democrat, as
indicated tn the preceding chapter,
he

was more

King was fond of appointees who were
close to
lacked during his

first

term In

his first term.

partisan than Dukakis had been in
that

his

wing of the

party, a trait

Dukakis had made an

Dukakis

effort to bring

professionalism to Massachusetts, avoiding
any appearance of patronage Neither King

nor Dukakis had been particularly successful.

Regarding the focus of the respective campaigns, the
primary campaign of 1982
mirrored the campaign of 1978 Dukakis emerged
victorious

campaign

that stressed

King

s

mismanagement of the
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State.

in

the primary by running a

Competence and

integrity

in

were

his central

themes, and he continued
to mi<;h
them oeven as the campaign
P sh th...
became

increasingly b.tter and hard-fough,.^'

He

nraintarned a popular-manager
conception of the

executive throughout the campatgn
Dukakts portrayed the
recently-passed Proposition
2
'/.

as an adtntnistrative challenge,
claitntng that he. not
Ktng, had the ability to
administer

the

new

policy to the greatest publtc
benefit.- Dukakis kept up
a Progressive conception

of the executive even though that
had cost

King attempted
candidates

He

felt

to

Democrattc Pritnaty four years

earlier.

keep the campaign focused on
the issues and away from the

the citizens of Massachusetts
agreed with his central positions

ot a tax cut, the death penalty

may

htnt the

and against drunk driving - The

citizens

in

favor

of Massachusetts

not have particularly cared for King
himself, yet they were in agreement
with his

general positions

away from

-

made

It

sense, therefore, for him to shift the
focus of the campaign

the candidates and toward their
respective stands on important issues. King

was focused on what

the government should be doing, as a
partisan-type executive would,

while Dukakis focused on process, efficiency
and neutrality, more along the

lines

of a

Progressive-type of executive.

Dukakis did not ignore issues completely, however, and King
was not averse

to

pointed attacks on Dukakis’s character. Dukakis attempted
to cut off King’s offensive
regarding the issues of taxes and crime.

Proposition 2

first

'/2
,

as he

may have

if

As

noted, Dukakis did not shy

he did not want to

raise the specter

term. In typical fashion, he sought to portray Proposition 2 Vz as a

claiming he could do the better job implementing the measure.^^

in

which he related

how

crime had

hit his

family and
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how

He

away from
of taxes from

management

his

issue,

also aired commercials

he wanted to prevent families

in

Massachusetts from experiencing
the same tragedies.^
Ktng maintatned that Dukakis's
attempts to conv.nce the voters
that he had become
a better l.stener and less
arrogant were

He

phony.

arrtving

deplored Dukakis's relatively
puntanical

home

l.festyle,

ndiculiug Dukakis's habit
of

time for a dinner with his
family every night while
governor,^’ The

in

campaign turned

bitter at several points

while both camps attacked
the other through the

media

Dukakis handled the campaign's
debate masterfully, maintaining
an aggressive
stance which forced King onto
the defensive from the
beginning

« While

the incumbent Dukakis into
that position in 1978,
challenger Dukakis

pushed around

in

the rematch

If

King wanted

to focus

on crime. Dukakis used

to the extent that he

was

letting

was

King do

able to

it

do so

allegations of a rising crime rate against

him Dukakis kept up allegations of corruption
and incompetence
aggressive, Dukakis

would not be

Dukakis would define himself rather
than

Dukakis also took the opportunity to define
King,

King had forced

clearly the victor in the April
debate

*

Determined and

King canceled a second

debate that had been scheduled for two weeks
before the primary"

John Sasso was a most important addition to
Dukakis’s
build a

J

King

‘field’

large, tightly knit

in.

.

.

[the]

campaign organization

for

Dukakis

Democratic primary.”" This campaign

electoral team, helping to

that steamrollered ...Edward

unit included

both a “grassroots

organization” and a “system of ‘issues task forces.’”" Sasso called
the

field

organization the campaign’s “safety net” and, indeed, the organization, led
by Jack

Corrigan, w'as instrumental

in

the primary victory.'"
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The campaign spent one-million

dollars

on meticulous

efforts at identifyins
n
ers, especially
y 5 voters

unhappy with the King

ironic lack

gift for

982 Duhakis’s

of any particular

effective at

many

1

orgaoizing throughout
hts career, and

gift for

twenty for King
he

cante to

grass-roots orga.zi„g was
opposed to Krng’s

talent in that direction

The Dukakis

organization was

32%,“ One

poll

showed

that six out

left

” Where

Dukakis had conducted an

nothing to chance

in

1982

When

as

often voters who had

supponed Dukakis had been contacted
by the campaign, compared
with

,

it

gathenng Democratic Convention
delegates, gamermg more
than twice

as IGng, 68«/o to

primary

who were

administration.''

Dukalas had displayed a
the fore agatn ,n

u
urban
voters,

ineffective

three out of

campaign

in

the 1978

the campaign operatives found
that Kin»

had closed the early Dukakis lead,
making a race out of the campaign.
Jack Corrigan
spread the word that Dukakis could
lose, thus ensuring a

last

minute push and a Dukakis

victory

Dukakis obtained 53

4%

of the vote on Primary day, to King’s 46.5%.
The

campaign had heightened peoples’

interest to the point

greater than in 1978 King garnered

more than he

had.

Dukakis was

suffered at King’s hands in 1978.

Democrats

24% more

where turnout was

votes than he had

in

significantly

1978, Dukakis

partially vindicated for the crushing defeat he

The nature and

visibility

72%

had

of “the rematch” had drawn

to the polls to give Dukakis, the popular manager, a victory
over King, the

partisan administrator.

If

Dukakis’s hallmark as Governor was administrative competence. King’s was

incompetence. The popular manager, with a focus on
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neutrality,

competence and

efficiency,

was more

able to

make

himself respectable

on the admln.strative

side

of the

executive challenge, while
the partisan admtnistrator
could easily be seen as
.ncompeten,
his

appcntments were

ineffectual, as

If

many of lOng's were.
Competence would, of course,

win respect over incompetence,
,f Ktng presented
more of a substantive vis.on
of what

government should, or should
once

m office,

not.

be doing, he d.d no, show
the

Dukakis may have shown

ability administratively,

ability to carry that
ou,

refomung the way

which government was conducted
to allow for greater
professionalism and
he presented

little in

the

way of vision The

in

efficiency, but

question of what this newly
professionalized

gov ernment was to do remained
unanswered The task remained
one of combining
substantive vision with administrative
capability

Dukakis achieved victory handily
John Sears nearly two-to-one

In

November, defeating Republican candidate

With Massachusetts’s Republican Party

in

such a

dilapidated condition as to qualify the
state as, effectively, a one-party
state, Dukakis ran a
fairly safe

campaign, purposely conducted that way

predominantly Democratic State had been

Dukakis’s

governing

gift

for electoral organization.

in a single-party state

to learn

along party

lines.

how

to

What does Dukakis

Capturing office as a Democrat

fairly easy, especially for

As Dukakis

would not be nearly

chapter, a lack of party competition

would have

"

would not mean

learned in his

as easy.

in

someone possessing
first

As noted

term, however,

in

the previous

a lack of factions, and Dukakis

govern with divisions which did not organize themselves

s

victory say about the relationship between the partisan

administrator and the public manager as conceptions of the executive";^
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It is

necessary to

a

present a clear agenda in
order to persuade people
to embrace a coherent
package. King

had done

that four years earlier
agatnst

hrs tradtuonal

Dukakts and beaten

Here Dukakts maintained

htnt

themes of competence and
integnty against K.ng
and achieved victo^

There was somethtng about
Dukakts’s popular manager
partisan administrator

.0 hold office even

if

Dukakts had excluded people
who were not

they had worked for htm

him King excluded those people
disagreement even

that the public
preferred to King's

less favorably

who

tn the

techntcally competent

campaign or been personally
close

to

did not agree with him
King had brooked

than Dukakts had. and
standards for tnclusion seemed

even more arbitrary than they had
under Dukakis.
1

hough Dukakis ran

his

primaiy campaign based on
essenttally a popular-manager

conception of the executive, he would
change
term, Dukakis

now

his notion

of the executive

understood that a vision of the public
good has to be

in his

second

flexible

enough

to allow for other visions.
Legislators and voters alike needed
to be enlisted and heard if

the executive

wanted to be able to flmction as a

leader, providing

and implementing a clear

agenda Further, he posited a notion of the
public good which moved beyond the
way

which government should be conducted and
doing

He

into the realm of what

understood, to a greater extent than he had

be included

if

the executive wanted to count on their support

constitutional executive,

an election on

in his first

his

own

Dukakis was able to achieve the
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government should be

term, that people had to

By becoming more of a

realization

substantive terms in Massachusetts

in

of an agenda and win

Dukakis
Dukak.s-s second

,e™ was marked

relattons with the legtsiature.
In

TT

by a greater use of
patronage and

tWs incama.ton, he
became more of a constitutional

executive During this term,
he represented a late
-twentieth-century

Founding conception of the
American executive.
to the public,

Dukakis recognized

embodied the public

will. It

passed his program, take

it

Governor
efficiently,

served

still

or leave

,t

it,

was

still

a liaison

government as a whole, not
only the Governor,

but that he

to ensure not that the
legtsiature

work with

the legtsiature. and

government as a whole met the
public

will

members

If the

had a respons.bility to see
that administration was
earned out reasonably

Dukakis was more conducive

m hts campatgn,

often takes

in hts

appotntments to individuals

who had

and was also more tolerant of
“patronage,” provided the

individuals he appointed possessed

that

that the

incarnation of the

If the elected
executive

was up to the executive

ot the general public, to
ensure

less-s.ratned

what he

more than a simply

refers to as “political sktlls ”

a well-run

government

to

He

keep people

recognized

satisfied

ma

democratic republic.

Dukakis’s relationship with the General
attending to public business than

it

had been

Coun was

in his first

far

more conducive

term Dukakis notes that

such as House Mmority Leader William
Robinson (R-Melrose) were dtsmayed

of debate

that

took place

in

to

the legislature,’'' That lack of debate would

make

a

legislators

at the lack

good

Progressive cringe. Yet, the branches of the government
worked together to institute an

agenda, with Dukakis leading the

way
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campaign promise Dukakis
had made and was a
core
term.

Members of the

legislature

.ssues in Massachnseus,

toward the beginning of
his

had important
ii
concerns regarding a

The Me.ropoh.an D,s,n«
Conan.ss.cn (M

agency and a source of patronage
for certain

MWRA

initiative

would have unlinnted

rate-setting

legislators,

would be

bill

affecting water

D C,),

an ln,ponan.

affected

power Legislators would be

The
required to gir

up a cenatn amount of control
over an important problem
Lawmakers from Western
Massachusetts would see reservoirs
such as the Quabbin affected
While the
.Xdm,n, Stratton’S proposal would
have affected

many

had passed nothing regarding
water-related issues
have handled the issue “The
overwhelmtng desire

in

legislators greatly, if the
legislature

Massachusetts, the Courts would

m the legislature was [against]

anything,” and thus allowing
legislators to deflect the blame

away from themselves

Dukakis and Senate President William
Bulger objected to
the busing problem as

it

was handled through

complex matter handled by coun order

would have

it

to be passed, difficult and lengthy
negotiations ensued

work with

the administration

want

to see another

had been established that some

had proven that he could work effectively with
the
willing to

They had observed

that

the courts and did not

« Once

pass[ing]

legislature,

and

By
its

this time,

bill

Dukakis

members were

In addition to Bulger, Representative Michael

Creedon (D-Brockton), Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee and Representative
John Cusack (D-Arlington), Chairman of Housing and Urban
Development which

oversaw the

M.D C

,

were important

legislators in
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moving

this

through the General Court.

Neither Creedon nor Cusack
were particularly

were

willing to

work with

liberal

or devoted to Dukakis

the administration and
create legislation that

interested parties. Importantly,

« Yet

they

was acceptable

Dukakis had established a
reputation, with the

to

earlier

passage of right-to-know legislation
and the impending passage
of plant-closing
legislation, as willing to take
stands

such a

way

in

which Dukakis handled the

differences in his second term.

issue of a tax increase, in

and

first

his insistence

second term. Dukakis was
office,

Remember

more amicable

could not be balanced Raising taxes the
s

of the budget
of the

term had been ineffective due to

on handling the

far

issue

that his handling

fiscal crisis in his

in his

Dukakis faced the same problem he had

Ed King

issues, to follow through,

and to do

portrayal of Dukakis as a

first

is

in

instructive as to the

issue, especially the

his lack

of regard for

own manner Dunng

handling of the issue

at the start

year back

of his

in office

Governor who would

first

Upon

was not an

certainly

Either obvious path

would mean

So Dukakis and
collection laws.

Over

entering

do

so.

option, given

Cutting

first

term.

political death.*^^

his advisors

came up with another

plan:

Reform of the tax

The Revenue Enforcement and Protection Act (R E

of amnesty for delinquent taxpayers and
netting the state

Ins

term: a budget that

spending would alienate other constituent groups
and be too reminiscent of his

period.^^

it

as to include legislators
importantly in the process

The way

legislators

on complex

stiffer penalties for

A P.),

tax evaders

with

was

its

period

successful in

S86 million between October of 1983 and January of 1984, the amnesty

its first

two

years,

it

produced $292.8
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Million.''^

Dukakis had found a

method of dealing with the

potential budget deficits which

was both

politically

and

fiscally

successful

Most
Dukakts

done

m

as

importantly, the passage of R

Governor He went to the people

his handling

legislature

would

of the budget issue

cut

programs

if

RE

in the

Dukakis

early, often

A.P were not

initially

His message

passed,

handled the legislature

The

that the

important and

more graciously than

penod Though
its

passage after

Ira Jackson,

head of the

Dukakis made appearances before both branches of the
General

Court and made a point of speaking to legislators

Michael Dukakis

far

objected to this particular provision, he
assented to

P.^‘

Michael

to legislative leadership caused

encountering the legislative opposition and being
persuaded by

vote on R.E. A

was

gamenng

a result, the administration added the
amnesty

Department of Revenue

style for

and effectively as he had not

mid-1970s Early presentation of the measure

some opposition As

new

represented a

in his first term.

« He

widespread support for the measure
he had

EAP

bill

in his office

on the day of the scheduled

passed both the House and the Senate

who was working

easily.

with legislators to include what

Here was a new

may be

necessary for

the passage of a reasonable law and expanding the nature of
the legislation that

was

enacted Indeed, he was able to have that legislation enacted because he was more willing

and better able to include members of other

political institutions

and the public

in his

efforts at governing.

Dukakis’s appointment policies were

been during
job with

his first

less strict in important

ways than they had

term According to John Sasso, ‘“We have always said that to get a

this administration,

you had

to have competency, integrity, political skills and
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loyalty- These

qualities

appear s.milar to the
qualities Dukakrs desired

appmntees. Yet, he was more
willing to consider

pan of hts campa,gn

for posnions dur.ng
hts

of the Department of Revenue,
was not

ends and individuals

second

o.y the

adm,„istrat.ve skrlls,” as
evidenced by h,s

ft,

tern,

work on

the

REA

him during

his first

suppon within

appointment pohey between

h,s

evidence against that assert.on
recognized a change

in his

sure to appoint individuals

that

As a

Dukakis hrmself assens

is

Governor Yet,

as

strongly convincing

”

also a

first

term, Dukakis

wWch

was

had eluded

Yet,

who had what

he terms

many

that there

more

recently,

Significantly,

“political skills,”"

individuals

who

was no change

in

as they also demonstrate,
the

appointment policy between terms

Dukakrs has
Dukakis made

Dukakis notes

that

lacked significant public

result, inter-institutional relations
strained

when

executive branch

not properly attentive to legislators.
In the second term, the basis for

appointment became not only technical competence,
as

Now, Dukakis looked

for individuals

who

realized, at least implicitly,

was

it

had been during

his first

term

recognized the importance of being able to

work with other members of the government

their eflorts,

Jackson head

Harvard.” In sen,ng aside
the

h.s adnunistrative
ranks, support

two terms

term, he had appointed too

members were

a

term

Kenney and Turner cla.m

sector expenence

,ra

P program, hut

against patronage which
Dukakrs had enforced in his

able to maintain greater

in his first

at

who had been

of impress, ve po, ideal and

possessor

longtime fftend of Dukakts's
and an admimstrative dean
strict nrle

For example,

in his first-.ernt

to administer the law.

that supporters

and that did not necessarily mean

What Dukakis

wanted to see something
that
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as a result

of

Dukakis was corrupt. Individuals who

had worked on a

political

campaign, after

ail

were more

likely to

have relevant

experience.

Dukakis used

his constitutional
position to

as governor the
Pledge-of-Mlegiance

dunng

bill

the Presidential
campaign of 1988

.eacher retdsed to lead
students

in

veto only one

bill in

w.ch George Bush would
The

would have made

bill

the Pledge of
.^legiance,

.nto

law and

it

that the legislation

was challenged

would be found

,n state

second tenure

use against him
a criminal act

it

if a

Dukakis's veto came after
he

had requested a recommendation
from the Massachusetts
Supreme

Court adjudged

his

Judicial

Court The

unconstitutional if Dukakis
signed

coun ” Here was Dukakis
judging

it

the fitness of a

proposal based not on whether
the proposal was rationally
a good policy Rather,
he based
his

determination on whether or not
the government should
be undertaking that endeavor,

and used the Constitution to
make that determination.
Certain individuals such as
Barbara Anderson,

Proposition 2

>/.,

claim that what Dukakis

leadership ?*^ According to some,
his

new

was doing
style

who

in his

had led the

fight for

second term was

not, in fact,

of coalition building represented a

selling-

out of pnnciples. Yet Dukakis had
taken stands and had accomplished
legislation toward

those ends.

A refusal

which Dukakis had

to

compromise would have jeopardized

set for his administration.

efforts

Governmental action

toward the ends

in

a system of

separation of powers and checks and
balances necessitates compromise

going to be affected. Also, Dukakis had not
backed

down from

were broad enough

enough

to be

workable and yet

specific

if

certain principles,

which

to be substantive. During the

general election, for example, Dukakis had run a
campaign aimed mainly
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measures are

at

people he saw

S

summarized

of economic

his

policies associated
with President

campaign theme

hnefiy:

thiidr

10 provide leadership in
changing not oidy
the nation.

its

Ronald Reagan

Massachusetts has a unique
opportunity

own economic

hiture, hut that

He had promised measures
on economic development

campaign, and he achieved
those measures, including
R.E A.P
financial

» Dukakis

,

of the

rest

of

issues during his

to correct the state’s

woes; the Employment
and Training Choices
program (E.T.). to reform
the

state’s welfare

program, and the Massachusetts
Housing Partnership, to
help correct a

shortage ot affordable housing
in his

second term. Michael Dukakis
made greater attempts than
he had to present

an agenda, some vision
of the public good, beyond
simply reforming the
governmental
process The

detail

MWRA

legislation

below, are examples of that

and the iUght-to-Know law,
which

He

is

discussed

also recognized that his
vision of the public

had to include and account for
versions that might be

at

odds with

his or at

other Institutionally, he
recognized the legislature as a
coequal institution

one to which he had

process,

agenda

He

to attend if he

personally friendly, or people

who

had worked for him, and he could

odds with each

institute

whom

still

good

m the policy

wanted to maintain support and

recognized that appointments could
include individuals with

in

he was

maintain

standards of integrity and performance
Effectively, Dukakis became more
ofa
constitutional executive.

The Right

to

Know

Rill

Dukakis’s more constitutionally-based approach
to the executive
illustrated

through the passage of the Right-to-Know
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Bill in

an

office can

1983 Significant and

be

powerful interests were involved

m accomplishing this measure
in

and Dukakis did not

the measure through the
General Court
u, an
dn inaication
indication th
,t h'
nthat
his willingness
to establish
5

cordial relations with that
branch

than he had possessed during
his

The Right-to-Know
from Dukakis’s second term

way

that the issue

first

greater ability to pursue
his program

term.

was an

Bill

It

would allow him

early and important
piece of legislation to emerg,

helped set the tone for
Dukakis’s second four years
the

of ta.xes had help

se, the

tone for his

first

four years

determine early on how [several]
constituencies, including the

Dukakis

Dukakis’s handling of the tax issue

executive,

process

who was

By

would

legislature itself, [saw]

full

partner in the political

the end of 1983, with the passage
of the Right-to-Know

Governor who was open

It

1975 indicated an arrogant, aloof

in

unwilling to accept the legislature
as a

established himself as a

more

Bill,

Dukakis

to others’ ideas and opinions,

understood, and acted on, the importance
of other

and

who

political institutions in the political

process The result was that he was able to
carry out a campaign promise and provide
substantive leadership

To

help shore up labor’s support during the
election, at the Democratic convention

Dukakis had promised some

sort

of law which would allow workers

substances companies were using

in

straightforward issue to Dukakis:

“Nobody wants

to

know what

and around the workplace. This seemed

obvious stance, there would be problems

to poison workers.”^^ Yet, despite that

in drafting a
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like a fairly

law

The ngh.-.o-know

issue

ca„e

.0 .he forefront

""
.he

admtmstration was ,0 keep

tt

Senate passed a

it

radical than the legislation

bill

when we have

to

[bUl],

However, the Massachusetts

Dukakis would eventuallv s,on
sign.

i,
It

off.he Governor's desk.
If he signed

was necessary

this particular

far

he d,d not s,g„

he would seem to be
reneg,ng on a campaign
prom,se

default

on

his

campaign prom.se Regarding a
key member of

the business community, an
important figure

was ever

a day

d.dn’t ..simply say

open

.0

when he

we were

against

it.

was a gentleman, but secondly he was
to

in

the administration claims:
“I don’t think

didn't wish that [the .ssue]
had

that the

what the administration wanted

we were going

do something.

It’s

a realist

gone away, or

Governor was going

to accomplish,

who

not going to

campaign promise, and was going to keep

to veto

however, because]

understood, because

the time

cluding
ly

we

hit

it.

Right-to-Know,

members of the

and importantly

in

we

really

were

[in-

public and the legislature open-

the policy process] very, very well...
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tha,

it

.

first

we

we

[He was
of all he

said so, that

go away.”"' Dukakis had made

Dukakis notes:

By

It

scarcely begun h.s term,
and someth,ng had to be
done

Dukakis would not

there

all

Dukakis

bill.

economy

was March, Dukakis had

more

to take

to be ant, -bus, ness, an
undesirable stance ,„
Massachusetts's grow,ng
it,

9S 3

.ncubate in

would seem
If

,

a pnonty of members
of Dukahis’s

sponsored by Gerard
D'Amtco (D-Worcester),
which was

b.l.,

steps to keep this

issue,

out of the Governor's
office "Let this

Envtronmental Affatrs and
dea, with

i„

-P-ed ,ece of ,e,s,at.on and, ,ven

^

complex and time-consunung
nature of this

of Duhahis’s agenda ear,

a

er

f

‘he Republican Minority
Leadthe t,me^^ complained
that there

were no debates
done such ajob of putting
the b.ll togethand mvolvtng key legislators
and constituenc.es and so

anymore
r

We had

That process of inclusion marks
the most impottant

second

shift

from Dukakis's

term to

first

his

Alden Raine, Dukakis's Director
of the Office of Economic
Development, was

the individual

who

headed the drive for the

legislation's passage

according to Raine, “in an intense
and never-ending

way

[to]

“The

strategy was,''

meet with everybody

The

administration counterparts and the
constituency counterparts and the
legislature and get
the message out there that

Key
“Certainly

we were

constituencies included

we began

with a very

interested in

some

management and

difficult,

sort

of

legislation

labor According to Dukakis

contentious issue

You had

business people

claimed that they would be required to
divulge business secrets and so forth

hand you had unions

who wanted

to

in this issue,

they were not involved

in

On

the other

be protected They didn't want to be put
out of work

because of environmental or public health
regulations
possessed a stake

,

who

but their coalition

”**

was too

Environmental

interests also

loosely knit, and consequently

most of the negotiations.

Members of the General Court were

involved

in

Right-to-Know

legislation

from

the earliest point in the process. Ironically, however, few
of the details of the legislation

were

actually handled within the legislature, largely

due to the complexity of the

Constraints on legislators’ time and an assumption against passage of the
legislative opposition for the

bill.

The

result

was
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that

Raine did

little

bill

issue

led to

little

negotiating with

legislators.

The administration
assumed

the
e neootiatina
negotiating fi
function on Right-to-Know
•

Bargaining thus assumed
a three-way stance
y
among representatives
of Business, Labor
and the Administration
,

If the details

of R,ght-.o-Know

administrative branch,

bill if

iHe

it

is

were

essentially

worked ou. whhin

also true that
Dukakis could not have

managed passage of the
he had not been on
friendly terms with
the legislature The
key legislator involved
in

bill's

passage was Timothy
Bassett (D-Tynn),
Chair of the House

Labor Committee The
administration was fortunate
enough

D

,\mico

who had proposed

.0 the legislation to help

willing to

in

the original

maneuver

it

bill, in

for the passage

the political

community

the lion's share of the
credit

to them," they never

at

to have Bassett, in
addition to

through the General
Court Legislators had to
be
in their districts

of the Right-to-Know
that they [inhabit]

was going

to

would have worked

working much harder

Commerce and

the legislature and
willing to attach himself

work with Dukakis They
could campaign

amount of credit
•hat

the

go

Bill, but,

when

to Dukakis.

for passage

creating an atmosphere

in

a certain

“they ..understood

they're not living in their
distnct,
If that

of the

which

and take

bill

had been

»

unacceptable

Dukakis was now

that attitude

was

feasible

and

desirable for legislators

In

working to pass Right-to-Know,
Dukakis handled many business

never forgave him for favoring the
regulations Raine notes:

something early

in

the administration,

would become the

“It

first

was

it

should be doing
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it

It

issue to pose that level

was

who

inevitable that

symbolism."™ More broadly, Dukakis
presented a vision of something he

government should be doing and why

interests

felt

of

the

a vision broad

enough

to be inclusive ye,

narrow enough ,o be reasonably
substantive and

than the Progressive-like
focus on the process and
the

conducted

way

intelligible.

Rather

which government

tn

Dukakis focused on the acivtties
government should undertake

itself,

for the

good

public

Raine scoffs

at the

notion that Dukakis

learned to include various
interests.
ends, but Dukakis did not

Not only

compromise on

was no longer

is

a leader because
he had

compromise necessary

certain ends which

may be

to achieve political

called principles:

The environmental community

not only never had a
Governor’s office than Dukakis
but
when you compare the magnitude
of issues he took on
in his first administration
with the magnitude of issues
he took on and won in his
second administration,. I’m
better friend in the

sure

not an exaggeration to say
there has probably
in any state in the
modern history of environmental politics a gubernatorial
administration that [took]
more good, sweeping [measures]
than Dukakis’s second
and third administrations. On
something like [Right-toKnow] there was no principle compromised
This was
‘you’re going to take something
that affects every workplace, could negatively affect
every business if
It

IS

never been

done badly,
you think you’re working with something
that can
poison you, there ought to be some
[structured] way [in
which] you can find that out through
your boss. that principle was never compromised/'
and

if

.

The problem was
politics,

way of dealing

and Dukakis was able to do that

Not onl>
other

finding a

did

Right-to-Know

members of the government

alienated certain

to be in the

to

.

with the right-to-know problem through

in his

second term

establish Dukakis’s ability to listen, but

working with him.

members of the General Court

same room with him. Here, Dukakis
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In his

first

it

opened up

term, Dukakis had

to the point that they literally did not

want

established a firm working relationship

W.th the legislature,

facilitating

passage of future
legrslation Regarding
Rtght-to-KnoWs

influence on the passage of
fature legislation,
Alden Raine notes:

W R.A.

"

and said. ‘We’re going
mo Ho'rh™'
1
do ths, there
was a reasonable
expectation

[State House] that, the

Uostng

guy did Right-to-Know

[a bill regulating

in

the

Plant

companies’ handling of plant

was on the way Let’s work
with him We realexpect we’re going to get a
bill on this
and we need

closings]

,

ly

to be involved too

[Dukakis’s] willingness to do
veiy
complicated legislative things,
but equally and
symmet-

ncally important, the legislature’s
willingness to embrace
me fact that he was going to take that
role, to a very oreat
degree, sprang from Right-to-Know,
because it was the first

Thus, Right-to-Know established
a different kind of leadersWp
under Dukakis than the
public had seen in 1975

“It isn’t,

that you’re

going to get unanimity on

this stuff.

But you

certainly can

achieve substantial consensus around
good policies and good legislation; but

work and
Through

effort

this

and

work,

and

sensitivity

effort

and

we had

sensitivity,

a lot

more of that

it

does take

the second time around.”^''

Dukakis showed more of the

characteristics

of a

constitutional executive Respect for the
opinions of various public constituencies in a

public dialogue, and recognition that other
governmental institutions than the executive

had a responsibility to interpret and protect the public
good came with Dukakis’s changed
perception of the executive.

As

the Right-to-Know

bill illustrates,

he was

much more

successful at promoting a substantive agenda based on what the
government should be

doing, and thus providing leadership, as a result.
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The Guberrmto rial Election of 1QR6

Even given

his

triumph over Edward King

in

1982, Dukakis had not

fulfilled his

pohtical ambition. Total vindication
required that he win a
Gubernatorial election that was

based on

own

his

to present

some

should work.

positive

vision of

He

in

his gift for organization

effectively

with a philosophy of government
that stressed

methods of conducting

As journalist Robert Healy

1986 campaign was “opportunity

effective tax collection

which “[njo

The theme of Dukakis's

for aU” Massachusetts citizens.

through programs such as E.T.(a welfare reform
proposal

in

itself.

noted: “perhaps as important

as anything, Dukakis in 1986 ran a campaign
with a message.”™

environment

it.

had no choice but to run a campaign
based on something other

than an anti-incumbency stance.

more

He needed

the election of 1986 and
took advantage of

relationship with society rather than solely
government's

Dukakis

stance.

what government should do rather
than simply how government

held that opportunity

Dukakis combined
its

message rather than simply an
anti-incumbent

Dukakis

that received

built a

much

case

that,

praise),

and the promotion of a thriving economy, he
had fostered an

state in the country stands for opportunity
like Massachusetts

stands for opportunity.”^^

The

actual

campaign saw Dukakis acting both more and

been necessary. During the campaign, he hardly seemed
Kariotis.

Dukakis consented

night of the seventh

for the

title.

Globe, most

to only

to notice his

may have

opponent George

two debates, one of which had been scheduled

game of the World

Series, in

The Governor’s race received
likely

less intense than

which

surprisingly

the

little

for the

Boston Red Sox were playing
coverage

in

The Boston

because the Republicans had been so careless and Dukakis so effective
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in

preparations for the election
that

Yet, Dukakis

won

was

still

support would

In 1986,

issues. In late

itc
,ts

outcome was considered
a foregone conclusion

campaisnino
^
P gnin, hard nn
on election day,
to insure

slip

that

none of his hard

away/^

Dukakis went out of his
way to run a campaign
based on substant.ve

September and early October,
he conducted four
-.heme weeks -

In turn,

he

focused on the economy,
educat.on, housing and the
environment, discussing
specfic
proposals for each area
require

compames

-

In the area of housing,
for example. Dukakts
offered a plan to

bu.Id.ng luxury hous.ng
on waterffont property to

percentage of ,t affordable to
the middle

class.

He

moderately priced housing on
state-owned land

make

a certain

also discussed plans to
build

On

more

the issue of dealing with
Federal

cutbacks, Dukakis offered a
state-level version of the
earlier Urban Development
Action

Grants/* Yet, while Dukakis himself
offered solutions to problems,
he was willing to
listen to others’

opinions and include them

from much of his

first

in the discussion, a

m a social

issue, for

economy was a

specific solutions.

and historical context. In doing

government should be undertaking these
housing

different

term.

Yet Dukakis did more than simply
offer
solutions

trademark notably

so,

He

also placed those

he offered reasons

activities in the first place.

On

why

the affordable

example, he noted that one consequence
of Massachusetts’s booming

rise in the cost

of housing. This was driving many people out of

Massachusetts, according to Dukakis. Massachusetts
residents

who were

well-off would only suffer under these conditions:

kids and their families and

“T want my

not particularly

the children of all families in the state to live in
Massachusetts... The purpose ...is to keep
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Massachusetts number one wnen
when
housing

bu, he

also

to nn
commitment for support for affordable
into
to the next generation

more capable of giving mean.ng

of finding solutions,”

,o those solutions
beyond the current,

meaning as well

Given

hrs posit, on as the

what son of a campaign to
in

cnm^c
comes

Dukakis was not only “moving
g

was

technical

it

.ncumbent, Dukakis may have
had

He

little

cho.ce about

did not, however, merely
repeat past accomphshment:

an effort to coast to an easy
victooi Rather, he conducted
talks involving detailed

efforts to deal with

problems facing Massachusetts
His campaign, while conducted

against an ineffectual opponent
during an

offered stands on issues

was adv ocating

specific,

affecting Massachusetts

be doing, not simply

economic boom, nonetheless was
well-run and

Here was a constitutional executive
on the campaign
though reasonably

He

how

it

flexible,

He

means of addressing problems

articulated a vision of what Massachusetts

should be doing

trail

government should

it.

There were factors other than simply Dukakis’s
conception of the executive which
contributed to his resounding victory in 1986.

The Republican Party was mired

circumstances which made victory relatively easier for
Dukakis than
otherwise.

The Republicans offered a candidate who was

it

in

might have been

smart, but an inexperienced

campaigner. George Kariotis was also standard-bearer of one of
the most disheveled

Republican state party organizations

in the

United States. Republican party

Kariotis to run for the Governorship only after

including the candidate

who had emerged from
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two previous

elites

chose

potential candidates.

the convention with the nomination, had

quit the race Kariotis
essentially
for nothing

more than

a

conceded the race to
Dukakis from the beginning,
hoping

good showing,

Nonetheless. Dukakis had lost
the 1978 primary to
an individual

experience running for elective
office
that feat if he

Respecng
that he

had not changed

hrs

It is

conceivable that Dukakrs
could have repeated

conception of the

way

to conduct his

the positrons of others
rn the political
system allowed

had squandered

hrs first

term

He

who had no

Govemorshrp

Wm to gamer suppon

maintained his organization^

fervently toward a reelection
that as even hrs opponent
conceded,

skills

and worked

was secure Ifom

the

Stan of the campaign. Even with
that security, Dukakis
understood the importance of

winning the election based on
and he succeeded

in that

his

own

record, rather than tunning
against

in the

mid-1980s

in

Massachusetts, another external

factor that helped Dukakis to a
substantial degree Certainly, the
is

beyond the control of the incumbent. Yet an
upturn

helped Dukakis

in 1978,*

else,

regard

The economy was thnving

extent

someone

The

larger point

is

that

economy

in the

to a certain

economy had not

Dukakis had created a support system

which allowed him to take advantage of externalities
such as a strong economy. He had
not created such a system

worked

in his first

term. Indeed,

many of his

actions at that time had

against the creation of such a system. In 1986, Dukakis
turned a thriving

*The unemployment
governor.

By

rate in Massachusetts

was

1

1.2%

the Democratic Primary year of 1978,

admirable number

in

absolute terms,

election period to the next.

Edition) (Washington

Cf

DC.: U.

it is

it

in

1975, Dukakis’s

was 6.2%. While

first

this is

certainly a substantial reduction from

Statistical Abstract

of the United States:

Bureau of the Census, 1978),
Abstract of the United States: 1979 (lOU^ Edition),
p 406.
S.
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p.

1978

economy

year as
not an

one
(99‘^

409, Statistical

*. *„

« th,
among

5....,„„„

the legislature and the
public and an electoral
success a thriving

economy could

not

necessarily ensure

Dukakis

won

with

69%

1,140,125 votes to Kariotis’

of the vote

31%

in the

or 520.261 votes

“mandate” were popular among
Massachusetts
entered his thtrd term, he

Gubernatorial election of
1986. wtth

was more

“ Words

such as “redetnpt.on- and

political pundits that

substantive than a

fall.

good government

Even

as

Dukabs

reformer, wtth

atdes noting that “Dukakis
plans to focus in the third term
on four key areas: economic

development, improvements

program

tn public

education, affordable housing
and an anti-dmg

for schools

Michael Dukakis was able to achieve
a substantial victory because
he had
rethought his image of the executive
Conducting his administration along the
constitutional executive allowed

election based

on

that

program

existed as to Dukakis’s future

in

him

to shore

Heading

up support

for a

program and

to

lines

of a

win

into Dukakis’s third term, however,
doubt

Massachusetts state

politics

In addition to

themes of

redemption and mandate, speculation on whether
Dukakis would choose to run for
national office

was

also popular

among Massachusetts

political pundits

His success

in

Massachusetts and his position as head of the National
Governor’s Association made him
an important potential candidate for the Democrats’
consideration
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The
Dukakis

,s

best

known

Presidential

Campaign of IQSS

nationally for having lost
the 1988 Presidential
election to

George Bush, The campaign
Dukakis ran was one based
on
the executive as a popular
manager. Yet Dukakis

Much of his

his efforts

the Progressive
conception of

was unsuccessful and
unconvinc.ng

tn

lack of success has to
do with the image of the
executive that

Dukakts projected dunng the
campaign. The weaknesses
of the public manager
concept.on

of the executive are d.splayed

A
was

clearly tn the events

development before the primary season

of the Summer and

that

would

hurt the

the loss of John Sasso Sasso
resigned after admitting his
part

presidential hopeful Senator

of 1988

Dukakis campaign
the downfall of

Joe Biden Biden had withdrawn
from the race

revelations that he had plagiarized
the conclusion of a speech
in
politician Neil

in

Fall

Kinnock These

after

Iowa from Bntish

original allegations led to ftmher
investigations

eventually drove Biden out of the
primaries Speculation on

videotape which served to alert the media

first

who

which

had distributed the

focused on the campaign staff of

Representative Richard Gephardt, but eventually
settled on Dukakis campaign and John

Sasso In September of 1987, recognizing
Dukakis could not accept what had been labeled
a

dirty tnck,
O

’

Sasso confessed

his role in the incident

and resigned from the Dukakis

I

campaign.

Sasso’s absence affected the campaign

was

in

numerous ways. Most

directly,

the individual closest to Dukakis, seemingly the only campaign
worker

Dukakis would readily accept.

More

Sasso

whose advice

broadly, Sasso had brought to Dukakis’s political

operations both an ability to create a substantive image and the “political
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skills”

Dukakis

adn..ts

were so i.ponan. Re.e.ber

organiza.,on in 1982

.ha.

when he cap.ured

Sasso was

v..a, in

shaping Duka^s’s
campaign

.he gubema.onal
nomina.ion from

King Sasso had pu. togerher
a campaign comprised
of a

se.

Edward

J

of “issues .ask forces”
and a

s.rong grassroots organization
Sasso thus helped ensure
tha, Dukakis was
able to
establish an

image while including others
actively and impo^an.ly
Without Sasso, under

new campaign manager Susan Es.nch,
Dukakis and
characteristics tha.

had hurt him

his organization
displayed

in his firs, gubernatorial

many of the

term and the 1978
Massachusetts

Democratic primary
Sasso’s absence, Dukakis's campaign
could no. decide on a
compelling theme, a

In

problem

earnest

tha.

A

came back

to haunt

Dukakis once George Bush began

strong advertising campaign

the Dukakis’s campaign

was

was

less inclined to

ail

but nonexistent

show

the various Democratic state party
organizations

organization] had existed from

state

campaign managers.

We moved

The organization

process

when we

as

much

As Susan

*’

his

campaign

in

Also, without Sasso,

respect to other

members of

Estrich notes: “[The campaign

started through June with about
eight or nine

them around the countiy thj-oughout

the

pnmary

ultimately obtained a reputation for
“insularity,” specifically

the insularity of Boston,” due to the location
of the campaign’s headquarters, as a result

of which.

It

“was never able

campaign professionals

in

to harness the best and brightest of its party’s
trained

Washington and elsewhere.”*^

Effective communication with

lower-level party officials, for example, might possessor
of “impressive political and
administrative

skills,

as evidenced

Dukakis from recommending

by

his

work on

the R.E.A.P

that Iowa’s local farmers
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program have prevented

grow Belgian endive (As

Congressman and fellow office-seeker Richard
Gephardt’s
Belgian endive?

Jesse Jackson also took offense at
the Dukakis organization’s

unwillingness to utilize individuals
as Richard Hatcher, former

who had been

Mayor of Gary,

absorbing his people or

his structure,

them

was

Tellingly, Sasso

election in an attempt to

Indiana Jackson notes that rather than

Dukakis simply worked around them, ignoring

the individual

smooth

important organizers for Jackson, such

relations

who spoke

to Jesse Jackson

that time,

however,

it

was too

late

dunng the general

between the two camps.

Sasso did return to the campaign one year after he had

By

advertisement intoned:

later

left, in

September of 1988

.

Dukakis appointed him vice-chairman of the

campaign, but he w'as de facto manger given that he had the most
influence with the
candidate. Friction between workers with loyalties to Sasso and
workers with loyalties to

Estrich

made working

together

difficult.

Lines ot

established at the beginning of the campaign

The

the end.

after

initial

Had

that

managers should have

were only being delineated two months from

fact that, despite Sasso’s efforts, Jesse

Dukakis’s

extensively.^'’

command

Jackson never quite

felt

rebuff of him also indicates that Sasso’s return was too

Sasso been

in the

campaign

all

along, perhaps Jackson

comfortable

late to help

would have been

included from the stan, and his animosity quelled.

The Primary Elections saw Dukakis
series

rise to the

top of a

field

of Democrats

after a

of scandals and challenges mainly from Jesse Jackson and Albert Gore. As Wilson

Carey McWilliams

employ

in

notes, the primary

was a preview of the

strategies

Dukakis would

the general election. McWilliams notes: “Part of Dukakis’s primary success

derived from his refusal to be drawn into intraparty conflict, his reliance on vague,
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liberal.

but relatively unprogrammatic
appeals, and his rejection
of negat.ve campaigning

Dukakts again displayed a
the

pnmanes, these

The

factors

presidential

political history.

talent for raising

money and

would come back

campaign of 1988

is

to haunt

known

Bush attacked what he perceived

bu.lding a w,de base of support
in

him

in

the presidential campaign

as the most vitnolic in

Bush accused Dukakis of

being unpatriotic due to Dukakis's
veto of the Pledge-of-Allegiance

Honon was

modem

as Dukakis's weaknesses
with the

voters and stuck to those themes
throughout the campaign.

infamous Willie

While

bill

The soon-to-be-

used to portray Dukakis as
“soft-on-crime ” Bush used the

pollution in Boston Harbor to illustrate
Dukakis's supposed lack of concern with
the

environment The trouble here, of course,
election's

in

is

that

Bush

is

defining Dukakis and the

agenda when Dukakis should have been defimng
himself and maintaining a share

defining the agenda for the campaign

Yet Dukakis’s conception of the executive

office during the

precluded his establishing himself as anything but
anti-Reagan/Bush,

campaign

He

effectively

asserted

repeatedly that the election “was not about ideology,”
but about competence

Reagan

had been a poor manager and the country could not afford
to have a managerial bumbler
in its

highest office. Dukakis criticized Reagan’s handling of the

handling of the military budget. Typically, criticisms were

‘We’ve got

to put our defense dollars

in

War on Drugs

managerial terms:

where our defense

needs are greatest, we’ve got to use those dollars to buy
that work, and we’ve got to manage those dol-

weapons

lars to strengthen

ets

our military forces, not to

line the

pock-

of dishonest contractors and wheeler-dealer consultants.’^^
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and

his

Cnticisms also came

voodoo economics
The

in the

form of vague

for can-do econonucs,"
or “a fish rots

comment was an

latter

generalities such as: ‘It’s time
to

exchange

from the head first,-

indictment of Reagan
himself as the individual

who

should be held responstble for
the ethtcal transgressions
of members of his administration
Indeed, Dukakis spent

management of his
ethical lapses

program.

administration,

earliest efforts in the

what one reporter

campaign

criticizing

Reagan’s

called “a full-throated
assault

on the

of the Reagan Administration,”
to the exclusion of offering
any substantive

This was to the frustration of many
observers

generalities with

criticized

much of hts

Andrew Rosenthal’s

Dukakis

for “being too

who responded

question: “Yes, but how^”'^

vague and

unspecific..

.Ail

E

J.

to Dukakis’s

Dionne,

Jr.

along, Mr. Dukakis has

presented himself not as a messenger carrying
words of protest or promise, but as a

manager who could get things done.”‘°" Dukakis’s
program, a bane for

•After

his allies,

would prove a

failure to articulate a positive, detailed

blessing for his enemies.

spending the early part of the campaign

criticizing the current administration

rather than outlining a positive program,
Dukakis spent

much of the

rest

of the campaign

responding, or not responding, to George Bush’s allegations.
Dukakis’s mental health was
called into question at

one

point.

Bush

called

him “soft-on-crime” and “weak-on-defense.”

His campaign used attack advertisements to demean Dukakis's
television

couple

abilities,

most famously

commercial involving convicted criminal Willie Horton who had terrorized

in their

own home

Dukakis’s

role in his loss.

a

while on furlough from a Massachusetts prison.

failure to

He

a

respond to Bush’s negative campaigning played an important

maintained his early refusal to answer Bush’s attack ads
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in

popular

tern^s:

'He

th.ng -«

.0

said he did no. think
Antericans [were] 'interested
in a

Yet the ads were effec.ve

George Bush, an .mage

misread the public, and

competence without

would most

it

folly

of this

sort

of

Once

again,

Dukak.s

cost him an election If
he criticized Reagan and
Bush’s

persuading the public that he
was

fit

for the office, the public

be willing to maintain the
status quo, as they did

likely

the second

diet

conveytng an intage of
Dukakts that was beneficial

that apparently resonated
with voters

Dukakis performed well

m

in

da„y

The

best

known

in

the

first

debate between the two candidates,
not as well

instance from either debate

is

Dukakis’s response to the

opening question of the second contest,
asked by television’s Bernard
Shaw "Governor,

if

[your wife] were raped and murdered,
would you favor an irrevocable death
penalty for
the killer’’”'® Given an opportunity
to answer a seemingly inflammatory
question with
in his

many

voice. Dukakis responded in a cool

manner and with

fire

a technician’s answer leavino

ot his supporters in stunned silence:

No,

I

don’t, Bernard, and

I think you know that
I’ve opposed the death penalty during all of my life. I don’t
see
any evidence that it’s a deterrent, and I think
there

are bet-

and more effective ways to deal with violent crime
We’ve
done so in my own state, and it’s one of the reasons why we
have had the biggest drop in crime of any industrial state
in
ter

America,

why we have

the lowest murder rate of any industrial

State in .Ajnerica,'”'’

In attempting to

be objective, Dukakis missed an opportunity to display

keeping

his cool,

wedded

to the culture

his humanity. In

he failed to seem anything other than a bright individual

of competence, as he had been

victories in Massachusetts.
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at the

who was

time of his early political

Dukakis’s perception of the
role of the executive
as a manager, and hence
focus on competence, prevented
him from defining hts
agenda. Indeed,

from establishing much of an
agenda
generalizations. This allowed

at all

beyond

George Bush

,t

his

prevented him

several broad, oft-repeated

to step in and define
Dukakis to the voters

before Dukakis himself could In
taking advantage of Dukakis’s
lack of specificity. Bush

managed

m

to

voters with a sense of unease
about Dukakis’s patriotism, hts
toughness

instill

the areas of crime and foreign
policy and even h.s competence.

Had Dukakis made an

effort to

be more substantive. Bush would not
have had the chance to create
Dukakis’s

electoral

image

Even more than
vision of what

presented

government should be doing and any reason

little in

government

a coherent program, Dukakis’s
campaign lacked any substantive

the

way of meaningful

mediator among competing

interests, a

should be doing

interpretation and reasoning

functions in society. Dukakis

s

it

seemed

manager.

been more philosophically responsive to Bush’s

to be

little

allegations.

It

on American

more than

Dukakis admits

it

a neutral

that he could

have

Regarding the allegation of

being unpatriotic, which stemmed from Dukakis’s veto
of the Pledge-of- Allegiance
action he had taken because of its dubious constitutionality,
Dukakis claims:

Had

I

had

my

wits about

me

during the campaign.

I’d

have turned to Bush during one of those debates and
said, ‘Let me ask you something. If you’re the Pres.

ident of the United States and the

you something

is

.

Supreme Court tells
do it anyway'’

unconstitutional, you’ll

Is that what you’re telling us'’ That you’re the rule of
law ..Do you think a President ought to be a law-break-

er ..that the
I

was

Governor ought

trying to

keep

it

to be a law-breaker'’’ But

positive.

288

bill,

an

Actually, this

neutral

is

a striking example of
where
ere Dukaki.
m have
Uukakis rn.
could

competence and mto the realm
of a more substantive
notion of government’s

in society,

bu, he chose no, to
do so There

governmental responsibility
executive

his

moved beyond simply

in

,s

a philosophy of
government, and

Dukakts’s above assert.on.
bu, hts conception of
the

the 19SB Prestdential
election precluded
Ins capttaltatng on

,,

and using

advantage Thts was an
electton about competence
rather than ideology,
For

hts

role

after

it

to

all

pan. George Bush was no,
panicularly substantive either
As a response to

Dukakis’s repeated tndictments
of Ronald Reagan’s
competence. Bush cenainly cnticized

Dukakts for focusing on the
managerial aspects of the
executive

was as general and vague

as Dukakis for the

office.

most pan. and tended

However. Bush

to speak in similarly

amorphous terms when he was not
impugning Dukakis’s assenions of
character and
competence Bush’s conception of the
executive was as managenal
sough,

little

beyond maintaining the

quo and not upsetting

status

as Dukakis’s

the ship-of-state

Dukakis’s use of the Progressive
conception of the executive led to
Presidential Election of 1988 His
focus

campaign strategy

way of a

m which

substantive program.

to evaluate

Dukakis beyond

that evidence,

to this, the public had

that offered

and Dukakis’s

than ideal picture of him.

Due

failure to

his loss in the

on competence rather than ideology

he criticized the incumbent but

by

his

led to a

failed to offer very

little

and he

much

detailed evidence

in the

on which

opponent. Given the disparaging nature of

respond to much of it, the public received a

Had Dukakis thought of the

less

executive as something more than a

manager, as having to be more than neutral and competent,
had he presented a substantive
program,

his

campaign would have been a more
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effective one.

The question of why
M.ehae, Dukahis
employed
of the executtve

Edward

Kmg in

in

the popu.at-ntanager
conception

,988. and seennngly
forgot evetythtng he
had learned after his loss
to

1978,

,s

a perplexing one.

One

possibility

is

simply that Dukakis had
not

as governor in the
1980s, and certainly seemed
to realize what he
needed to do to be a
successfol chief executive In
interviews, Dukakis
recognizes his first-term’s
mistakes and
IS at least

aware of a possible remedy.
So what happened’’

.Another possibility, suggested
above,
do, he had not internalized

it

is that,

while Dukakis

knew what he had

to

Without an individual or individuals
such as John Sasso

fiilly.

nearby to remind him what was
necessary, Dukakis reverted
to the institutional behavior

of his

first

gubernatorial term

learned what

was necessary

A

in the

Bay

the

distinct,

argument

context of Massachusetts

changed with the move up to national
in

though

similar,

politics,

he was

lost,

politics,

is

that

Dukakis had

but once the terrain

unable to translate

his success

State to a different setting.

Another persuasive argument

is

that

Dukakis took the tack he did

in

the

wake of

the Iran-Contra scandal and Ronald
Reagan’s seeming administrative ineptitude. In
1987,
in the

face of a presumably incompetent, irresponsible
executive, the stage was apparently

set for the national

responsible.

emergence of Dukakis, who conversely seemed competent
and

Yet, by 1988, Reagan’s political credibility with the
public had returned,

and attacks on him no longer had the
earlier.

effect they

were thought

to have had

one year

Thus, an image that had seemed to be appropriate prior to the primary
season,

became inappropriate and

ultimately helped lead to Dukakis’s loss.‘°^
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The

n .he

of why Dukalos chose
.he popular-manager
co„cep,,on of .he execu.ive

issue

.988 pres.den.iai can.pa.gn

however,

why Dukakis chose

and that he

failed

when he

complex one For .he
purposes of.h.s

a

is

that conception

is

less

.hesis.

important than the fact
that he did

did

Conclusion

Michael Dukakis had wea.hered
defeat

Edward K.ng, Dunng Ws second
term

in

,n

governing

He was

appointments. As the Rtght-to-Know
off.ce to

He

in

b.li

which

presented more of a vision and

doing than with

how

it

1982 to vanquish

He was

more of a

able to see the legislature
as a

able to incorporate politics
into his polit.cal

promote an agenda and oversee

he ran a substantive campaign

in

as governor, he established
himself as

consututional execu.ive than
a popular manager

coequal partner

1978 and returned

aptly illustrates, he used this
conception

its

h.s

of the

passage through the General Court.
In 1986,

.mage of a

constitutional executive held

sway

was more concerned with what government
should be

should be conducted.

Dukakis, especially after the loss of John
Sasso, returned to a Progressive

conception of the executive
presented

little

in the Presidential election

substantive vision of what America should
be and

what government’s

role in

Amencan

of George Bush. Dukakis’s success
national level in 1988, in

in defeat in

1978,

moving beyond

of 1988 Under that conception, he

much

He showed

that base

the

little

reasoning behind

society should be This led to his defeat at the
hands

in

1982 and 1986 had wound up

way

his success in

in defeat at the

1974 (and previously) had wound up

a gift for building a base of support, yet he had trouble

when he maintained

the Progressive conception of the executive.
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While the focus of this
work

is

on Diil-aHc’
ukakis s

conception of the executive

another poss.ble explanar.on
of h.s pohtical fortunes
would be
.s

his personality

office,

Although

it

not central to t.s thesis,
Duhahis's personality
cannot be contpletely
.gnored as a factor

and should be mentioned
introduction, this

an analysis of hts political

in

work focuses on

activities.

As

indicated in the

the roles of the office
because a psychological
approach

might lead too easily to the
notion that an executive’s
fortunes depend on having
the
charactenstics of a cenatn tndiv.dual,
which
limits

too greatly individuals

who

makes

generalizatton difficult and
possibly

could achieve success as a
chief executive

Those objections notwithstanding,
Dukakis’s
role in his political

expenence Dukakis has

being frugal and almost puritanical

in his

a,

personality certainly played a
notable

not entirely undeserved,
reputation for

As

habits

illustrated in chapter four,

he has

at

times placed a value on integrity
and principle to the point where
personal and political
relationships have suffered

to the point where can

him to

legislators,

is

very bright and sure of himself and
his

seem aloof and arrogant.

many

especially during his

He

other

first

including Dukakis

between

his first

s

in

members of Massachusetts government,

or the electorate,

term.

the 1980s,

own

intelligence

Certainly, these qualities did not endear

Yet Dukakis came back to experience both
resounding reelection

own

a successful second term

Kenney and Turner note

father-in-law,

that

many

communication with groups

that

individuals,

do not believe Dukakis’s personality changed

and second administrations.'" By the 1980s, Francis

Dukakis since the 1960s and claimed

and a

that

Bellotti

had known

Dukakis ‘“probably thinks more about

would have an opposite
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position than he

would have, but

that's a pragmatic
change, not a
Finally,

good

change

in

Knd. he

[still]

Fran Meaney. a close
friend of Dukakis's,
notes:

lesson

governorshtp

Whether he's changed

in

internally, .

Massachusetts Accordingly,

than on the former.
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don't

has the same ngid values

••‘Intellectually

know "'-

this thesis has

-

he's learned a

xhus, Mtchael Dukakis

focused on the

latter rather
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CHAPTER 6
leadership through
the constitution.al
executive

™. .h»i. h.

“— -

““““'

^
E«

these conceptions
represents responses
to pressures
piessures that the
the president
a
or the governor
faces.

These pressures

and an administrative

arise

from the tact
fact that
that the
the executtve
must be both a

figure, not roles
that necessarily
necessarilv

fi,
fit

political figure

,

,u
together
easily If the executive

,„E,
t.

trom these roles are
reconciled toward the
end of providing
ability to

win elections based on a

executtve pursues and,
adership

American

is

that

it

political

may wind up

ideally,

stable,

leadership, defined here
as an

coherent program of
governance, which the

implements after attaining

office.

The key

to executive

must be simultaneously
vigorous and restrained
Executives
system are expected to
provide leadership, and without

it,

in

the

the polity

with the institutional gridlock
observers often bemoan Yet
tha, leadership

cannot be too strong, as the
American public does not readily
tolerate tyrannical

political

figures

This typology of the
historical

Amencan

elected executive serves

The development of various types of
executives

progression that

is

two

fttnctions First,

it

is

has followed a historical

outlined below Yet previously
dominant historical types have not

passed from the scene so completely that
they are no longer available for
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use. Indeed,

each

Wstoncal type can be translated
Into a broader

political culture, so
that the

typology also

lends itself to the
establishment of analytic
categories wh.ch can be
used to evaluate

present-day executives.

in

Massachusetts

As summarized below,

polit.cs

this thesis has traced
these histoncal types

then applied the analytic
categor.es to the political

It

experiences of Michael Dukakis,
three-time governor of
Massachusetts and 1988

Democratic presidential nominee

The

Constitutional F.yerntivp

In Massachusetts, the
constitutional executive

developed as a

result

of colonial

experiences with early, tyrannical
governors and after the rejection
of a proposed
constitution that contained a

weak

executive. Colonists chastised
early governors such as

John Winthrop and royal governors such
as Thomas Hutchinson

for

what colonists

perceived as attempts to deprive them of their
rights, especially by dominating the
various

branches of government. Yet, both governors
made the legitimate point that the

government had a
for the

community

responsibility to keep the peace and to
enforce laws that

was

a

the proposed constitution of

member of the Senate

chosen governor by the members of the
tool of that

in

political pressures

from other

polity.

The executive under
officeholder

beneficial

as a whole. Thus, the executive challenge
emerged: the executive

needed to execute the law, and simultaneously address

members of the

were

1

778 was quite weak. The

and, though popularly elected,

legislature,

potentially

making the officeholder even more a

body Separation-of-powers and checks-and-balances were

the proposed constitution.

was

all

but nonexistent

The governorship possessed no veto power, and
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politics

was

Th, l,k

^
community.

The executive

m the constitution of 1780 was

powerful by eighteenth-centurv

standards Popularly elected,
the officeholder
possessed a qualified veto.
Popular election

and possession of the negative
positioned the governor
squarely within a
Popular election, rather than
appointment by the
whrle the veto

made

and

d.stinctly

gave the

office legitimacy

the governor’s approval
necessary for the passage
of leg.sla.ion,

gtvtng the officeholder the
clearly

legislature,

political system.

power

to say “no” if necessary
Separation of powers

was

wntten tnto the constitut.on,
buttressing the governor’s
pos.tion as

chtef executive Popular
election and other constitutional
.nstitutions also setved to check
the governor

The

legislature, the courts

governor would not overstep

and the executive council

all

ensured that the

his constitutional authority.
This institutionalized the

executive challenge. Here was a chief
executive with sufficient power to
carry out
duties while voters and

members of other

officeholder did not exercise

place within and

among

policy or an action

power

in

its

too heavy-handed a manner. Politics

in this era

took

constitutionality.

Early executives such as John

Strong served early

constitutional institutions ensured that
the

constitutional institutions, while judgement
of the rightness of a

was based on

constitutional executive.

his

Hancock and Caleb Strong were models of the

Hancock was

in the

the

first

governor under the new constitution, while

nineteenth century as well-organized political parties began to
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take shape in .he

Commonweahh, though unde,

a non-pan.san

ideal.

Each of these

governors reconcied the
pressures facing the
executive through the
constitutionalexecutive nodel of leadership
Both were vet, successful
electorally, wtth each
holding
office for eleven years
in an era

leadership, but this

During

of annual elections
Neither provided substantive
policy

was a time when

their tenures.

chief executives

were not expected

do so

to

Hancock and Strong recognized
and acted upon

the

legitimacy of other institutions,
maintaining a respect for
the system of separation
of

powers They saw the popular

members of other
officeholders

will as

embodied

the government as a
whole, and treated

in

institutions with the respect
they

Hancock and Strong exercised

were due

the veto rarely,

as constitutional

if at all.

and considered the

legislature the preeminent
policy-making branch, at least
coequal to the executive Affer

the passage

federal

of the United

government while

Administratively.

States Constitution, they urged
and maintained a respect for the
also recognizing their duty

Hancock and Strong recognized

of the executive and that other members
of the
responsibility

toward the law as the executive

administrative appointments were

toward Massachusetts

that the law

political

did.

men of proper

was not

solely the

domain

system had as much of a

Strong indicated the nature of his

character and due respect for the law

,

regardless of their political persuasion.

Under current
political culture.

community
will

s

conditions, a constitutional executive emphasizes
a constitutional

Under

laws and

this

its

model, the chief executive respects others

constitution.

Members of the government

who

follow a

expect that citizens

follow the laws and the constitution and that other members of government
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will

conduct themselves with a
respect for

government

i

will protect peoples’
riehts
P
gms, a?
P
as Hf^finori
defined in the constitution,

of the govemmen.

way

culture, the

stitutional provisions.
Citizens expect that the

wll,

conduct themselves accord,
ng.y Thus,

to judge behavior

is

,n

and that members

a const, tutional political

through the constituuon,
and members of the polity

hold themselves to that standard

The

Partisan Administratnr

By

the 1840s, panies had

served both to

facilitate

come

and to direct

to dominate political

life in

the

political careers, as party
elites

for office. Partisan machines,
such as that

Bay

By assunng

his cronies,

that only

candidates ran for office, and by controlling
the open voting procedure, party

were able
occurred,

to

choose candidates and attempt to deliver
them to

when

under the party

a candidate

s label,

whom

office.

When

s

approved

officials

exceptions

the party elites did not necessarily favor
ran for office

the disputants buried differences for the
sake of the party. Further,

appointments to lower administrative offices came to be
based on partisan
party

They

approved candidates

of Democrat David Henshaw and

maintained a firm hold on both office
seekers and voters.

State.

affiliation.

The

leaders controlled appointments to office and used
promises of patronage to win

voters and as rewards for loyal party workers and supporters.

The

partisan thought of political

based on his partisan

terms of party, an individual was judged

affiliation. Particularly in elections,

and demeaning, party meant everything.

Debate over policy was
voters.

life in

where language was often harsh

Politics at this time

public, taking place

was an

electoral activity.

through partisan rhetoric

A party’s members felt the party worked for the public good,
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in front

of the

while the opposition

was

a

mere

faction,

the party based

working to the detriment
of the people’s

on individual

interests Efforts to splinter

differences, even those
ostensibly based

on

principle,

were

ultimately evU, as they cost
precious votes and
potentially denied the
party a vctoty
in office,

the proper policy

was judged by

partisan standards.
Official act.on, too,

be judged based on partisanship
If i, was nght according
to the party,

Yet

this did not

mean

that parties

business once elections were
over

A focus

and respect for the opposition
limited
parties often buried vital issues

soil

were so divided as

question

right

to be unable to conduct

on the rewards of the

office, rather than policy,

politics within constitutional
institutions, so that

As noted

in

chapter two, the Massachusetts
Whigs free-

desire to break up the pariy over
one question, no matter

might have been. Further, as Whig
governor

it

in

the 1840s

indicated regarding the slavery question,
party stands did not have to

completely.

Members of other

parties in the

business accordingly while

Briggs was the

first

still

vital

well,

a

George Briggs
split

the parties

in

check

and conducting

maintaining the well-being of the party.

self-consciously partisan governor, serving from 1844 until

Briggs represented the end of an era

in

which governors were more

using the veto than they would become, Briggs did not veto
any

judgement of legislators regarding proper

more

how

government could keep each other

by remembering that the other party’s members
had rights as

veto

was

came to

stand on slavery exemplified this
Parties were far from monolithic
groups, and the

Whigs had no

1851

it

Once

policy.

Governors

bills,

after

hesitant about

deferring to the

Briggs began using the

frequently. While Briggs appreciated political parties, he did not think they

needed to be radically divisive

in

the government and he sought
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harmony both within

his

pany and between
pan.sa„s.p

.He

WHigs and

for Br,ggs

because of .He.r partisan
individuals

WHHe

.He Oe.oc.a.s

He d.d no. .H.nH
ad„,n.s.ra.ive of^cers
sHon.d He removed

affiliation,

he saw no
^ problem
proDiem With
with

mo.

fiir
filling

vacant offices with

of his own partisan
persuasion.
utler faced divided-party

.1.

Appoin.nten.s were .a..e.s
of

government during

B*

his gubernatorial

term

^

^

» .b,* ,.n,
... .h.

He

Sb.,„b,p „ „„

__

berated the General Court
rather than according

.nstitution

and called

for

in

i,

respect as a coequal
constitutional

reforms that would give
the governor greater
control over

administration Butler used his
veto frequently, judging
policies on his

own

perception of

their soundness.

Frederic Greenhalge

is

indicative

nineteenth century Greenhalge

of the partisan administrator
by the end of the

was even more up

than Briggs had been, and he
respected
Further, Greenhalge used the veto

more

front about his partisanship
in elections

members of the

legislature in a

way

frequently than any other governor

Butler did not

m the

nineteenth century despite the fact
that, like Briggs, he never
faced divided government

Greenhalge based

his

vetoes not solely on the constitutionality
of the proposed legislation,

but also on whether they were
responsible policy Greenhalge also indicated
tendencies

toward a merit-based

As an

civil service,

but

was reined

in

by members of his

ideal type, the partisan administrator
stresses a

Adherents of a given group,

in this

party.

group-based

political culture.

case a political party, are seen as the key members of
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wMe members of opposing

the

status

inclusion

political party

government

is

based on

how

well the individual

Members of the government

will

behave according

that, if

they toe the party

line,

all

•outsider'^

conforms to the standards
of a

expect that citizens and
other members of

to the strictures

place the well-being of
the party above

expect

groups are often relegated
to an

of panisan behavior and

else in
i
their

that they will

conduct Members of the
electorate

they will receive
benefits, including
patronage

appointments and partisan public
policy action, once

their party has

won

office

The Popular Managpr

A reaction

against the domination of
political

life

by parties began

Massachusetts as early as the
1850s Reforms that followed,
such as the

in

civil

service

system and the direct primary
were supposed to take away
the hold of the party on the
electoral process

and administrative appointments

Parties, reformers claimed,

were too

focused on the rewards of holding
office rather than substantive
issues of governance The

patronage system, they asserted, led
to corrupt and

Court also frustrated reformers

empower

who saw

it

,

inefficient administration

The General

too, as inefficient and corrupt
and looked to

the governor to lead the legislature
which, they claimed,

was too fragmented

to

lead with a unified voice.

Electoral reforms included the institution
of the secret ballot permanently

and regulation of the electoral process.

by 1911

Many

A direct

primary system, for example, was

substantive administrative reforms were slower

in

coming, but the

service system, calling for merit-based
appointments and instituted in 1884,

Advocates of these reforms claimed

that they

was

took away the power of political
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in

a

1888

in

place

civil

start.

parties

and

clean, efficient
administration.

The Constitutional
Convention of 9 7
1

the governor
greater power.

initiatPH
tiated

The two-year
term
y ar term,

recommendations and the
executive budget
get

would be able

1

th^
the

many reforms which
would

power

am., tv
^^ose
from

all

to return a

bill

give

with

u-

this

convention. The governor

to play a greater
role in policy
affairs, imt.ating
a budget and being

constituttonally

empowered

to

make

substanttve suggest,
ons on legislat.on.
Further the

two-year term perm.tted
the Cefexecut.ve
to focus on
mst.tuting agenda rather
than on

campatgmng

as under the s.ngle-year
term

The

officeholder did not ga.„
d.rect control

over adm.n.strat.on,
however Desp.te lim.t.ng
the number of
executive departments, the
General Court rema,ned in
charge of reorgan, zation
of the executive branch,
and the
execut,ve councl mainta,ned

its

approval power over
adm.ntstrat,ve appointments
and

removals.

James .Mtchael Curley, elected
governor

,n

1934 represented trends
,

Massachusetts that paralleled those

at the national level

in

Curley advocated the intervention

of the government to provide
rehef for the problems ansing
from the Great Depression

He campaigned

apart from his party, seeking
to elect himself rather
standing firmly with

Democratic party leaders Curley saw
the governorship alone as
representative of the
popular

people

w,ll.

Using radio to reach the

dtrectly,

mefficient,

public, he

brought

his legislative

program

over the heads of lawmakers Curley
derided the General Court

to the

calling

it

and therefore harmful to the public. If
legislators would enact the governor’s

program of relief, he claimed, they would
be acting
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for the

good of the

people.

He

used

h.s

own judgement of wha. was

proper policy .0 w,eld
the veto Further, Curley
sough,

greater control over
administration, attempting
,0 appoint individuals

were

loyal .0 the

legislative

governor above

program only

Foster Furcolo

all

Ultimately, Curley

left

office in disgrace, his

partly achieved

was

indicative

of the Massachusetts
governorship as

developed by the 1960s, on the
eve of reforms that would
strengthen
Furcolo-s election indicated the
secondaiy role parties had taken
on
elections

Once

in office,

I,

had

administratively

in gubernatorial

had become the governor’s job
to lead the legislature

name of the people Furcolo maintained

in

the image of the executive as
acting directly

for the public good, used his
veto without regard to party concerns,
legislature as mimical to the public
interest if lawmakers did not act

Where Curley had used

it

it

he continued many trends
toward the solidification of the

executive as a popular manager
the

who

and viewed the

on

his

program

radio to reach the public directly, Furcolo
used television,

Furcolo, too, complained of the nature of
the administrative system under the

Massachusetts governor

A report

made

,0 him called for greater efficiency in the state’s

administrative branch, and he sought to institute
reforms to
In the 1960s, the

governor received the

make

that possible

direct admimstrative control that reformers

had been calling for since Benjamin Butler. Through constitutional
amendment, the

governor acquired control over reorganizations of the executive branch.
Through
statutory reform, the governor acquired direct control over appointment
and removal of

administrative officials.

The

gubernatorial term became four years instead of two, and

governors received more time

in

which to return a
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bill

with recommendations The

governor thus acquired
greater

ability to act

administrative control in
executing
i

on a

legislative agenda,

and greater

it.

Further, the election
of 1960 demonstrated
that gubernatorial
politics had

developed a quite personal,
rather than

partisan, nature

Joseph Ward, the Democrat.c

candidate was his party’s
endorsee and called for
party unity. Not only
did he not receive
It,

losing in a state dominated
by Democrats, but

many

other

members of the

party

spurned htm as a result of
a nasty pnmaty battle
John Volpe, the Republican
candidate,
received h.s party's nomtnation
wtth out a struggle

htmself from

Though

,t,

parties

He

then went about disassociating

urgtng the .Massachusetts
electorate to “Vote the
man, vote Volpe '
still

dominated the General Court,
gubernatorial

politics

had developed a

personal flavor by the 1960s

This model of the executive
represents a bureaucratic or
managerial
culture

The focus

efficiently

is

Inclusion

on conducting government
is

based on professionalism,

than partisan affiliation

political

properly, meaning openly, honestly,
and
re. honesty,

Members of the government

openness and

ability,

rather

expect that voters will follow them

personally and that other officials will
advocate for their

own

constituents, while following

standards of honesty and efficiency.
Citizens expect that government will
address any
pressing public problem through proper
administration, and that government will be

conducted openly, honestly and

efficiently.

The Executive Cycles of Michael

Diilcalcis

Under current expectations of the
conception of the

office,

officeholder, employing the Progressive

Michael Dukakis experienced cycles of success and
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failure.*

Employing the Progressive conception
of politics, and
expenenced two cycles of victory
and defeat His
General Court

in the 1960's

and ended with

1978 Hts second cycle started
with

George Bush

loss to

first

especially of the executive,

cycle began with his
success in the

his defeat at the

his victory

over King

in the Presidential election

Dukakis

in

hands of Edward King

in

1982 and finished with

his

of 1988 Dukakis broke the
cycle with the

Gubernatorial election of 1986 These
cycles of victory and defeat,
and the breaking of the

second cycle, can be traced to Dukakis’s
conceptions of the executive
At the beginning of each cycle,
Dukakis was tremendously successful
support

He

possessed strong organizational

to be aggressive and productive at
raising

campaigner, he had

little

the incumbent, and thus

skills

money

his

An

active and effective grass-roots

campaign organizations proved

more

specifically,

guise ot the Progressive executive the popular
manager Dukakis

for a cleaner,

in his

was wrong with

trouble winning elections Dukakis
achieved his early

victories emphasizing the managerial
political culture and,

ranks of local politics

gamering

and

trouble convincing individuals that
something
little

at

hometow n of Brookline As

more responsive government, Dukakis

first

under the

shot through the

a reformer representing a desire

battled traditional Irish pols

whom

he

thought conducted government unprofessionally and
therefore irresponsibly. Dukakis
helped to bring together a group of individuals

who

sought to replace the dominant

partisan political culture with a managerial one.

During

his

experience in the General Court, Dukakis succeeded admirably

the Progressive mind

more

efficient

set.

He

in

using

sought procedural reforms that would allow for a cleaner,

government as well as reforms

that
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would strengthen

the governor. His

biggest success

came with the passage of
no-fault automobile

reform for the good of consumers

insurance, which he

rational solution to a
public problem,

maintained a firm dedication
to that solution and
successfully debated
legislator,

as a

in their battles
against powerftrl special
interests

Dukakis was successfol because
he had advocated a

General Court, As a

saw

Dukakis established

his focus

its

ments

in the

on matters of governmental

process and sought to convince
others of the nghtness of his
cause, regardless of the
political interests that

were

at stake.

He would

carry these attitudes into the
governor’s

office

From

early in his political career,
Dukakis’s ambition had directed

him toward the

governorship, which he saw as the office
truly representative of the
people’s

interests. In

the gubernatorial campaign of
1974, Dukakis further employed the
strategy he had been

using

all

along The message was that the
incumbent was not administenng the

government correctly Competence was

were rampant

If they

were cleaned

will,

embodied

in

against

Dukakis had been conducting throughout
that

competence

Bob Quinn

his career.

paralleled the political fight

Quinn represented the “old-boy

Dukakis saw as corrupt and as needing reform. Dukakis

into question

and lambasted the corruption and

represented. Voters could only expect

chair,

greater competence Only then could the

t.e.,

the executive, be carried out properly

The 1974 primary campaign

network”

supply while corruption and inefficiency

up, the candidate could introduce
neutral

professionalism and greater efficiency,

popular

in shot!

Dukakis told the

more of the same

electorate.
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if

called Quinn’s

inefficiency

Quinn were

Quinn

in the

governor’s

The general

election

campaign featured more
of the same from Dukakis.
Governor

Francis Sargent did not
focus heavily on the
administrat.ve aspects of the
offrce, and

spending

m state government

attributes

and based

him governor
and staunchly

He

hts

had spiraled upward
Dukakis took advantage of these

campaign on a prom.se

offered

management reforms

insisted that he

would not

for better

management

if

voters elected

as the solution to the state's
fiscal

raise taxes. This

.ncompetent Sargent worked, and
Dukakts began

h.s first

woes

campaign against the allegedly
term as governor

in

Januaty

1975

In h.s first

term as governor, Dukakis’s
conduct alienated many members
of the

General Court While he indicated
rhetorically that he understood
the importance of the
legislature,

Dukakis did not

He

act as if he did

handled

many

issues, taxation for

example,

with an arrogance that did not
endear him to legislators Dukakis
consistently relied solely

on

his

own

intelligence

and competence to

try to

push

his personal vision

through the

legislature This eventually resulted
in his simply presenting bills
to the legislature with
little

or no negotiation on their behalf Regarding
a court-reform

did not even contact Senate Judiciary

proposal

its

It

Committee Chairman

bill,

for example,

Dukakis

.lUan Sisitsky about the

only became law after Dukakis worked
more closely with legislators to ensure

passage. While legislators attempted to

work with him and

themselves spurned, and ultimately they rebuffed
Dukakis

support him, they found

in return.

Dukakis also alienated potential supporters because of his
administrative
His no-patronage appointments rule caused campaign
workers and

friends,

policies.

presumably

supporters, to be frozen out of potential administrative jobs. Instead,
Dukakis turned to

j

1

j

—

nd, .duals he

felt

could conduct adnti„stta.io„

,n

a profess, onal, open,
and efficient

with no appearance
of political .nfluence.
Even foe Grandma, son,

Ouhahts's successffil cantpa,„,
was not a

„e.her of the

who had

tun

ad.in.strat.on Ouhahts
sought

.0 g.ve hts adntin, Stratton,
patt.cularly his cab.net,
broad pohcy-.ah.ng
power, w.th the

ch.ef executive a. the
top of the Inerarchy,
and the legislature following
their lead This
lirther alienated

lawmakers when members of
the administrat.on
treated

legislators

poorly Conceivtng of the
elected execut.ve as a
public manager, as the
sole representative

of the public

will

with a duty to carry out
that will through
efficiently run programs,
made

maintaining institutional
support difficult

The

taxation issue

amply

illustrates

Dukakis's

institutional behavior during
his first

term Dukakis's campaign
promise not to raise taxes was
an important one

in voters'

minds, given Massachusetts's
high local property-tax
rates Rather, as a means
of

tmproving the

state's ternble fiscal condition,

Dukakis preferred

better

management and

cutting back of government
resources Initial efforts a,
persuasion by leaders of the

General Court were unsuccessftil
Once he had decided to

raise taxes,

to balk in his relations with the
legislature, delaying a speech
that

lawmakers by

raising public support for the tax
increase.

When

would have helped

Dukakis had come

with a rational plan and sought to
implement that plan, even
legislative relations

Dukakis continued

at the

into office

expense of good

he had no choice but to abandon that
plan, Dukakis

legislators arrogantly, so that his
political capital with

members of that body

still

fell

treated

heavily.

Despite Dukakis’s popularity with the electorate
even after he raised taxes, his

behavior was not

lost

on voters. There was

a general perception of Dukakis’s arrogance
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on

their part .^so, the
taxation issue

Proposit.on

.

3 in Califorma,

government d.d no, have to

came back

to haunt

Dukakis

after the passage

Voters saw that state
as an example of one
ratse taxes to

Massachusetts could not be run

,n the

tn

of

which the

conduct bus, ness and
wondered why

same manner Duhah.s scoffed

ciatmed that Massachusetts
citizens would never

fall

for

a,

the measure and

what he considered a

soluuon to a complex problem.
However, Dukakts mrsread the
public on

simplist.c

this issue,

and

they turned him out of
office.

The flaws

in this

approach became especially
apparent

after

the governor’s office for
a term and ran for reelection
Elecorally,

evaporated and he

lost the

1978 Democrat, pnmary
Dukakis
c

Dukakis had been

in

much of his support

lost for

many reasons

,n

1978, including voters’ percept,
ons of h,m as arrogant and the
tepid campatgn he ran

More

broadly, Dukakts’s use of the
popular-manager conception of the
executive did not

allow for shonng up and building
on immediate electoral support whtle
voters

may have agreed

in office

In 1974,

with Dukakts for various reasons
that Frank Sargent should
no

longer have held the Governor’s
office, Dukakis’s message of
costly inefficiency and

corruptton

not

enough

in

the state’s administration certainly
resonated with

to sustam a coalition

Those

individuals

they were against Sargent easily
deserted Dukakis
expectations, as he gave them

1978, he had lost

little

much support

who were

when he

many

for

in

Dukakis

failed to live

up

it

was

largely because

to their

substantive reason to remain supportive. Indeed,
by

that he

had carried

in

1974. Advocates of human services,

ethnic voters, and residents of cities
such as Pittsfield and Lowell,

had carried

voters, but

1974, voted against him in 1978.^
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all

of whom Dukakis

Edward
.he

more

J

Kmg, Dukakis’s opponent

,n the

trad.tiona, pol, a
partisan-admtnistrator

Dukakts had been battling
.he ieg.siat.ve

h.s entire career

1978 Democratic primary,
represented

mode, of the executwe,

Dunng

whom

agatnst

the primary h,ng
aligned htmself wtth

w.ng of the Democratic
pany, the wing of the
party Dukak.s had
spumed

King ran a campaign based
on substantive, as opposed

to procedural, issues,
thus

galvanizing groups Dukakis
had alienated King’s
stands on issues such as
taxation, the

death penalty and abortion
were opposed to Dukakis’s
and King combined these
stands

with an appeal to the business
community that Dukakis did not
possess. King’s stands

gave

won

v oters

something beyond an image of
competence on which they could
focus Kin»

the primary and ultimately
the general election,
promising that politics would be

conducted

in

a friendlier

manner than

Between 1978 and

it

had been under the Dukakis
administration.

his return to public life in
1982. three factors

Dukakis’s favor The nature of Edward
King’s governorship was the
contrast to Dukakis’s neutral
competence. King

managerial function of the governorship
his

own wing of the Democratic

more

partisan

party.

manner than Dukakis

be incompetent,

this reflected

first

In

in

marked

to grasp the intricacies of the

basing his appointments largely on
loyalty to

King attempted

had.

badly on

By

was unable

worked

When many

Kmg, and

to

conduct administration

in

a

of those appointments turned out to

his reputation as

an administrator

suffered as a result

The other two

factors

Harvard University and

working

his befriending

in

Dukakis’s favor were

John Sasso. His years

at

his teaching experiences at

Harvard helped push

Dukakis toward recognition of the legitimacy of other
points of view. Having
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to

work

w..h students, and be
evaluated by thetn, helped
open Dukakis's eyes to the
possibility that
there

were points of v.ew other
than

Sasso displayed what
Dukakis terms

groups

into a

reeiection

and

meaning&l
his

after running his

his

own

that he might

“political skills

coalition, that

an

Dukakis would

have wanted to consider,
John

ability to bring

together disparate

find vitally important
in his

second term Sasso would
eventually become Dukakis's
Chief Secretary

1982 gubernatorial campaign.

Dukakis and Edward King
squared off again
Dukakis once more ran as a
popular manager,

in

the 1982 Democratic
primary

pitting his

competence against JGng's

managerial weakness Competence
and integrity were Dukakis’s
central themes, while

King attempted to keep the election
focused on substantive issues
Again, King
agreed with

his stands for

penalty, and attempted to

voters

felt

lower taxes, a higher dnnking
age and institution of the death

move

the terms of debate in that
direction and

competence of the respective candidates
Given Dukakis's

away from

the

victory, the Progressive

conception of the executive seemed to
be most effective for winning
elections, especially
there

were an incumbent who was vulnerable
from an admimstrative standpoint, giving

the

challenger an opportunity to display his
managerial talents.

Dukakis thus capitalized on King’s shoddy
administrative record, and

manager defeated the

Dukakis went on to defeat Republican candidate handily
despite his presenting a

incompetence was

the popular

partisan administrator Despite a late surge
by King, Dukakis had

developed a strong, effective grassroots campaign
organization

more

in the

that rolled to victory.

general election. Thus,

issue-oriented program than Dukakis, King’s administrative

his undoing.

But administrative competence had not been enough
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for

if

Michael Dukakis after

his first

term

It

was necessary
necessan/

that
that h
he

ucombine
administrative

competence with a substantive
program of governance.

Ms

After

v,ctory in the ertise of a
popular manager,

1983, h,s conception of the

executive

He

govemorsMp took on

when Dukakis

entered office

in

the charactenst.es of a
constitutional

recogntzed, and acted upon,
the value of the other
branches of government

Regarding the General Court,
for example, Dukakis
was much more respect&l of
the
opinions of lawmakers than
he had been dunng

Ms

firs,

term, and

much more

willing to

bargain regarding legislation
Both the i^ght-to-Know and
Massachusetts Water

Resources Authority

manage

their

bills

affected

many

passage through the General Court
quite well

entorcement program, also indicated

and heed

legislative interests, yet

their advice

As a

that

RE

Dukakis was able to
A.P., a tax collection

Dukakis was more willing

result, legislators

to listen to legislators

were open to working with Dukakis
because

he was open to working with them.
Admimstratively, Dukakis lost his prior
aversion to patronage, and, as a
closer to his admimstration. His
administration, in turn,
legislature. In this term,

skills

Dukakis focused

rather than general competence.

his efforts

Too many

worked more

result,

closely with the

on obtaining appointees with

appointees

was

in his first

political

term had not

possessed appropriate public sector experience,
and Dukakis looked to correct what he

saw

as an important flaw.

Now, Dukakis

looked for appointees

acted upon, the value of working with other
law.

and

Here was a way

who

who

members of government

understood, and

in

implementing the

m which Dukakis could appoint individuals who had worked for him

agreed with him without seeming corrupt. Administrative competence
did not
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have to mean poHtical
neutrality Indeed,
competent admimstration, as
Dukakis had
discovered, often requ.red
effect, ve pol.t.cal
action, and he sought
appointees such as John

Sasso, Ira Jackson and Alden
Raine
Further, in his second term,

who

understood that

Dukakis presented a more
substantive program

regarding what government
should be doing and
that Dukakis's willingness
to

in

on

compromise with

focusing on building coalitions,
Dukakis

it

should be doing

it,

Cntics charged

legislators represented a selling
out, that,

was no longer

a leader Yet Dukakis stood firm

issues such as environmental
protection and affordable housing
and passed measures

such as the

MW

R A and

issues These measures

view

the Massachusetts Housing
Partnership to deal with those

were possible because Dukakis was now
taking other points of

into account rather than
attempting to act unilaterally to implement
policies If he

were indeed

selling out,

had accomplished

it

was

in his first

presenting

it

clearly

leading to greater, and

more

substantive, results than he

term

In the general election

all,

why

of 1986, Dukakis based

his

campaign on

his

program,

and openly to citizens The campaign had
a theme, ^opporturnty for

and Dukakis pressed that theme, while also
promoting discussion among members of

the electorate as he campaigned. Despite the
seemingly foregone conclusion of the
election,

and while the incumbent essentially ignored

his

opponent, Dukakis campaigned

vigorously to present both his record of achievement
and future proposals to

Massachusetts voters.
election in

He won

with the largest margin of victory

modern Massachusetts
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in

a gubernatorial

By

1988, Dukakis had decided
to

move on

to national politics
and he captured the

Democra.,c no^na.ion for the
Presidency, facing off
aga.ns, George Bush,
inhen.or of
the legacy of Ronald

Reagan Dukakis again based

his at
general election

campaign on the

Progressive conception of the
executive: The issue was
competence, not ideology.

Dukakis spent the

first

portion of the campaign railing
against what he saw as
the

administrative ineptitude of the

Reagan

adimnistration.

Because of the focus on

competence, Dukakis's never found
any sort of effective program
By
coherent theme or a compelling
and substantive vision, Dukakis

George Bush

to define the terms

left

failing to present a

the door open for

on which the election operated
Bush,

naturally,

presented the electorate with an
unflattering picture of Dukakis.
Dukakis
this portrayal

and misread the public, declaring,
incorrectly,

that

Bush’s

failed to react to

tactics

would be

ineffective.

Dukakis completed

his

second cycle with a defeat

at

Bush’s hands. The

Progressive conception of the executive,
which Dukakis had employed so effectively

in

electoral politics previously, failed
against a candidate associated with
a popular

incumbent

who

wielded a strong ideological message. As he
had

in

1978, Dukakis had

suffered defeat employing the Progressive
conception of the executive.

Michael Dukakis experienced cycles of victory and
defeat when he employed the
Progressive conception of the elected executive.
defeat an incumbent, but he

was unable

As

a challenger,

Dukakis managed to

to hold together any sort of long-term coalition of

support Both electorally and institutionally, using the Progressive
model of the elected
executive, Dukakis

left

himself nothing

in the

way of maintaining
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a solid base of support

for the institution

of a program, thus inhibiting

Dukakis was able to break the cycle

in

his efforts at providing leadership

Yet

1986 by becoming more of a constitutional

executive

Comparing

The important question
executive

is

th e

at this

Conceptions of the FxpmtivP
point

is

whether one of the three conceptions of the

better suited for reconciling the pressures
of the executive challenge than the

others are Given the pressures of being both a
political figure and a chief executive, can
a

governor or a president increase the chances of successful
leadership by choosing from

among

the constitutional executive, the partisan administrator
and the popular manager‘s

One

conclusion that this study demonstrates

is

the necessity that a chief executive

understand the nature of others conceptions of the executive office
and recognize the
legitimacy of competing political cultures."

As Benjamin

Butler,

James Michael Curley and

Michael Dukakis learned, timing and the appropriateness of a given course of action
do
matter

in

attempts

at exercising

executive leadership. Butler, employing essentially a

Progressive conception of the executive,

saw the

vast majority of his

parts of

it

was

reviled by partisan- oriented legislators and

program rejected by the General Court

would be implemented one year

despite the fact that

Curley served during the Great

later.

Depression and presided over a flood, emergencies that would seem tailor-made for the

emergence of a strong

figure. Yet, he, too,

over-emphasized the popular manager

midst of a more partisan-based government and

left

suffered a similar fate for similar reasons in 1978

office in disgrace as a result.

in the

Dukakis

Governors such as Caleb Strong,
Fredenc Greenhalge and Michael
Dukakis

in his

second term recognized the need
to conduct the
governorship with an eye on what
others
expected from the officeholder
Strong noted the anti-partisan
the failure of governors

who

ideal

of his

era,

witnessed

attached themselves to burgeoning
political parties, and

succeeded, as a constitutional
executive, by keeping himself
above the partisan fray
Frederic Greenhalge, while displaying
tendencies toward a popular-manager
conception of
the executive, kept these proclivities
largely in check.

By conducting

himself mainly as a

partisan admimstrator, Greenhalge
succeeded in a partisan political culture
Dukakis, in his

second term, recognized the potential
constitutional executive while

if

he conducted himself along the

lines

of a

acknowledging and respecting the more partisan
tendencies

of other members of the polity
Indeed, Dukakis’s successes in gubernatorial
elections
willing and able to

acknowledge and

act

Despite his anti-establishment campaign
regular

Dukakis

and

lost

reformer

on the legitimacy of competing
in

1974, Dukakis was

wings of the Democratic

because he had acted

in

together In 1982 and 1986, Dukakis

came when he was most

such a

was

way

still

political cultures.

able to unite the

party, if only for the election. In 1978,

as to prevent his bringing those factions

able to win back the support he had

lost,

and

flourished as a result. In the 1988 presidential campaign,
Dukakis

was

acknowledge a popular competing conception of the executive,

outgoing president

Ronald Reagan, and

lost as a result.

in

less willing to

Taking into account the legitimacy of other

conceptions of the executive and other

political cultures is

executive’s attempts to provide leadership.
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important

in

an elected

The Need

to

Eno ag;e

•Another

thesis, the

way of stating

this is to

ones most successful

members of the

political

at

note

that,

of the executives portrayed

providing leadership were able to engage other

system effectively, both

politically

and administratively.

Governors acting as partisan administrators and as
popular managers were

when

they did not engage other

governors

who

members of the system

their viewpoints into the discussion as vital

conceptions of the executive office and the various

compare

in a respectful

least successful

manner. The

acted as constitutional executives generally did engage
other

the political system in an effective manner, considering

working

in this

them

members of

as equally important and

and necessary

How

do the various

political cultures, as illustrated here,

in this regard'’

The

Partisan Administrator

of the limitations

in,

partisan because he

George Briggs

illustrates the potential for,

leadership by a partisan administrator Briggs

was

only the maintenance of his

own

viewpoints of members of other

in

in office,

Briggs urged not

party against faction, but also respect for the rights and

parties.

His party’s agenda, by association

Massachusetts allowing Briggs to claim success

so desired. Yet, Briggs’s desire not to alienate

to his avoiding stands

effective as a

able to join factions of his party His appropriateness as a

“compromise candidate” repeatedly won him election While

implementation

was

and some

members of either

on important issues and acting

in

his

in policy

own, saw

matters

if

he

party while in office led

what may be considered too

passive a manner on the issue of slavery, for example. The partisan administrator can lead

to the burying of important issues in a desire to maintain institutional harmony.
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The behavior of legislators
during
problems with a partisan

Coun would

act

political culture

the tenure of Benjamin
Butler illustrates further

As

noted, the Republican-dominated
General

on many of Democrat Butler’s
proposals

under Republican governors.
Admittedly, Butler acted

manner The Republicans

in

despite partisan differences

in

pitfalls

J

subsequent years, generally

a rather imperious and insulting

the legislature, however, could
have chosen to engage Butler,

They did

not, indicating the possibility

engage others on the part of these adherents
of a partisan

Edward

in

King, Michael Dukakis’s nemesis

in

of an unwillingness to

political culture

1978 and 1982,

of the panisan administrator regarding the
administrative

role

illustrates the

of the governor. In

1978, King campaigned with a substantive
agenda, and was successful against Dukakis’s

cool competence Voters reacted positively to
King’s stands on specific issues. The
presentation of a agenda based on substantive
issues, as opposed to an image campaign

based around the candidates’ characters and competence,
was effective for King. Yet,

once

in office,

governorship.

he proved himself inept

Many of King’s

at

handling the administrative aspects of the

appointments, based on

be incompetent. King evinced no

gift for

In aligning himself with his preferred

his partisan preferences,

proved to

recognizing different views and engaging them.

wing of the Democratic

partv,

by employing the

partisan-administrator conception of the office. King succeeded in alienating those

views did not match

his.

King may have presented an agenda

whose

as a partisan administrator,

but he could not demonstrate administrative competence given his use of patronage.

The Popular Manager. Despite James Michael
governor,

in his first

Curley’s ultimate failure as

year of office he was able to persuade the General Court to

324

implement
fatled

relief measures in the
face

because he cons.dered

of the Great Depression However,
Curley ultimately

h.s vision

of the popular

will the only legitimate
one.

Employing the Progressive conception
of the executive, Curley did not
mmntain a sense of
the legitimacy of other
constitutional institutions, he did
not engage others well, of at

all

Hts believing that the executive
alone represented what was good
for the people caused

him

to denigrate legislators

result, his

and

their place in

Massachusetts’s constitutional system As
a

second year as governor was an
unsuccessllil one, and he

In hts first term.

manager. Yet, he had

left

office in disgrace.

Michael Dukakis was able to project
an image of competence as a

failed politically

His competence and efforts

government had come without much of a substantive
agenda

at

reform of state

Further, Dukakis

unwilling to consider other points of view,
for example those of legislators,

implementing

his

was

in

reform agenda. Dukakis’s appointments, based
on a neutral

professionalism, alienated

many supporters who were

not given positions

in his

administration. Electorally, Dukakis misread the public
regarding issues such as taxes, and

he had no support

issues

more

left.

Ultimately, voters found

attractive than

Dukakis

s

displays

Ed King’s

presentation of substantive

of competence. Dukakis had

similar

experiences in the 1988 presidential campaign, in which focusing
on administrative

competence

at the

expense of a substantive agenda helped cost him the election by

allowing George Bush to define the terms of debate. Employing the popular-manager

conception of the executive, Dukakis had seemed competent as an executive, but was
unable to conduct the political aspects of the office effectively.

in

an effective manner
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He

did not engage others

Xhe

Constitutional Executive. During his second
gubernatorial term, Michael

Dukakis was able

to

overcome the flaws

in the

popular- manager conception of the

executive. Gaines and Segal note about
Dukakis’s second administration:

Dukakis’s intent was the same as

it

had been

administration, the creation of a reform

in the flrst

government

that

brokered the competing legitimate needs, requirements and demands of the people. This time,
however,
the debate about what was fair balance
would take place
fairly

within the administration, among advocates
closely associated with the various interests and in private —
not on the
floor of the House or Senate, or on the nightly

news broad-

casts and in the next day’s newspapers.

This

an accurate assessment as

is

far as

it

goes, but

it

misses the point that Dukakis was

able to do this within a fragmented institutional environment.
Dukakis needed the

cooperation of the General Court to accomphsh any agenda.
Accomphshing an agenda

made

it

easier for

Dukakis to

inspire voters

term, he demonstrated that he

of other

institutions

demonstrated a

where he was
reelection.

executive.

It

It

gift for effectively

able to implement a

was

just that he

that he

done so by becoming more of a
in

electorate.

involving

in

such a

During

his

members of other

way

During

his first

as to alienate

members

second term, he
institutions to the point

program of governance which helped him win

had brought pohcy capacity under the domain of the

had acted

Massachusetts community

attain electoral victory.

was capable of acting

and members of the

was not

and

in

such a

way

as to

make doing

so possible.

constitutional executive, by engaging

He had

members of the

discussion inclusively and effectively.

The executives presented

here have been most successful

when

they have acted to

spur debate and discussion, when they engage others most effectively. This
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is

the key

feature

of the constitutiona,
execuuve ntode, of executive

executive seeks to engage
ated this

dunng

members of a

all

his

the public

during his

seemed

constitutional polity. Dukakis,
for example,

a

much

greater percentage of
hts agenda than he
had

through the use of debate
and deliberation among

Whereas he had been seeimngly
first

term, he

was more open

to

indifferent to

As

a result, he

honed

his ability to

in his

and

institutions

second term. He

members of other

have policies

dunng

political instttutions

members of other

working with them

to understand the
potential inherent in involving

deliberation

wh.ch the

second gubematonal term,
when he accomplished much
of

.s environmental agenda,
and
h.s first term,

leadershrp,

institutions in

instituted that he advocated

as beneficial,

Dukakis also involved various
members of the public
degree Having representatives
of both labor and business

Right-to-Know

bill

was an example. He appeared

in policy

debates to a greater

at the table in negotiating
the

to recognize that he needed
to persuade

people of the value of his program
and present them with a substantive
they could grasp.

dissipate, as

Once he

did that, the public’s perception

evidence by a resounding reelection

If the elected executive

that officeholder

institutions.

public

good

As
IS

is

in

1986

vision,

something

of him as arrogant began

to

.

most successful when acting as

a catalyst for discussion,

must recognize the legitimacy and importance
of other

constitutional

the Declaration of Independence
reminds citizens and officeholders, the

embodied

in

legitimated by the people.

the government as a whole, provided that
the government

It is

is

the institutions established in the Massachusetts

Constitution taken together, not the office of the
governor alone, that represent the
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will

of

the Massachusetts public.

him

As Alden Raine

10 receive the greatest
share

Dukakts

at ,h.s

pent was

astute

notes, Dukakis’s position as

of the credit for passage of
the ngh,-to-know

enough to reahze

deliberations, otherwise
political cred.t with

that

IS

is

embodied

in

b,ll.

Yet,

he needed to include legislators

members of the General Court would
be

and accomplishing any future
projects would be that much
more

government

Governor allowed

a single officeholder in the

difficult.

mind of the

Even

in

thin

if the

public, that officeholder

nonetheless part of a constitutional
system. Other institutions are as
legitimate and

important to that system as he

Dukakis seemed

is,

and he must recognize that

to recognize this

by

administration, he had been least
successful

ot other institutions,

success he did have

when he

second administration. During

when he was most

his first

arrogant toward

members

failed to give sufficient justification
for his proposals.

came when he both recogmzed

and acted on

its

including the

members of the General Coun

come

his

fact.

the importance of the General Court

legitimacy as a part of the policy process.

to understand the importance

The

By

in discussions

of other constitutional

his

second term, he was

over policy proposals.

He had

institutions.

Indeed, Dukakis went so far as to insist that his
administrative appointees have a
similar understanding, that they possess
“political skills.” This

capability to deal effectively with

Inherent in this

on the
During

that

part

is

members of other

meant a willingness and a

institutions in the policy process.

the notion that administration of the law requires astute
political action

of public administrators, Dukakis’s experiences with the budget

his first term,

Dukakis handled the budget

bespoke an unwillingness to negotiate with
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illustrate this.

issue, specifically taxation, in a

legislators

and

treat

them

manner

as equals.

By

his

second administration, through
passage of the

REAP

budget (Broadly speaking, he
executed the law.)

program, Dukakis dealt with the

in a politically

capable manner, that took

account of the interests and
concerns of members of other
governmental
Political

institutions

and administrative effectiveness
had come to be linked for
Dukakis. This

understanding on the pan of his
administration led to

hts

acWeving much greater

effectiveness as a chief executive
during his second gubernatorial
term

The Necessity of a
As

a

Vi<;inn

means of motivating and guiding

discussion, as a context for the
reasons

behind a given policy, and as a
means of avoiding the

pitfalls

of neutrality seen

in the

popular manager, the constitutional
executive must present a vision. Michael
Genovese
notes that

“A

vision

is

an idea, a dream of the future, a dream
that

appear attainable, different enough to

inspire, attractive

commitment.”^ Genovese’s

of a vision

however Part of the

definition

project here

Part of that definition

America

more

or,

generally,

is

is

is

rather

to give “vision” a

certainly, as

enough

is

it

community
This

set the

is

imprecise,

normative

is

meaning of

in that

it

offers

normative

in

one

two

requires offering a definition of a community, of what that
community

should and should not be. Second,
that

to

specific, detailed definition.

later indicates, the

of a community.® .Any vision

enough

to gain consent and

course of action over another The meaning of “vision”
offered here
senses First,

realistic

amorphous and

more

Genovese

is

in

it

necessitates defining the government’s role within

terms of what the government should and should not be doing.

not solely agenda setting.

agenda for the government

is

To

limited.

a certain extent the

power of the executive

Dukakis became aware of this when he
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to

mhented

a

huge budget

deficit at the

beg.nmng of his

Rtght-to-Know issue became a
necessity
Court had passed

its

own

tn

first

Dukakis’s second term only after
the General

version of that law The
power to set a governmental agenda

depends on many factors including
the tmportance of an
tn the debate.

most other

A massive budget

issues in a State in

Court passes a

bill

term. Similarly, acting on
the

deficit, for

example,

which budget

issue

and an indivtdual's position

going to be more important than

is

deficits are unconstitutional.
If the General

and that becomes public knowledge,

that issue

may become

part of the

agenda despite the wishes of the
Governor Despite the importance of
setting an agenda,
the executive

must

Though

It

realize he

is

cannot always do so to the

fullest extent desirable.

not limited to agenda-setting, a
vision certainly involves establishing

some son of program

If that ability is incomplete,
as

,t

must

be, then vision involves

defining and interpreting. Defining
problems or areas of interest within a
community are of

course important aspects of providing a
vision." The important follow-up
areas are important and

why

beyond an abstract public
the “interpreter-in-chief ”*

community and

his

is

why

these

the government should or should not
address these issues,

interest. Also, as

He must

Maty Stuckey

interpret

what occurs

has pointed out, the executive

in light

is

of his ideas of a proper

notion of what government should and should not
do.

This definition of vision also involves a recognition
of the necessity of institutional

debate and deliberation, even within

its

presentation by the executive. Indeed, presentation

of a vision on the part of a president or a governor can
politics

instigate

and promote

institutional

In the managerial political culture, under the Progressive notion of
the executive,

the public

manager merely has to manage

as a mediator
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among

different interests. Further,

when
The

the executive does present
a program,

it is

alone representative of the
public good

constitutional executive does
not remain neutral, and

would give members of the

other institutions something
to consider and something
to which they can respond,
while
at

the

same

time, the executive considers
their responses as legitimate
and important.

This defimtion of “vision”
connects directly to the notion
of a constitutional leader

The

constitution embodies the

constitutionally

is

is still

be.

Massachusetts

interpretable."

of Massachusetts as a

of vision to a

much

that direction are

second term

He

in politics to the

which

it

community

is

embodied

The meaning of the
is

far

from

settled

it

comes

to

is

meamng

in offering this sort

term. His vision of

affordable housing,” and his proposals

in his

turned from a focus on the character and
competence of the participants

meaning of the Massachusetts community. He proposed

led discussions,

One purpose of a

both

is

one sense

in

is

into his notion

fit

institutional

constitutional leader

meaning of the community. This
here

constitution, and thus the

first

it

and that

examples of the substantive concerns that Dukakis
employed

community and he

policies

in its constitution,

Dukakis engaged

such as the Massachusetts Housing Partnership, which
as a

created.^ Thus, any effort to lead

is

greater extent his second term than he
did his

Massachusetts as “number one when

m

for

going to involve defimng that
community, creating a vison of what

should and should not
constitution

community

specific policies,

of Massachusetts

and public, regarding those

to engage a substantive debate over the

which the

definition

of “vision” offered

normative.

This model of an executive vision

constitution instructs

is

also normative in the institutional sense.

members of the government

not merely

how

A

they should conduct

themselves procedurally, but also
as to what government
as an entity should and should
not do Constitutional leadership

is

therefore institutionally
normative leadership

It

involves directly addressing
questions of what the government
should and should not do,

guided by the framework of the law
embodied

however, constitutions are negative
They

member of the

polity

in the constitution.

limit

Predominantly,

governmental power Therefore,

if

a

proposes that the government should
undenake an action, the most

important question should be

“Why-

pamcipants to give reasons for

This can ensure effective debate by
forcing

their proposals, to

which other members of the

political

polity can

respond

Under the Progressive notion of executive,
there

is little

as evidenced by Dukakis’s

first

term,

opportunity for the giving of reasons for what
the government should do

because the focus
the government

is

is

on how the government should conduct

itself If the

focus

is

on how

conducted, openly and efficiently for example, the
issues Q^what the

government should do and, more importantly, why

it

should do

it,

along with the giving of

reasons behind proposals, become less central. Under
the constitutional executive, the

main question

shifts

from

how

the government

accomplish something to whether
should do

this sort

should undertake an enterprise

of politics, the potential for stalemate

that institutional

how

at all,

it

is

and

to

why

it

certainly exists.

Genovese

deadlock and advocates the executive’s use of a vision to help

break the deadlock which he claims

hesitant

to conduct itself or

so.

Under

bemoans

it

is

is

so perilous for American government." Yet,

government may not be as threatening
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as

many

observers believe. If institutions

are frozen, their

pursue

,n

members can be forced

to give reasons for the
policies they wish to

order to work out some policy
to address a given concern
As Dukakis indicates

about the Right-to-Know

bill,

he became

far

more aware of management’s

representatives of business gave him
reasons against the policy

nobody wants

to poison workers, so that

This giving of reasons

is

bill

Whereas
moral issues,

of compromise needed

discussion regarding

why

to be reached

policies such as the

should be passed.

politics in the Progressive sense involves
appeals to the

politics in the constitutional political culture
involves

constitutional institutions giving reasons

project Morality

notes, however,

through administration. Dukakis saw his
greatest

when he encouraged debate and

R-ight-to-Know

sort

when

the starting point for the working
out of public issues through

institutional politics rather than

successes

some

As he

position,

comes through

why

the

people on great

members of the

government should undertake a given

the interaction of

members of political

institutions rather

than directly from the popular will If both constitutional leadership
and popular leadership
are moral leadership, the morality for each has a different source,
and a different shape.

Popular leadership uses the
negative,

if

it

limits

will

of the people as

its’

sole justification. If the constitution

is

government, specific reasons must be given as to why the government

should be undertaking proposed policies. Morality thus arises not from the people
but from the interaction of institutions. The public

good

is

directly,

not an abstraction represented

by the executive, but something which emerges from the constitutional process.
Michael Dukakis’s career

problems through a

illustrates this well

rational, efficient administration,

When
he

he sought to address public

faltered.

His abstract notion of the

public good, which

led to charges

was

often disconnected from
what

of arrogance,

left

him

politically

much of the

weak and

public actually favored,

cost him an election.

When

he

allowed for the legitimacy of other
members of the government and the
public, when he
allowed policies to be shaped through
the interaction of members
of the polity within
political institutions,

he was markedly more successful.

Conclusion
Institutionally, the notion

executive greater latitude

in

of the constitutional executive would
allow the elected

moving

a

program through the

legislature.

As Michael

Dukakis’s career proved, legislators are
more conducive to considenng a program

members of the executive branch show them some

if

respect. If the executive has something

to present to the legislature, he can
act as the starting point for discussion
and debate

program must allow room
executiv e

politics

power

is

for discussion and debate,

that the holder

remembering

of the office can become the

If the executive maintains the discussion

and

willing to

that the importance

of

catalyst for institutional

treats legislators as legitimate

participants, rather than as individuals frustrating
the will

more

The

of the people, they

engage the executive’s plan and follow up on

it

will

be

far

as a result.

Administratively, acting as a constitutional executive allows
appointments that can

be

politically intelligent,

without appearing to be exclusive or corrupt. Part of Dukakis’s

concern with appointments, especially

in his first

term,

was

the propriety of appointing

individuals personally close to the newly elected executive. In his

Dukakis carried neutrality to the point where having a
nearly guaranteed that an appointment

administration,

relationship with the

would not be forthcoming.
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first

Governor

In his second term,

by

ensuring

political skills”

on the part of his appointees,
Dukakis found a means of making

appointments that rewarded those

who

agreed with him or were close to him,
without

appearing corrupt or exclusive If
the executive bases his program
on an interpretation of
the constitutional

community and

interpretations of which activities

government should

undertake, this allows a broad
agreement on the part of which seems far
more noble than

simple partisan affiliation or personal
association as a basis of appointment
If the

executive bases his administration on
the notion of promoting conversation
within and

about

his vision,

admimstrative appointments can be justified
as able to contnbute to that

discussion, whether they are close to the
executive personally or not.
ability to

engage others, what Dukakis

called “political skills,”

on the

administrators can help ensure their effectiveness
and relevance
Electorally, acting as a constitutional executive

Looking

for the

part of

in that discussion.

would give the candidate both

a

strong platform and a record on which to run.
Presenting a vision can capture people’s

imaginations and their votes If the executive has an easier
time moving an agenda through
the legislature, he has something substantial

on which

to base his

campaign afterward.

Thus, as Michael Dukakis demonstrated, the executive can break
the Progressive cycle

through the use of the constitutional model of the executive.

By

including others in a

discussion of the public good, the executive can take greater account of their needs
and
desires.

Rather than a record of limited substance, rather than misreading a

rather than alienating

public and

members of other

members of the

institutions, the executive

legislature with a

public,

and

can present both the

program of reasonable substance and

inspire

confidence rather than lose respect Indeed, Dukakis’s second term combined with the
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g^bematonai election of 1986
dentonstrate

become

less

of a

strain

on the executive

manner Granted, Dukakts had

fallen

tha,

,t

,s

possible that electoral politics

if .nstitutional
polit.cs

are conducted

when both

electoral

and

.nstitutional politics

with equal vigor, the constitutional
model of the executive lends
successfitl

a certain

out of favor by the next
gubematonal election, but

1986 was as non-competit.ve
an election as Massachusetts
has seen
electoral era In a time

in

may

in the

modern

must be conducted

itself to the

combination of these and to the
most effective efforts toward

most

fruitful

executive

leadership

The partisan-administrator model
of the elected executive produces
administratively

weak

executives and appears corrupt
by excluding those of other parties,

or those individuals not exactly
in line with the views of
the party

demonstrated

this in

Massachusetts

manager model produces an

during his gubernatorial term. The public-

isolated executive

substantial guaranteed support

Butler,

politics

Edward King

who seems

when attempting

powerful, but has

little

to institute a program, as Benjamin

James Michael Curley and Michael Dukakis

all

demonstrated. The constitutional-

executive model corrects for these defects by
restoring awareness of both the limitations

and the

possibilities

of the elected executive. The executive can seem

at

once panisan,

in

the broad sense of presenting a program or
a vision, and inclusive, by recognizing the
necessity for inter-institutional and popular discussion
within that vision. At the same time,
the executive can

seem powerful by

virtue

of being able to carry out a program and by

relating himself to a constitution, thus recognizing,
and

limitations surrounding that document.
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making use

of, the possibilities

and

Michael Dukakis
so poorly during his

legislator,

D

who met

He

he treated

“Why

m Florida

members of the General Court

did Michael Dukakis, a four-term state

does not have a specific answer. Rather, he

with the same trouble:

Robert Graham

we

why

term as governor;

first

place where, by God,

seem

puzzles over

ignore the legislature^”^^

other governors

Georgia,

still

Bill

Clinton in .Arkansas,

Dukakis muses, “Do

can get things done'’”*'

Too

we

think

,

Jimmy Carter

finally

work has

attributed that frame of

dominant conception of the executive
office as a constitutional executive,

in .America,

we’re

mind

in

when

in

is

Dukakis’s case to the

the public manager.

by stressing a constitutional

By

conducting the

political culture rather

the latter conceptions of the executive office
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in a

that

than a group-based or a managerial one, the president
or the governor can begin to

overcome problems inherent

in

often, .American elected executives

to think that they are, ex officio, in
a position to accomplish something

not the case This

lists

Notes

in

Stephen Skowronek has proposed a similar set of cycles regarding the presidency
The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership From John Adams to George Bush

(Cambridge: Belknap, 1993). The cycles noted here are not meant to parallel
Skowronek’ s. Nor is this to suggest that every chief executive who employs the
Progressive conception of the office must necessarily go through these cycles. It
to note that

^

Robert

Dukakis

In fact

Dukakis only won nine

L. Turner,

is

simply

did.

Dukakis:

cities in

1978 and

An American Odyssey

lost thirty.

Charles Kenney and

(Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1988), pp.

133-134.

Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership from
Lincoln: A Cultural Theory (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1989) make the

Richard

’

Washington
argument

to

Ellis

and Aaron Wildavsky

that Presidents

political cultures

must balance

than this

work

in

political cultures,

though using a

different set

of

does.

‘‘Games And Segal, p 218
For an incisive critique of the model of public administration Dukakis followed

’

term, see John

his first

A

Rohr, To

Run a

in

Constitution: The Legitimacy of the

Administrative State (Lawrence; University Press of Kansas, 1986).
^

System

Michael Genovese, The Presidential Dilemma: Leadership

(New

in the

American

York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 60.

^Genovese, pp 59-60.
**

Genovese,

p. 60.

'^Mary E. Stuckey, The President as Interpreter-in-Chief (Chatham,

Chatham House,

Jersey:

1991).

Graham Walker, “The
Moral Imperative,”
" Dennis

New

J.

Polity’

Constitutional

XXVI

(fall

1993):

Good; Constitutionalism’s Equivocal

p.

96.

Goldford, “The Political Character of Constitutional Interpretation,”

Polity XXIII (winter 1990): pp. 255-281,

Genovese,

Four Party

pp. 15-21;

Politics in

James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy:

America (Englewood

Cliffs:

Prentice Hall, 1963).

'^Michael Dukakis, interview by author, Boston,

338

MA, 27

September 1996.
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